<h4><em>Under review</em></h4>
<p>In the United States, environmental law has <a href="#evolution-environmental-law-policy">evolved</a> into a combination of federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and policies. Environmental laws include <a href="#international-environmental-law">international treaties</a> as well as statutory law made by <a href="#role-of-congress">Congress</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_3"></a&gt;, <a href="#role-of-states-and-tribes">state legislators, and tribes</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_4"></a&gt;, administrative regulations promulgated by state and <a href="#role-of-federal-agencies">federal government agencies</a>, <a href="#local-environmental-law">local ordinances</a> created by municipal bodies and case law created by <a href="#role-of-courts">judges</a> deciding legal disputes. These environmental laws create a complex and interconnected web of rules intended to protect the environment and public health.</p>
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<p>For a discussion of how environmental professionals work, watch a recent ELI seminar on <a href="http://www.eli.org/summer-school-introduction-careers-environmental-law… Introduction to Careers in Environmetnal Law and Policy</a>.</p>
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<h3><a name="evolution-environmental-law-policy"></a>Evolution of Environmental Law and Policy</h3>
<h5>Common Law Origins</h5>
<p>The <a href="#" title="For a thorough discussion of the history of environmental law, see Law of Environmental Protection chs. 1-9.">roots of environmental law</a> in the United States can be found in our common law tradition. Common law is a body of judicially-created law that has developed over time through court decisions issued to resolve lawsuits brought by parties in conflict. The common law system is based on a respect for precedent that requires courts to render new decisions in conformance with past decisions. This respect for prior case law provides consistency and predictability in the law.</p>
<p>Environmental law largely grew from the common law doctrines of public nuisance and the public trust doctrine. <a href="http://www.nuisancelaw.com/learn/historical#ELM&quot; target="_blank">Public nuisance law</a> protects public safety and welfare by placing restrictions on uses of and activities permitted on private land. The public trust doctrine established the cultural and legal understanding that certain natural resources should be reserved for public use and the common welfare. This doctrine has been used to<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/161/519/case.html&quot; title="Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)."> ensure access to navigable waters</a> for all citizens, conserve federal lands for uses compatible with the public interest, and to protect wildlife for the public benefit. While both the law of <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131206110455/http://nuisancelaw.com/sites…; target="_blank">public nuisance</a> and the <a href="http://lawschool.unm.edu/nrj/volumes/51/1/35-94.pdf&quot; target="_blank">public trust doctrine</a> are still used as tools in modern environmental litigation, in most areas, early common law doctrines have been supplanted by enforcement efforts under our complex regulatory system of state, federal and local laws passed by legislators. Statutory law passed by legislative bodies usually <a href="#" title="For example, the Supreme Court found that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law claims for climate change damages in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut: “’[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law,’ the Court has explained, ‘the need for such an unusual exercise of law-making by federal courts disappears.’ Milwaukee II, 451 U. S., at 314 (holding that amendments to the Clean Water Act displaced the nuisance claim recognized in Milwaukee I).” See generally AEP. v. Connecticut—Global Warming Litigation and Beyond.">displaces</a> common law.</p>
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<p>For a discussion of displacement of common law and the use of nuisance in climate change cases, listen to and download materials from the ELI seminar <a href="http://www.eli.org/Seminars/past_event.cfm?eventid=609"><em>American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut</em>: The Next Landmark Supreme Court Climate Case</a>. These issues are also discussed in the following ELR articles: Kevin Gaynor, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10845/challenges-plaintiffs-face-litig… Plaintiffs Face in Litigating Federal Common-Law Climate Change Claims</a>.</p>
<p>A series of cases filed in all 50 states seeks to use the public trust doctrine to force action on climate change, for example. See also <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/creative-common-law-strategies-for-p… Common Law Strategies for Protecting the Environment</a> edited by Cliff Rechtschaffen and Denise Antolini for a discussion of innovative ways to use common law to address environmental issues.</p>
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<h5>The Beginnings of Modern Environmental Law</h5>
<p>The origins of our current system of environmental laws can be traced back to the mid-1800s when the federal government first began to take steps to protect, catalogue, and regulate the natural environment. The Department of the Interior was founded in 1849 and tasked with the management of federally owned lands and the creation of geological surveys of the western territories. Yellowstone was established as the <a href="http://www.nps.gov/yell/naturescience/index.htm&quot; target="_blank">first National Park</a> in 1872. The first federal environmental statute, the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/33/407">Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act</a> was passed in 1899.</p>
<p>Environmental law and policy began to gain momentum under President Theodore Roosevelt. The first <a href="http://www.fws.gov/refuges/">National Wildlife Refuge</a> was established at <a href="http://www.fws.gov/pelicanisland/&quot; target="_blank">Pelican Island, Florida</a> in 1903. The <a href="http://www.doi.gov/whoweare/history.cfm&quot; target="_blank">National Park Service</a> was created within the Dept. of the Interior in 1916. During the Great Depression, a work relief program called the <a href="http://www.ccclegacy.org/&quot; target="_blank">Civilian Conservation Corps</a> provided federal funding for projects focused on conservation and development of federally owned agricultural and park lands. The focus of environmental laws passed during the first century of environmental law focused primarily on the conservation of natural resources.</p>
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<p>For a timeline of environmental protection efforts, see <a href="http://www.factmonster.com/spot/earthdaytimeline.html">http://www.factm…;
<p>A good list of environmental laws organized by date of passage is available here <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_major_U.S._environmental_and_o…; &nbsp;and a history of environmental policy is available here <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_policy_of_the_United_States"…;
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<h5>The Rise of Modern Environmental Law and Policy</h5>
<p>Historically, most pollution control concerns had been left to the states to resolve -- air and water pollution were largely seen as subject to the states’ <a href="#" title="According to Black’s Law Dictionary, police power “is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, security, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government.”">police powers</a>. As a result of rapid economic and technology growth, the federal government began to address pollution control after World War II. In 1948, the first federal law addressing water pollution, the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/33/chapter-26">Federal Water Pollution Control Act</a>, was passed. Then, in 1955, the<a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-69/pdf/STATUTE-69-Pg322.pdf"&gt; Air Pollution Control Act</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_21"></a&gt; was passed as the first federal air pollution law. A growing public awareness of pollution’s impact on public health and the environment in the 1960s led to the strengthening of federal pollution control laws in the 1970s, when for the first time the federal government was given the leading role in pollution control.</p>
<p>President Richard Nixon <a href="http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/epa/15c.html&quot; target="_blank">created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)</a> in 1970 through a <a href="http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/org/origins/reorg.html">Reorganizat… Plan</a>. This signaled a boom in environmental law reform during the1960s -1980s which resulted in passage of the majority of our current federal environmental statutes including <a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/keywords/natural-resources#national-environ…;, the <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/air-1">Clean Water Act</a>, the <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/air-1">Clean Air Act</a>, and <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/waste-0#CERCLA">CERCLA</a&gt;, to name a few.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The history of modern environmental policy is told in Richard Lazarus’ “The Making of Environmental Law,” <a href="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo3629140.html">…;, and Richard Lazarus and Oliver Houck’s “Environmental Law Stories,”&nbsp;<a href="http://store.westacademic.com/s.nl/it.A/id.1789/.f">http://store.westac…;
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<h3><a name="role-of-congress"></a>The Role of Congress</h3>
<p>The U.S. Constitution does not directly empower Congress to govern environmental issues. Congress’s authority to enact laws regulating the environment instead derives primarily from the Commerce Clause, found in Article I § 8 of the <a href="#" title="The Congress shall have Power …To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes…">U.S. Constitution</a>. The Commerce Clause reserves to the federal government the right to regulate interstate commerce – or commerce between states. There is a constant tension between state and federal power when Congress uses its authority under the Commerce Clause. Cases testing the definition of interstate commerce and exploring the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080705051224/http://www.endangeredlaws.or… of federal power under the Commerce Clause</a> have been extensively litigated throughout our history continuing up to the present day. For example, the extent of federal power over surface water pollution is currently in dispute and quite unclear. Similarly, several cases have addressed whether the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) can govern species found only in one place, although all courts to date have found that it can.</p>
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<p>The evolving understanding of the limit of federal jurisdiction over water pollution is putting wetlands and other valuable resources at risk, according to an <a href="http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=11416&amp;topic=Wetlands"… report</a>. The interplay between the Clean Water Act and the Constitution is discussed in Robin Kundis Craig, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/clean-water-act-and-the-constitution… Clean Water Act and the Constitution, 2d ed</a>. For a discussion of the seminal Rapanos decision, see William Want, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/36/10214/us-supreme-court-review-rapanos-…. Supreme Court Review of “Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers”: Implications for Wetlands and Interstate Commerce</a>&nbsp; and Calvert Chipchase, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/33/10775/clean-water-act-whats-commerce-g… Clean Water Act: What’s Commerce Got to Do With It</a>.</p>
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<p>In addition to its power under the Commerce Clause, Congress also has authority over environmental law and policy through its constitutional <a href="#" title="The Congress shall have Power … to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States…">spending</a> and <a href="#" title="[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur….">treaty</a> powers. In the division of powers between the three branches of the federal government, Congress holds the power of the purse. Using this power, Congress can offer states incentives to enact environmentally friendly provisions and <a href="#" title="The Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius No. 11-393 (June 28, 2012) calls into question the scope of Congress’ power to withhold existing funding to states.">withhold funding</a> when states act in environmentally irresponsible ways. The federal government can also regulate migratory species and other environmental issues using its exclusive right under the Constitution to enter international treaties.</p>
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<p>For a discussion of the current state of Commerce Clause and spending powers jurisprudence in relation to environmental law, as well as a discussion of Congress’ power to withhold funding from the states, listen to a recent ELI teleconference <a href="http://www.eli.org/Seminars/past_event.cfm?eventid=660">What Does the Healthcare Ruling Mean for Environmental Law</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="role-of-federal-agencies"></a>The Role of Federal Agencies</h3>
<p>Federal agencies are responsible for implementing and enforcing federal environmental laws. The <a href="http://www.epa.gov">EPA</a&gt; is responsible for the preponderance of federal environmental regulatory and enforcement activities. The Department of the Interior implements and enforces most natural resource laws, while the Departments of <a href="http://www.commerce.gov/">Commerce</a&gt;, <a href="http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome">Agriculture </a>and <a href="http://www.justice.gov/">Justice </a>and the<a href="http://www.usace.army.mil/"&gt; Army Corps of Engineers</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_29"></a&gt; also play important roles.</p>
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<p>For a discussion of administrative law generally, see <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_law&quot; target="_blank">http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_law</a&gt;. For a discussion of how to research administrative law generally, see <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/help/administrative.php&quot; target="_blank">http://www.loc.gov/law/help/administrative.php</a>.</p&gt;
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<p>The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) created the <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/&quot; target="_blank">Council on Environmental Quality</a> (CEQ). The CEQ is the first and only cabinet-level council of environmental advisors to the President. The CEQ is responsible for promulgating regulations under NEPA and mediating disputes between agencies regarding the sufficiency of NEPA compliance efforts and other environmental matters.</p>
<p>When empowered to implement a statute, agencies promulgate regulations, which appear in the <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionCfr.action?collectionCode=CFR…; target="_blank">Code of Federal Regulations</a>. In addition to promulgating regulations, federal agencies are responsible for enforcement of environmental laws using civil enforcement, criminal enforcement, and compliance assurance activities.</p>
<p>The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is an important procedural statute that helps to enforce environmental laws and regulations. The <a href="http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/apa.html&quot; target="_blank">APA</a> establishes the procedural framework for agencies to make decisions, such as provisions requiring agencies to seek public comment during the decision-making process. The APA also establishes a framework for <a href="#role-of-courts">judicial review</a> over agency actions. For example, after an agency has promulgated a regulation, persons affected by the regulation can seek judicial review to ensure the agency’s rules are consistent with the law and are not arbitrary or capricious.</p>
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<p>The process for an agency to promulgate a rule or regulation can be quite complex and can involve many layers of review within the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches. A Congressional Research Service report provides a good overview of this process here. <a href="http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20120422_RL32240.pdf&quot; target="_blank">http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20120422_RL32240.pdf</a&gt;. Another CRS report addresses the rulemaking process and judicial review here <a href="http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRSrulemakingCB.pdf&qu…; target="_blank">http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRSrulemakingCB.pdf</a…;
<p>A key component in administrative law is the requirement that agencies propose actions for public notice and comment and respond to the comments before taking final action. This helps to ensure that agencies take well-informed actions and that the public’s views are taken into account. An excellent guide to commenting on agency actions is available in Elizabeth Mullins, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/art-of-commenting%3A-how-to-influenc… Art of Commenting: How to Influence Agency Actions with Effective Comments</a>. For a discussion of the important role the National Environmental Policy Act has played in ensuring citizen involvement in government decisionmaking, see <a href="http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=11405&amp;topic=NEPA">NEPA Success Stories: Celebrating 40 Years of Transparency and Open Government</a>.</p>
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<h3><a name="role-of-courts"></a>The Role of Courts</h3>
<p>Where congressional legislation and agency regulation end, litigation in the courts begins. When a case is filed alleging a violation of a federal environmental law, it usually is filed in the district court located where the alleged violation occurred. In some environmental lawsuits, called “<a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Fed…; target="_blank">judicial review</a>,” disagreement is over whether federal regulations are consistent with statutory requirements and whether federal agencies are acting within the limits of the law. To resolve these conflicts, interested parties such as NGOs, corporate interests, and private individuals file lawsuits in federal court. In such cases, initial review of the agency action often begins directly at the appellate level in the <a href="http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf//content/home+page#&quot; target="_blank">United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_35"></a&gt;. As a result, the D.C. Circuit is one of the busiest, and arguably most influential, federal appellate courts in the country on environmental regulatory matters.</p>
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<p>A good overview of the federal court system is provided here <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federal_courts&quot; target="_blank">http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federal_courts</a>.</p&gt;
<p>Judge Douglas Ginsburg, a long-time judge on the D.C. Circuit, describes the court’s role in administrative law in a 2011 speech here <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjlpp/upload/zs80…;
</blockquote>
<h5><a name="standing"></a>Standing to Sue</h5>
<p>Before a case will be heard in court, a plaintiff must demonstrate <a href="http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title4/civ0003… to sue</a>. This is because Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to actual “cases or controversies” that arise between adverse parties. The U.S. Supreme Court has outlined three requirements that must be met by a petitioner to establish Article III standing: (1) injury directly suffered by the petitioner (2) that is caused by the conduct petitioner complained of and (3) that is redressable by a favorable court decision. This seemingly straightforward standing test has become a contentious issue in environmental lawsuits where courts have been faced with the question – who has standing to complain about air pollution or harm to endangered species?</p>
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<p>Two ELI seminars on standing issues, one <a href="http://www.eli.org/events/access-courts-after-massachusetts-v-epa-who-h… and <a href="http://www.eli.org/events/access-courts-after-massachusetts-v-epa-who-w…; the <em>Massachusetts v. EPA</em> decision, offer a discussion of and insights into the standing issues.</p>
<p>To better understand the jurisdiction of federal courts, read this <a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jur…; target="_blank">http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jur…;
</blockquote>
<h5><a name="citizen-suits"></a>Citizen Suits</h5>
<p>Many federal environmental laws allow concerned citizens to sue and enforce environmental protections by empowering citizens to act as “private attorneys general” to protect natural resources. These “citizen suits” are somewhat unique to environmental laws. For example, under the Clean Water Act, a citizen who enjoys recreational activities in a local river would be able to sue a polluter who is illegally dumping into the river if the local, state or federal agency had not sought to end the dumping. They have been somewhat controversial, with accusations of people suing just to recuperate attorneys fees, but others believe they serve a useful check on agency inaction (See <em>ELR</em> articles <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/33/10704/now-more-ever-environmental-citi…;, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/33/10721/environmental-citizen-suits-thir…;, and <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/16/10162/citizen-suits-defense-perspectiv…; for three different perspectives).</p>
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<p>For an understanding on how to bring citizen suits, see <a href="http://www.eli.org/research-report/citizens-guide-using-federal-environ… Citizen’s Guide to Using Federal Environmental Laws to Secure Environmental Justice</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="role-of-states-and-tribes"></a>The Role of the States and Tribes</h3>
<p>States remain primarily responsible for implementing pollution control requirements. In establishing the EPA and passing the new federal environmental protection statutes, Congress relied on the model of cooperative <a href="http://www.cliffsnotes.com/more-subjects/american-government/federalism…; title="See this page for a discussion of types of federalism.">federalism</a>. Under cooperative federalism, states are asked to implement and enforce federal laws while retaining the power to create laws more stringent than federal laws. The vast majority of federal environmental laws are thus implemented by the states. The same is largely true with Indian tribes, who remain sovereign over their lands.</p>
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<p>For a discussion of the role of Native American tribes in environmental enforcement, see David Coursen, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/23/10579/tribes-states-indian-tribal-auth… as States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and Enforce Environmental Law and Regulations</a>, Joe Stuckey, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/31/11198/tribal-nations-environmentally-m… Nations: Environmentally More Sovereign than States</a>, and &nbsp;Jane Kloeckner, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/42/10057/hold-tribal-sovereignty-establis… On to Tribal Sovereignty: Establishing Tribal Pesticide Programs That Recognize Inherent Tribal Authority and Promote Federal-Tribal Partnerships</a>.</p>
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<p>An example of cooperative federalism can be seen in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). RCRA governs solid and hazardous wastes. The EPA issues federal regulations under RCRA. States can establish their own waste statutes and regulatory schemes based upon RCRA’s requirements. If EPA finds these state regulatory efforts to be consistent with the federal requirements, then state agencies are given approval to implement and enforce RCRA and state agency action “has the same force and effect” as <a href="#" title="42 U.S.C. § 6926(d)">EPA action</a>.</p>
<p>Cooperative federalism can also be more deferential to state authority. The <a href="http://elr.info/legislative/federal-laws/surface-mining-control-and-rec… Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977</a> (SMCRA) establishes a federal framework that regulates mining activities in the absence of state regulations. A state may avoid the federal requirements entirely by establishing its own laws to substitute for SMCRA’s requirements.</p>
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<p>For a discussion of federalism and how it operates in environmental law, see Douglas Kendall, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press/redefining-federalism-listening-states-sha… Federalism</a>. For an interesting article on cooperative federalism in both the pollution control and natural resource realms, see Robert Fischman, <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=824385">Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In general, federal environmental laws create minimum standards. They do not prevent the states from enacting more stringent environmental protections. For example, <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/aaqs/caaqs/caaqs.htm&quot; target="_blank">California has adopted air quality standards</a> for ozone and particulate matter that are more protective than the federal standards under the Clean Air Act and has a <a href="http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/&quot; target="_blank">chemical regulatory system</a> that is broader in scope than the federal program.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>See the ELI Research Report <a href="http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d7-07.pdf">Federal Regulations and State Flexibility in Environmental Standard Setting</a> for a discussion of how states can be more nimble than the federal government in implementing environmental law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Additionally, many state legislatures have adopted state laws modeled after federal laws such as NEPA. In California, the <a href="http://ceres.ca.gov/ceqa/&quot; target="_blank">California Environmental Quality Act</a><a href="http://live-eli.pantheon.io/#_msocom_43"&gt; </a>(CEQA) was based on NEPA, but its focus is on ensuring that state, rather than federal, government agencies take environmental impacts into account prior to taking action. In New York, the <a href="http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/6208.html&quot; target="_blank">State Environmental Quality Review</a> (SEQR) law serves the same purpose.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The differences between federal and state court systems are discussed here <a href="http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jur…;
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="local-environmental-law"></a>Local Environmental Law</h3>
<p>Local environmental laws are probably the least visible form of environmental law, but at the same time they are some of the laws felt most directly by average citizens, such as <a href="http://www.eli.org/research-report/planning-development-and-sewage-infr… use and planning</a>. Most localities have a zoning code that outlines permissible uses for private land depending on its location. Zoning laws are used to <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/smartcode-solution-to-sprawl,-the">g… development</a>, protect areas important to the public interest and to limit unfavorable results of certain land uses.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a fascinating exploration of local environmental law, see John Nolon, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press/new-ground-advent-local-environmental-law"… Ground: the Advent of Local Environmental Law</a> and <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press/open-ground-effective-local-strategies-pro… Ground: Effective Local Strategies for Protecting Natural Resources</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In addition to zoning, local governments make infrastructure planning decisions that affect the environment. The new <a href="http://www.smartgrowth.org/&quot; target="_blank">smart growth movement</a> has led to local governments emphasizing development and infrastructure plans that minimize environmental impacts by supporting development of pedestrian and cyclist-friendly communities, privileging public transportation options over highway development and upgrading older less environmentally friendly storm water management infrastructure. Cities have helped spur new environmentally friendly trends and initiatives by passing local ordinances in support of urban agriculture, recycling programs, and creating local funding sources to support green roofs, solar panel installation or preservation of historic buildings. Similarly, many cities are on the front lines of taking action to reduce climate change. Other environmental functions carried out by local governments include managing waste removal and recycling, managing city parks and managing the local water and utility systems.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For an example of how localities can use local ordinances to protect the environment and preserve biodiversity, see James McElfish, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/nature-friendly-ordinances">Nature Friendly Ordinances</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="international-environmental-law"></a>International Environmental Law</h3>
<p>Many environmental issues are international in nature as they transcend boundaries: some forms of air pollution, like greenhouse gas emissions, international trade in chemicals, international transportation of hazardous wastes, etc. While domestic environmental law in the United States has taken root since the 1960s, so has international environmental law. Several major treaties address <a href="http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/index.php&quot; target="_blank">stratospheric ozone destruction</a>, <a href="http://www.cites.org/&quot; target="_blank">endangered species</a>, <a href="http://www.cbd.int/&quot; target="_blank">biological diversity</a>, <a href="http://www.basel.int/&quot; target="_blank">hazardous waste</a>, <a href="http://www.pic.int/&quot; target="_blank">chemical regulation</a>, and many other important topics.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a good overview of the operation of international environmental law, see this article <a href="http://www.ucar.edu/communications/gcip/m3elaw/m3pdfc1.pdf&quot; target="_blank">http://www.ucar.edu/communications/gcip/m3elaw/m3pdfc1.pdf</a>.</p&gt;
</blockquote>
<p>Most of these negotiations are conducted among nations through the United Nations. The <a href="http://www.unep.org&quot; target="_blank">United Nations Environment Programme</a> and other international bodies have responsibility for environmental issues. Periodically, nations gather to forge a path forward on environmental and sustainable development issues as well.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Ecolex, <a href="http://www.ecolex.org&quot; target="_blank">www.ecolex.org</a&gt;, is a terrific gateway to international treaties and laws. The American Society of International Law also has a helpful overview and research guide here <a href="http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=ienvl&quot; target="_blank">http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=ienvl</a>.</p&gt;
</blockquote>

A Cheer for Global Environmental Governance. Then What Happens?
Author
Bruce Rich - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
5
Bruce Rich

Robert Kuttner’s new book Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism is a timely warning that “corporate and financial elites have substantially captured the machinery of the state,” as well as governance institutions of the international economy such as the World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the European Union.

The book, endorsed by Nobel economics laureate and former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz, devotes a whole chapter to the challenges of global governance, with many examples taken from the environmental sector. In Kuttner’s view, ideologies emphasizing free trade and market-based approaches to environmental and social issues have mostly strengthened the very forces undermining sustainability and equity in many countries.

Free trade with nations with low environmental and human rights standards imports “the low standards along with the products.” Privatization of public services both in developed and developing countries “has often been shown to be less cost-effective, less reliable, and more prone to corruption than . . . public alternatives.”

It is mistaken to assert that market liberalization and privatization are either inherently bad or good, but it is certainly the case that the Bretton Woods institutions and other multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have promoted trade liberalization and privatization in many countries with very mixed environmental and social equity results.

The World Bank provides an interesting case study of repeated failures of projects and programs that were supposed to promote “sustainable” forestry, and good environmental and social practice in private-sector mining and fossil fuel power and extraction investments. The bank finally has committed to withdraw from financing oil and gas development after 2019; it has already ceased support for coal power.

Kuttner cites cases that illustrate the limits to the “tempting” notion that, as “markets and corporations have outrun the constraints of national governments,” “global civil society as counterweight is a major part of the solution.” He examines “the illusion of corporate social responsibility,” particularly with respect to the literally “hundreds of monitoring and certification regimes” that NGOs have promoted together with corporations eager to protect their brands from reputational risk.

For example, fair-trade coffee, which seeks to certify social equity and environmental sustainability, covers only around 5 percent of world bean trade. Kuttner maintains it is questionable how much poorer coffee growers actually benefit from the higher fair-trade prices, given the added costs of obtaining certification. Moreover, he argues, premium prices for fair trade coffee have catalyzed more conversion of land to coffee plantations, resulting in increased supply and depressed prices for coffee in general — thus undermining sustainability.

While the Forest Stewardship Council and other certification regimes have, Kuttner concedes, “raised consumer awareness,” they have failed to slow deforestation. Citing U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization statistics, he notes that deforestation has increased in recent years to 16 million hectares annually from 13 million in the 1990s. What progress that has occurred, he asserts, is due to political will and better enforcement by national governments like Brazil and Indonesia. In reality the situation is worse: Brazil reversed course over the past several years, and Indonesia’s effectiveness in reducing deforestation has long been questionable.

Kuttner recounts a temporary “rare story of success,” the campaign of environmental, human rights, and anti-corruption groups to tame the bribery and other abuses of international oil and mining corporations: the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Publish What You Pay. The United Kingdom, the United States, and some developing country governments agreed to the initiative, as well as the bank and International Monetary Fund. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act required U.S. extractive industries to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission public accounts of their payments to foreign governments. But industry lobbying delayed the issuance of implementing regulations, and the Trump administration killed the rules.

Still, Kuttner grants “one cheer for global governance,” but concludes only reform efforts through the nation-state can contain markets and constrain financial elites, calling for a progressive populism to counter the prevailing right-wing version. He is skeptical of environmental efforts that “use more market forces to address the growing problems caused by market failure,” because they address people as consumers, not as citizens — a view which recalls Aristotle’s insight that humans are first political, not economic animals. Kuttner believes binding international conventions are the best solution for global governance. But this ignores the long, problematic record of public international law in securing lasting and effective compliance from nation-states.

A cheer for global environmental governance. Then what happens?

Trump's Coal Mandate Ignores the Real Threat to National Security
Author
David P. Clarke - Writer and Editor
Writer and Editor
Current Issue
Issue
5
David P. Clarke

Scientists understand that climate change looms ever more urgently as a cataclysmic threat to both the Earth’s biodiversity and human society. Rejecting the issue, however, the Trump administration isn’t content to merely halt or weaken Obama-era carbon regulatory programs and to withdraw from the global Paris climate agreement. In June we learned that the Department of Energy is weighing a proposal to help prop up failing coal and nuclear power plants that market forces would shut down, a policy DOE suggests is needed to avoid a power-generation shortage that might threaten national security.

But the closure of uneconomical plants “is not a national security issue,” says retired Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn, an advisory board member of the Center for Climate & Security, a nonpartisan institute guided by military and security experts. While perhaps once vital to U.S. national security, coal-fired power is no longer essential, and skewing markets to help the fossil-energy sector is generally a bad idea for the U.S. power portfolio and overall economy, McGinn says.

The Defense Department has long recognized climate change as a genuine threat to national security, McGinn adds. In the West, multi-year droughts and resulting possible wildfires hamper the ability of Army and Marine Corps bases to conduct realistic live-fire training. West Coast beach erosion and shifting harbor contours also constitute a threat. At the Hampton Roads military complex in Virginia, sea-level rise as well as the growing frequency and intensity of mid-Atlantic hurricanes are top concerns. Globally, climate change is a threat multiplier for instability, as recognized by the CNA Military Advisory Board in 2007 and again in 2014, when 11 retired generals and admirals concluded climate-related national security risks are “as serious as any challenges we have faced.”

When it comes to national security, DOD civilian and military leaders need the best possible data and objective analyses to understand security environments in which the military will have to operate five to 20 years into the future, McGinn says. For example, when various stresses destabilize societies, para-military groups, drug cartels, terrorist organizations, and others exploit the resulting power vacuum, and a U.S. military engagement could result or resources vital to national security could be threatened.

Regarding the proposal to bail out failing coal and nuclear plants, McGinn notes that an overlooked consequence of DOE’s reliance on the 1950 Defense Production Act’s authority as a basis for supporting the continued operation of uneconomical electricity plants is that billions of dollars would likely be diverted from defense budgets under such a policy, siphoning off more traditional national security funds.

While the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s June 12 hearing made clear that no grid reliability emergency exists, and diverse groups including conservative think tanks, Big Oil, and other energy organizations oppose DOE’s proposal, activists remain concerned that it nevertheless could have traction.

It is troubling that the administration has wrapped its proposal “in the national security flag,” says Gillian Giannetti, staff attorney with the Sustainable FERC Project, a clean-energy coalition, because “certain deferential standards can come with that.” But, even if DOE’s security assertions could make immediately defeating the proposal more difficult, the proposal lacks factual and legal support that ultimately will make it untenable, she adds.

According to Giannetti, dozens of reports have shown that grid outages are the result of distribution system weaknesses and grid elements outside of FERC’s direct authority that could be addressed at state and regional levels. Fuel security is not the reason the lights go out, she says, noting that less than 1 percent of outages were caused by fuel shortages. Real security issues, such as climate change impacts and cyber invasions, could take out distribution systems. But grid resilience and security could be enhanced by encouraging a broader, robust energy system that fully integrates distributed resources, such as wind and solar, with large-scale power generation, Giannetti says. DOE’s proposal would divert finite government resources from the real issues, she concludes, and ultimately consumers and taxpayers would pay for any bailout.

As DOD seeks objective information to understand the climate threat, a recent report by the progressive Center for American Progress, “Burning the Data,” finds that Trump requests would have cut federal climate and energy data and research funding 16.8 percent. Thankfully, appropriators rejected those cuts, though Trump is still trying.

Meanwhile, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in 2017 the U.S. spent $306.2 billion on weather and climate-related disasters.

Almost no security or energy analysts support the president’s generation policy.

The EPA Pith and the Law Pendulum
Author
Stephen R. Dujack - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
4

The EPA Pith and the Law Pendulum 

I met William D. Ruckelshaus a year after the Saturday Night Massacre, and 18 months after he left the Environmental Protection Agency as its founding administrator. I was a reporter for the Daily Princetonian, and he was on campus to give a talk. I recognized that here was a true American hero. Nine years later, Ruckelshaus would return to EPA for more heroics: restoring the agency to its original sense of idealism and high purpose.

It is comforting to think of men and women who were inspired by Ruckelshaus’s sainted example as still the pith of the agency’s workforce. Certainly the EPA staffers whom I’ve met over the last 30 years are dedicated to the high public purpose invoked by Ruckelshaus at the agency’s founding 48 years ago.

That is a venerable period for a government department. So it is both sad and somewhat startling to hear the founding administrator say that his successor “is pulling that whole apparatus down,” as Ruckelshaus was quoted in the Washington Post earlier this year.

This magazine is now 35 years old, and by far the most popular article we have published — to judge by reprint requests and other indicators — was Ruckelshaus’s cover story in the November/December 1995 issue. “Stop the Pendulum” was the headline, with our cartoon showing an environmental professional threatened by a swinging blade as in Poe’s classic thriller.

The article ran a year after Newt Gingrich’s takeover of the House of Representatives with his Contract with America, and Ruckelshaus sounded a warning to the 104th Congress. “We recognize, as perhaps the newer members of Congress do not, that the current rhetorical excess is yet another phase in a dismaying pattern,” Ruckelshaus wrote. He portrayed the anti-environmental swing of the early nineties as a reaction to the “pro-environmental excesses of the late eighties, which was prompted by the anti-environmental excess of the early eighties,” and so on, all the way back to NEPA.

“The new Congress may believe that it is the vanguard of a permanent change in attitude toward regulation, but unless the past is no longer prologue, the pendulum will swing back, and we will see a new era of pro-environmental movement in the future.”

That prospect wasn’t completely rosy, in Ruckelshaus’s view. Such swings, even those that benefit the environment, are by their nature temporary and are followed by opposite reaction to the detriment of public health and the public fisc, not to say also to the health of our democracy. He urged instead that policymakers concentrate on making smooth progress toward well defined goals in a single unified statute governed by a single authorizing and a single appropriating committee in each house of Congress.

What was then happening in reality was far different. In 1995, politicians opposed to environmental protection were painting a picture of “a bureaucracy run amuck.” The result was “battered agency syndrome,” in Ruckelshaus’s view. Given that pollution was obviously under better control, he wondered, “Why is EPA now the agency everyone loves to hate?” Those observations, readers well know, could well be made today.

A swinging pendulum is bad for the environment. It is also bad for business. “Regulators exist to give certainty to those that they regulate,” Scott Pruitt told EPA staff when he started. But according to NPR, “The Trump administration has tried to undo much of what was put in place by the previous administration. In fact, Gina McCarthy, who headed the EPA under [President] Obama, says that seems to be one of Pruitt’s top priorities.”

“I don’t want every administration to come in and think that their only job is to undo the one that happened before,” she said. “We cannot have constant changes to the signals we send to business and the public in the United States about what we should be doing to protect public health and the environment.’” The Cato Institute’s Peter Van Doren added, “Knowing what the rules are, and that they don’t change that often, strikes me as something we all should agree to.”

The author of “Stop the Pendulum” says that, today, “It’s some of the same stuff. And it’s really hard for the people who stay there to function when the administrator’s not sympathetic to the mission.” Ruckelshaus observed that the problems at the agency are not the result of some deep-state bureaucrats. Rather, “It’s the people that have been brought in that are taking the steps that are in many respects aimed at tearing down the whole apparatus that was set up over 40 years to protect public health and the environment.”

Controversy is not essential to environmental progress. As I wrote in the October 12, 1974, edition of the Daily Princetonian, quoting Ruckelshaus’s inspiring speech: “Energy and conservation don’t oppose each other. They are different sides of the same coin.”

Notice & Comment is written by the editor and represents his views.

Ozone Protocol Accord Will Generate Huge Number of Jobs

The White House now has evidence that a global warming treaty limiting coolants would generate thousands of new jobs, and now it must decide whether to send the treaty to the Senate for ratification. A report released . . . by the Air Conditioning Heating and Refrigeration Institute and the Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy said that the amendment to the Montreal Protocol limiting use of hydrofluorocarbons, a greenhouse gas, would help American manufacturers who produce the bulk of the world’s supply of advanced coolants. Ratifying the treaty would produce 33,000 additional jobs and an extra $12.5 billion of annual manufacturing output.

The report is considered critical to help presidential aides persuade President Donald Trump to advance the treaty to the Senate, despite the president’s aversion to multilateral treaties, his predecessor’s accomplishments, and anything involving global warming. “U.S. ratification of the Kigali Amendment is good for American jobs, good for the economy, and crucial for maintaining U.S. leadership across the globe,” said John Hurst, Chairman of The Alliance, and Vice President of Lennox International. He added, “Over 30 countries have ratified the amendment. America cannot afford to be on the sideline. America must continue to lead.”

Politico

 

“I walked to work by myself. I did not have 24/7 security. . . . EPA is not a high-priority target. It is just not. You are not even a full Cabinet member. You are an administrator, not a secretary.”

Former EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, as quoted in E&E News

News That's Reused 

Call out the emergency responders: the road from Wrzesnia to Slupca in western Poland is a bona fide Hershey Highway, according to the Associated Press. A tractor trailer overturned on the A2 motorway, blocking six lanes of traffic in both directions when its cargo of confectionary spilled. The gooey morass began to congeal, making removal more difficult.

“Rescue officials said the liquid chocolate was solidifying as it cooled and would require large amounts of hot water to clear away,” according to the AP. “Senior brigadier Bogdan Kowalski with the fire brigade of Slupca . . . said, “The cooling chocolate is worse than snow.”

There was no mention in the AP article about whether any Polish or EU environmental regulations were violated in the process, but local officials were treating the spill as if it were dioxin. The children of the affected community may have felt otherwise.

Environmental authorities in China are cracking down on funeral practices and public toilets to fight a “notorious pollution problem,” according to the Reuters wire service. “Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei province, which surrounds the Beijing metropolitan region, has given all 52 crematoriums in the city until the end of October to replace or upgrade their furnaces to ensure they meet emission standards, the government said in a statement on its website.”

The government is of course going after large industrial sources like coal-fired power plants, but it is also making inroads in domestic pollution from sources like, yes, backyard barbecues.

There are political appointees at EPA, and then there is the new head of Region 9. “Michael Stoker has been credited with coining the infamous saying calling for Ms [Hillary] Clinton to be put in prison for using a private email server while she was secretary of state,” according to The Independent. The chant was the infamous call to “Lock Her Up!”

“He reportedly began the chant at the Republican National Convention in 2016 while a state delegate and it went on to be heard at numerous political rallies of US President Donald Trump — followed by signs, t-shirts, and the president himself saying it on stage.”

Additionally, “news outlet ThinkProgress reported that Mr Stoker also once worked for Greka Oil and Gas Inc, a company with numerous complaints of environmental regulation non-compliance in its history.”

And apparently begging for controversy, Stoker announced that he would not manage the region from its offices in San Francisco but would instead telecommute from a satellite office in Los Angeles.

Specialized environmental courts are operating on every continent except Antarctica, according to Ensia, a nonprofit web-based environmental magazine.

“When the improper disposal of wastewater from the construction site of a joint shopping center and apartment complex threatened to contaminate hundreds of residents’ water in Sonsonate, El Salvador,” reports journalist Anna Catherine Brigida, “activists and community leaders filed a lawsuit through the country’s specialized environmental justice system.”

The result was something unusual for the small nation where the wealthy usually get their way, even when it endangers poor peoples’ lives: “In response, Lina Pohl, El Salvador’s minister of environment and natural resources, went to inspect the water. When she found signs of contamination, she ordered the suspension of construction.”

 

The EPA pith and the law pendulum.

Electrifying Transportation is the Next Big Step in Smog Reduction
Author
Kathleen Barrón - Exelon Corporation
Exelon Corporation
Current Issue
Issue
4
Kathleen Barrón

A total of 51 areas in 22 states are in nonattainment with national ozone standards. Ground-level ozone, or smog, harms both human health and the environment. Elevated ozone levels can cause myriad medical problems, particularly for children, the elderly, and asthmatics. Ozone can also harm vegetation, including agricultural produce. Ozone is formed when nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds react in the presence of sunlight. Major sources of NOx and VOCs include fossil fuel-fired power plants and industrial facilities, motor vehicle exhaust, gasoline vapors, and chemical solvents.

EPA’s nonattainment designations trigger an obligation for states to develop a comprehensive assessment of sources, current and projected emissions levels, and measures to reduce ozone levels by each state’s attainment deadline, the earliest of which is 2021. These State Implementation Plans have focused on seeking emissions reductions from large stationary sources, such as power plants and industrial facilities.

But in today’s complex circumstances, states must also be attuned to the risk that emissions from such sources may actually increase. Pollution from high-emitting power plants has the potential to rise in two scenarios. First, emissions will grow whenever the supply of lower-emitting natural gas to fuel power plants is disrupted, such as during the cold snaps last winter. In both New England and the 13 mid-Atlantic states, higher-emitting sources such as coal- and oil-fired generation ran more frequently when natural gas was diverted to home heating. With severe weather more frequent, these circumstances may occur more often, including during the summer ozone season, resulting in episodes of higher smog levels throughout the year.

Second, and more permanently, when zero-emissions nuclear plants retire prematurely, emissions rise as fossil-fuel power plants run more frequently. Again, this scenario is increasingly likely, with greater and greater numbers of nuclear plants retiring prematurely. States must take these scenarios into account when predicting future emissions, and state measures that prevent or mitigate either of these scenarios should be counted toward compliance with SIPs developed to address ozone formation.

In order to demonstrate attainment — as well as to protect their citizens — states will also need to seek non-traditional emissions reductions not only from stationary sources but from the transportation sector as well. According to EPA’s latest National Emissions Inventory, 56 percent of NOx emissions is from transportation, while only 24 percent is from power plants and industrial facilities. States will have to be more creative in reducing emissions from cars, trucks, buses, and trains, because states are in large part preempted from directly establishing emissions standards for vehicles. States have used inspections and maintenance requirements to seek some reductions from this sector, but potential gains from these limited measures are minimal.

However, advances in technology offer a variety of options for states willing to get creative with direct reduction measures and with partnerships to lower pollution. For example, the NOx and VOCs reductions from wider deployment of electric vehicles, including mass transit, could be substantial. While meaningful deployment of electrification is a big task, working together, states, utilities, and others could achieve a significant local environmental benefit due to reduced emissions of NOx, VOCs, and metals, as well as carbon dioxide.

A recent paper in Environmental Science & Technology estimates that, in a case where only 17 percent of miles traveled by light duty vehicles (cars) and 8 percent by heavy duty vehicles are electrified, NOx emissions alone would decrease by 209,000 tons annually nationwide. Electrification on this scale would also offer significant reductions in VOCs, CO2, and other pollutants, further magnifying the benefit.

States will need to utilize a number of policy tools to incentivize transportation electrification, such as building out public charging infrastructure, offering additional incentives for purchase of electric or hybrid-electric vehicles, and investing in government-owned electric buses, garbage trucks, and other heavy-duty vehicles.

This reality highlights a key task for states moving forward — with the lowest-hanging fruit of emission reductions identified, states need to align incentives with their full array of policy goals. This includes ensuring that policies at environmental protection agencies, usually the main SIP authors, align with public utility commissions and departments of transportation to maximize electrification. Leveraging market incentives will encourage additional emissions reductions to be as cost-effective as possible.

The author is grateful for the assistance of Kathy Robertson in developing this column.

Electrifying transportation is the next big step in smog reduction.

A Transparent Look at the Agency's Federalism and Science Policies
Author
David P. Clarke
Current Issue
Issue
4
David P. Clarke

Corruption allegations that have dogged Scott Pruitt since before he took office as EPA administrator will undoubtedly color any future review of his tenure at the federal agency. But beyond those matters, at least two policies that Pruitt has emphasized transcend his administration and warrant closer consideration — cooperative federalism and science transparency.

On federalism, the Environmental Council of the States, representing 52 state and territorial environmental leaders, has called for a “recalibration of state and federal roles” from a policy, operational, and fiscal standpoint. Since 1970, ECOS members maintain, states have become the main implementers of environmental laws and, as mature program managers, should not be second-guessed by EPA on how they choose to meet national standards.

According to ECOS Executive Director Sam Sankar, states across the board would have said that EPA did not always include them early enough in substantive policy discussions. But this administration has at least tried to be more open to “hearing and engaging” with them early, notably on the Waters of the United States rule, he says.

That engagement did not extend to California, however, which in May led 17 other states in suing the agency to protect federal automotive greenhouse gas standards negotiated in 2012 among EPA, California, and automakers. After review in 2016, EPA and California deemed the standards to be both feasible and achievable at lower cost than first believed. But in April, “without giving us any new data or analysis,” Pruitt announced that the standards “may be too stringent,” says a California Air Resources Board spokesperson. If Pruitt adopts weaker federal standards, that would end the “one national program” that encompasses separate but compatible federal and California tailpipe standards.

On federalism, the spokesperson adds, California has practiced that for 50 years and its authority to set stricter standards is embedded in the Clean Air Act. That view is strongly shared by ECOS. In 2017, the organization adopted an “absolutely clear” resolution supporting California’s and other states’ discretion to adopt pollution and tailpipe standards within their borders that are stricter than federal limits, Sankar notes. “California’s authority is important to the states.”

While touting federalism, the Trump administration has also repeatedly proposed slashing EPA’s budget, including state grants, but Congress so far has rejected those proposals. As the 2019 budget season advances, states are very focused on ensuring that Congress and the administration support continued funding for them to meet their expanding co-regulator responsibilities, Sankar says. It would not be cooperative federalism to simultaneously shrink EPA’s role while reducing state funding, Sankar says.

On science policy, in April Pruitt announced a new proposed rule on “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science,” alarming scientists and activists who saw it as a bid to exclude studies justifying strict regulations. Notable targets of regulatory critics are the Harvard Six Cities and American Cancer Society Cancer Prevention studies, which found links between air pollution and mortality and are widely used by EPA to justify strict air regulations.

In an initial response to the proposal, Dan Greenbaum — president of the Health Effects Institute, a widely respected air pollution research organization — says that how two crucial concepts are defined will determine how big an effect the rule has on the entire consideration of science at EPA.

The first concept, “pivotal regulatory science,” will limit which scientific studies are impacted, but it is unclear when a study becomes pivotal, Greenbaum says. The proposal only vaguely defines such studies as those “critical” to calculating final standards, costs, risks, and benefits.

The other concept is data accessibility. The rule calls for “public access” to “underlying pivotal science” and models “consistent with” privacy and confidentiality laws and confidential business information restrictions. The “number one question” is how accessible data is defined, Greenbaum says. Data depersonalized for a disc would not provide such information. Key issues remain unclear, Greenbaum says.

But some aspects of Pruitt’s overall approach to science are clear, most notably his rejection of massive troves of climate change data and his policy barring grant recipients from serving on science advisory panels while allowing scientists affiliated with regulated industries to serve. Federalism and sound science may be Pruitt’s watchwords, but helping companies, not environmental protection, is arguably his most transparent agenda.

A transparent look at the agency's federalism and science policies.

On Being a Trigger for Peace
Author
Ken Conca - American University
Geoff Dabelko - Ohio University
American University
Ohio University
Current Issue
Issue
4
On Being a Trigger for Peace

Ken Conca

Environmental change can be a trigger for conflict. It heightens our sense of group difference. It can make us think about hunkering down rather than reaching out. It tempts us to visualize a world of scarcity and of constraint rather than a world of opportunity and transformation. People assume scarcity begets grievances and grievances beget violence. Our work challenges that determinism.

I would never deny the potential for violence around environmental change. According to Ban Ki-Moon, the former secretary general of the United Nations, climate change “not only exacerbates threats to international peace and security, it is a threat to international peace and security. . . . Mega-crises may well become the new normal.” The human rights organization Global Witness has built a database on the assassinations of environmental activists in the last 10 years or more. The number is large.

What we risk losing if these narratives are only about security and conflict is the possibility that we can instead cooperate around them. They can bring people together, even people who may not be comfortable working together. They can lead us down a path of peace.

The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was the high-water mark for international environmental cooperation. By the late 1990s, when the international community was planning a 10th-anniversary summit meeting in Johannesburg, the bloom was off the rose of international environmental cooperation. The idea of welfare gains and sustainable development was not strong enough to get governments to live up to the commitments they had made in Rio. Many environmental policymakers and activists started casting around for another framework that might give governments that sense of urgency. Environmental security as a concept was born in that quest for agenda setting.

The Cold War was over. It was a time when people who thought about conflict and security were open to new ideas. There was a perception, which today seems quaint, that we would realize a peace dividend, that those massive resources that went into the preparation for war could be redeployed for a more affirmative social purpose.

It was the combination of the quest for urgency and the fluidity in the security space that produced this idea of environmental security. In the run-up to Rio+10, there were governments and activists who wanted environmental security to be the dominant framework for the dialogue and for policy initiatives. In my experience, when the North finds a security incidence in the South, the South would be well advised to duck. They fought too hard to throw off colonialism and have sovereignty over their natural resources to see it be framed simply as someone else’s security agenda.

It also bothered Geoff Dabelko, as the newly minted director of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Out of this strategic concern an idea occurred to us. If the environment can be a trigger for conflict, maybe environmental imperatives can be a trigger for peace.

There are three premises to our work.

The first is that because environmental issues ignore human boundaries, they demand cooperation across those boundaries, whether they are between nations, or clans, or identity groups, or neighborhoods, or the people who live upstream and upwind and those who live down. That interdependence can be used to create cooperative incentives, even among actors who are not inclined to cooperate with each other, even among actors in conflict.

The second premise is that the environment can create in people a deeply rooted sense of place. Maybe that can be used to strengthen people’s shared identities, or at least to soften some of the more divisive and conflict-oriented identities that can also take root in specific places.

And third: environmental problems are technically complex, and they challenge us to think forward into an uncertain world. Maybe that uncertainty creates opportunities for learning together. And maybe that learning can be used as a tool to build trust again among parties who might not be inclined to trust.

We never say that environmental cooperation will inevitably lead to peace. Environmental cooperation sometimes only leads to more efficient resource plundering. We instead assess whether particular types of environmental cooperation might be used strategically to make peace by creating cooperative incentives, or by enhancing trust, or by reworking conflict-laden identities.

There is now a large body of evidence that this can in fact be done. There are refugee camps where scarcities of water, or of firewood, or other resources trigger conflict, either within the camp or between the camp and the host community. But there are just as many where we see people developing creative, cooperative solutions. We know that climate change and water scarcity can cause tensions and conflicts between herders and farmers in the world’s dry grassland regions. But we also see creative adaptation under those same stresses. Farmers start to herd, herders start to farm, their children start to intermarry. Grievances are not the only factor. Much depends on our capacity to channel those grievances as productively.

A related observation is that much of what we know is not derived from the work of scholarly research. It is derived from practice.

There is a lot of rich experimentation by communities, by donors, by nongovernmental organizations, by intergovernmental organizations like UN Environment. That raises questions about selection bias. Are people only working in places where it’s easiest? It raises questions about the quality of the data, about long-term effects after the NGOs or the donors go away. It raises questions about community ownership of these processes.

A third observation is that there is not enough attention paid to the institutions that are tasked with implementing these initiatives, such as the UN Security Council. We have to study the institutions that are supposed to deliver on these programs.

Peace is not always the goal. The Palestinians we work with in the West Bank don’t want to talk about peace. They want to talk about justice, they want to talk about dignity. In Flint, Michigan, when the taps started spewing toxic water, those people weren’t interested in peace, either. People who are most directly involved in these conflicts often do not see peace as the principal challenge or the principal problem.

And on the other hand we know that violence can shred any possibility for attaining these other social goals. Peace, even in the most limited sense of forestalling violence, is a very good thing. It’s essential to the realization of other goals. But it’s often not the goal of most of the people who are involved. And we scholars or practitioners who come bearing peace strategies without an emphasis on justice will be looked at skeptically.

Geoff Dabelko

Environmental peacebuilding is often saddled with unrealistic expectations. Some observers ask, Why try environmental peacebuilding if you are not going to solve the whole conflict between India and Pakistan? Where is the evidence environmental peacebuilding works if you are not resolving a conflict? Is it not better to wait to address environmental conditions, goes the argument, until the country is rich, peaceful, and democratic? In this way of thinking, the environment is viewed as a luxury item in post-conflict settings rather than a critical input to saving lives, jump-starting agrarian livelihoods, and spurring economic activity.

Some early practitioners of environmental peacebuilding came from unexpected quarters. Fears of radioactive contamination in the Barents Sea provided an avenue for Russian, Norwegian, and American militaries to interact as the Cold War ended. The resulting Arctic Military Environment Cooperation Program included scientific assessment and safer storage of spent nuclear materials in the Russian Northwest. While radioactivity was a real concern, the collaboration between opposing militaries provided a means to interact regularly on less divisive topics. The program helped U.S. and Norwegian leaders figure out who was in charge of the former Soviet military in the uncertain transition period. Joint scientific assessment and environmental risk management were tools to help build confidence and a post-Cold War peace.

Environmental peacebuilding has faced numerous challenges, and early iterations demonstrated tangible shortcomings. In Johannesburg in 2002, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, only one speaker on a well-attended environment and security panel got questions, many of them hostile. A representative from the Peace Parks Foundation fielded questions about his organization’s peace park efforts in post-Apartheid southern Africa. Signing ceremonies with Nelson Mandela and other heads of state made for good optics, but the beneficiaries of these early transboundary conservation efforts were primarily political elites and large business owners. Local people bore the cost of increased human-wildlife conflict that came with the sudden removal of border fences. They reaped few of the benefits of increased tourism. Fortunately, many early environmental peacebuilders changed their programs, learned lessons, and adapted subsequent efforts inside and outside southern Africa.

The aftermath of the 1990s Yugoslavian civil war was an important place for UN Environment and its post-conflict assessments to make concrete steps toward environmental peacebuilding. Like AMEC, the UN took advantage of the relative lack of controversy around objective scientific assessment in post-conflict settings to tackle the peace and conflict dimensions of the environment and natural resources.

UN Environment identified environmental hotspots and natural resource management steps critical to restarting economies. Their comprehensive reports, done with the permission of host governments, assigned some degree of responsibility for environmental damage and helped formulate a plan forward. The plan was a little more subversive than we realized at the time. UN Environment assessed the role natural resources may have played in starting, extending, and recovering from conflict. It helped formulate a possible foundation for peace through environmental management institutions.

Those field assessments were fairly straightforward steps compared to the politics that surround peace and conflict issues at the United Nations. UN Environment still had many battles about environmental peacebuilding at its headquarters in Nairobi and at UN headquarters in New York. Member governments routinely assert their right to sovereign control of resources as an impediment to engaging in environmental actions designed to prevent conflict in particular. They commonly maintain that environmental issues are not security issues but instead economic ones better suited to be addressed by the economic and environmental bodies at the UN.

Despite these regular objections, those UN-focused efforts have had success. However, I would flag one dilemma raised by this example. I call it “What’s in a name?” What we call environmental peacebuilding really matters to the parties on the ground. Peacebuilding as an enterprise is inherently politically sensitive. The advantage of the environmental sector is often the issues are less so as illustrated by the earlier examples. But labeling an effort as environmental peacebuilding rather than environmental management can make the goal harder to achieve. Parties assume defensive positions and the conflict is renewed rather than reconciled. If making the peacebuilding objectives explicit makes it harder to achieve, how do we do it without that label? When do you use that label explicitly and when is it a critical but unstated goal?

Some have reacted that such a labeling decision can be troubling, since they value transparency and participation among all stakeholders from the outset. It raises challenging tradeoffs for small group negotiations and less transparent approaches versus all-inclusive negotiations in public. In the age of diplomacy by press release and even tweet, this transparency can actually make it harder to achieve success.

Let me share one more case to illustrate the environmental peacebuilding work yet to be done. In this example, practitioners are asking questions of researchers and scholars that we cannot yet answer definitively. I have worked closely with the U.S. Agency for International Development and their Conflict Management and Mitigation team. Many of you have had similar experiences with many other partners in the field. How do we practice, how do we pursue, how do policymakers grapple with environmental peacebuilding within a climate change context?

Twenty-five years ago, climate change was seen as a long-term, diffuse, incremental, and future topic for environment and security scholars and practitioners. The existential threat to small island states, for example, was not yet widely perceived. Steps to address climate change and security were largely separate conversations.

Today, the script has flipped. Since 2007, climate change has become the primary entryway into the environment and security conversation, almost to the exclusion of other important environment and natural resource topics. USAID’s conflict management staff now evaluate the agency’s climate change assistance by asking two questions: Is this climate-related investment going to create new conflict or contribute to existing conflicts? and, How can it be designed to contribute to additional development or peace-supporting solutions? If this investment is in a fragile state, or a conflict-affected state, how can we do environmental peacebuilding with this climate intervention?

Indeed, both scholars and practitioners need to develop better answers to these questions even if one can easily claim climate adaptation and mitigation efforts remain limited within countries and the international community. Our argument should be for finding ways to capture co-benefits and the triple bottom line even as we experiment and develop a research base for better knowing what works. In a financial resource-constrained policy environment, let us collaborate to achieve climate, poverty alleviation, and peacebuilding goals together with coordinated responses.

These are the challenges before us. There has been promising progress. There is lots more to do. TEF

 

AL MOUMIN AWARD WINNERS ❧ A colloquy on how to use environmental cooperation to alleviate, end, and hopefully prevent armed conflict, by two veteran “soldiers” in the field.

Blockchain Salvation
Author
David Rejeski - Environmental Law Institute
Lovinia Reynolds - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
4
Blockchain Salvation

In 2008, a nine-page article circulated on the Internet describing a protocol for a “peer to peer” electronic cash system dubbed bitcoin. Author Satoshi Nakamoto remained invisible and highly elusive and, in 2011, he simply vanished as a rich man with around one billion dollars in bitcoins. The true identity of Nakamoto has never been established despite periodic investigations and the emergence of publicity-seeking impostors with questionable motives. Even today, he casts a long shadow on the bitcoin community, which, when confronted with some imponderable challenge, will ask the rhetorical question, “What would Satoshi have done?”

Beneath Satoshi’s digital money — dubbed a cryptocurrency — lies a programming protocol called blockchain. According to Webopedia, “Blockchain refers to a type of data structure that enables identifying and tracking transactions digitally and sharing this information across a distributed network of computers, creating in a sense a distributed trust network. The distributed ledger technology offered by blockchain provides a transparent and secure means for tracking the ownership and transfer of assets.” Note the constant use of the word “distributed.”

Blockchain has been described by various digerati as a system for “permissionless innovation,” a “digital organism,” the foundation of the new “autonomous economy,” and the next incarnation of the Internet. The hype around blockchain is bidirectional, ranging from apocalyptic predictions of bitcoin energy use that will “destroy our clean energy future” to rosy scenarios that “blockchain technology can usher in a halcyon age of prosperity for all.”

As science and technology historians like Princeton’s Edward Tenner have pointed out, hype plays an important role in mobilizing resources when new technologies are introduced into society, but there is a need for some ground truthing to rein in the more egregious hyperbole. This will certainly be the case with blockchain, where notions of environmental salvation are already apparent in headlines like “The Environment Needs Cryptogovernance,” or “Can Bitcoin’s Cryptographic Technology Help Save the Environment?” Of course the looming question is whether such hopes are justified.

At a general level we can think of a blockchain as a digital ledger, a distant cousin of early records of transactions kept on clay tablets or papyrus, and eventually replaced by paper-based, double-entry bookkeeping developed in Italy in the 15th century. However, with blockchain, information is not held by a central authority or organization, but in an encrypted, distributed computer network making it immutable (maintaining its own history), secure, and sharable across users. Of course, operating computer networks requires energy and materials resources, and with trillions of transactions per day, this adds up. That is the environmental debit side of the blockchain ledger.

The algorithms behind blockchain are complex, but the good news is that, as some have noted, as with automobiles and iPads, “You don’t have to know how it works to get a lot of utility from the technology.” If people like economist Brian Arthur are correct that radical innovations build on the ability to “stitch together pieces of external intelligence to create new business models,” then blockchain may be the ultimate joining machine, especially in today’s information-intensive, transactional economy dominated by sharing platforms, e-commerce, high-speed trading, and the expanding Internet of Things. In other words, there is an environmental credit side of the ledger too. The question for policymakers is how to ensure that the environment profits in the end.

There are three reasons the environmental community needs to focus on blockchain technology. The first of course arises from its implications for energy and materials use and associated resource and pollution impacts. The second oppositely comes from its potential applications for a wide range of environmental challenges. Finally, there are governance issues raised by its use, which could range from facilitating standard setting, to creating codes of conduct, to guaranteeing transparency and security, and, finally, to ensuring a more robust public dialogue on the up and downsides of the technology. At a more general level, environmental professionals need to be part of an ongoing conversation with blockchain developers and other stakeholders that will shape the social contract affecting digital applications and their use, including policy and governance concerns.

The first critical task is to provide greater clarity regarding the existing and projected energy use associated with blockchain, especially in regard to cryptocurrencies like bitcoin and its various relatives such as Ethereum’s Ether, a so-called digital bearer asset. At the moment, processing a bitcoin transaction consumes an estimated 5,000 times as much energy as using a Visa card. The media have focused on a number of alarming and divergent estimates regarding energy use. For instance, bitcoin mining — creating the required server farms and especially powering them — could be using the same amount of energy as (fill in the country) Denmark, or Argentina, or Nigeria; or could consume the electrical energy equivalent of the entire United States by 2019.

Such estimates matter from an environmental standpoint, because cryptocurrency mining is rapidly expanding in countries where energy-intensive server farms are often connected to inefficient coal-fired electricity generation systems. China — where an estimated 60 percent of bitcoin mining takes place — is the most important example, but Venezuela began bitcoin mining in response to its currency crisis, and activities are emerging in Puerto Rico, where a significant proportion of the population remains without electricity following Hurricane Maria almost a year ago.

In the past, such inefficiencies have driven energy conservation efforts, so these extrapolations may not accurately reflect future reality. One is reminded of the projections of data center energy usage just a few years ago, which alarmed the energy and environmental communities but never panned out. Retrospective analyses by Lawrence Berkeley National Lab indicated that estimates from early 2000 projected a nearly 90 percent increase in data center electricity consumption by 2014. This projection dropped to 24 percent five or six years later. Actual energy use by data centers increased by only 4 percent by that year, and it now constitutes less than 2 percent of total U.S. electricity consumption. This should hold firm till at least 2020.

What happened is that firms like Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Facebook looked at their operations and undertook significant measures to reduce cloud computing energy demands while simultaneously expanding services to consumers. Similar steps will be needed for blockchain, which could include shutting down illegal bitcoin mining operations, providing incentives to shift to a more efficient server infrastructure, or establishing regulations to limit cryptocurrencies from engaging in resource-intensive bit-mining practices, especially in countries like China.

Energy reductions are possible from emerging technological options, such as new microprocessors, better software protocols (such as Intel’s Hyperledger Sawtooth Blockchain), shifts to energy-efficient cloud computing (such as Microsoft’s Blockchain-As-A-Service or IBM’s blockchain subscription service), or adapting new algorithms that help limit energy-intensive cryptocurrency mining. The impacts of these technologies, both alone and in combination, need to be explored to better shape incentives that can speed commercialization and adoption of energy-efficient options.

If blockchain energy use can be tamed, a variety of applications emerge that sit at the nexus of the digital and analog worlds, bridging the autonomous and physical economies. Even at this nascent stage of blockchain use, the range of innovations with environmental implications across various sectors and domains is significant and worth exploring for clues about the future. What follows is a snapshot of a dynamic and shifting landscape.

Blockchain could support the creation of highly efficient peer-to-peer energy markets, allowing an individual with solar photovoltaics on his or her roof to sell electricity directly to a neighbor with a Chevy Volt or another friend down the street with a household-level battery storage system. That is happening now in Brooklyn, a locale that has emerged as the new cryptolandia for blockchain startups. Here, the company LO3 Energy launched the blockchain-enabled Brooklyn Microgrid that uses a peer-to-peer system to enable residents to buy and sell solar energy through a smart phone app. Members of the network can either generate their own energy, usually through renewable sources such as solar or wind, or remain purchasers of locally produced energy. Blockchain allows residents to securely manage and record transactions of both energy and money.

The U.S Energy Information Administration found that 5 percent of electricity is lost through transmission and distribution before it reaches the consumer. Smaller networks and transmission distances enabled by microgrids could reduce this inefficiency, and also offer more stability when hurricanes, snowstorms, and other severe weather events can cause entire grids to fail. Microgrid electricity suppliers and buyers can create their own energy markets, allowing them to sell, manage, and track transfers among neighbors. Of course, in most cases, these smaller grids will still be part of the larger energy supply network, so the regulatory interface with the public utility system needs to be worked out, especially when the municipal utilities themselves are adapting blockchain to help optimize generation assets across the grid in real time — Burlington, Vermont, is experimenting now with such a system.

On the other side of the planet, the Republic of Georgia is partnering with the blockchain firm Bitfury to manage its land titling registry. The use of blockchain technology to attribute land titles is a highly attractive prospect: the government’s use of the system promotes transparency and reduces fraud, while also reducing administrative costs and inefficiencies. In some countries transferring a land title can cost hundreds of dollars (and an occasional bribe) and take months, but in Georgia it takes approximately 50 cents and a few minutes on a smartphone app.

There are important economic and environmental impacts of such systems, since landholders with secure tenure are more likely to invest in their property, which provides the foundation to increase funding for land and natural resource management. Economist Hernando de Soto estimates that there is over $14 trillion available in unused capital due to a lack of secure land tenure, and de Soto and Overstock.com founder Patrick Byrne have launched their own blockchain-based initiative that allows landholders with legal or extralegal ownership claims to upload the boundaries of their properties via social media.

This blockchain approach to land rights could also be used to map and secure genetic resources that will be critical to building a global bio-economy. That includes providing a way to combat genetic thievery, or “bio-piracy,” that often deprives local people from sharing in the economic benefits that accrue to companies exploiting indigenous resources from plants and trees. Juan Carlos Castilla-Rubio of the World Economic Forum has launched the Amazon Bank of Codes to capture and codify the genomic resources of the Amazon Basin, a rich source of potential DNA for medicines, foods, or even fuels. The ABC uses a blockchain ledger to provide a safe and secure method of tracking and transferring rights to genetic codes, an approach that could be scaled as scientists work to unravel the DNA of the 99 percent of the world’s species that have yet to be genetically sequenced.

These examples use the ability of blockchain technology to facilitate peer-to-peer transactions, execute smart contracts, and provide immutable audit trails between people and objects such as land parcels, solar panels, or the DNA fingerprint of a plant, but another class of potential applications focuses on tracking objects themselves as they move though the economy, for instance in supply chains. This requires linking an object’s digital signature to a blockchain using techniques such as RFID, radio frequency identification tags, or QR (quick response) barcodes, creating the potential to manage health and environmental impacts on an object-by-object, transaction-by-transaction basis. This approach could facilitate supply chain audits, enhance corporate disclosure efforts, and ultimately translate into greater brand loyalty, while providing environmental and public health benefits for all stakeholders: corporations, consumers, and regulators.

Last year, Walmart’s vice president of food safety, Frank Yiannas, grabbed a package of sliced mangos and challenged his team to find their origin, a task that required nearly seven days. After realizing room for improvement, Walmart developed a partnership with IBM to conduct a pilot blockchain project to track every movement of the mango shipments on a digital ledger. Yiannas was able to track every step in the mangos’ progress from harvest to point of sale within 2.2 seconds. A similar initiative was launched in 2017 in Dubai, the largest city in the United Arab Emirates, which created a digital program called Food Watch to have every dining and distribution establishment post comprehensive data on their items on an online public forum. Information would include food handlers, certifications, and storage facilities used. Future plans will incorporate blockchain to “predict, prevent, and protect” against food-borne disease.

The World Wildlife Fund is partnering with tech companies ConsenSys and TraSeable to pilot a monitoring program that tackles illicit fishing using blockchain to track the movement of Pacific Ocean tuna from catch to market. Once caught, each individual fish is labeled with an RFID tag that is later taken off during processing and replaced with a QR code on the product packaging. WWF hopes that consumers will be able to use their smartphones to verify when and where a fish was caught, how it was transported, and by whom. WWF believes that consumers will prefer the verified tuna over those from non-transparent companies, creating a market that favors companies who use sustainable practices that can be confirmed by independent means. These early pilot studies have highlighted challenges that extend beyond blockchain itself, involving traceability across entire supply chains, which will require cheap digital tagging systems like RFID and QR and incentives for data collection by multiple parties.

There is another class of environmental blockchain applications that builds on the original purpose of the algorithm, enabling and tracking currency or currency-like transactions. One example is Climatecoin, an Ether-based cryptocurrency, which uses blockchain to underpin a carbon credit trading system. A nation, state, or company would be able to buy or sell carbon credits that allow a specific amount of emissions. As in traditional trading schemes, if a company pollutes less than its total credit allotment permits, the firm can sell extra credits to an entity that needs to exceed its emissions levels for economic or technology reasons. Climatecoin tokens can be used to purchase carbon credits on the Gold Standard-certified Carbon Trade Exchange, and token sales can then be used for investment into environmentally sustainable business projects. The ability of blockchain to embed self-executing, so-called smart contracts — pieces of code which automatically move funds upon the completion of an objective — could make them an ideal platform underpinning a wide variety of environmentally relevant trading and futures markets.

Blockchain could also help channel more funding toward environmental challenges by creating secure platforms that facilitate crowdfunding. Projections from the World Bank and other sources indicate that global crowdfunding, now at around $35 billion annually, could reach $90 billion sometime between 2020 and 2025, beginning to compete with more traditional forms of financing like venture capital, which accounted for $150 billion globally in recent years. However, crowdfunding still has many barriers to market entry, including taxes and fees, as well as barriers that may limit who can contribute to crowdfunding platforms geographically.

The recently formed Acorn Collective is using blockchain to “democratize crowdfunding” with a platform that is designed to reduce barriers to entry and to function across geographic and political borders. Acorn uses smart contracts to swiftly dole out returns to investors and do away with the 3-5 percent overhead fees charged by conventional crowdfunding platforms such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter.

Blockchain advocates often point out that the technology could decrease the need for intermediaries in the future, disrupting existing value chains in a wide variety of sectors, a scenario which could spell trouble for companies like Kickstarter, Uber, or Amazon. We could see the rise of so-called decentralized autonomous organizations, or DAOs, in which the rules upon which a corporation functions are enforced digitally and blockchains replace contracts, bylaws, articles, or regulations that determine organizational and inter-organizational behaviors.

This could give rise to novel corporate structures with new implications for environmental management strategies, where blockchains control and verify assets such as the right to pollute in cap-and-trade systems or swaps between ecosystem services and development rights or the distribution of catch shares in fisheries. Some visionaries have discussed blockchain as underpinning a new “participatory democracy,” where the technology provides a more direct means for citizens to engage and vote on issues, identify local needs, and mobilize capital or political action needed to solve pressing issues. Social Coin, founded in Barcelona in 2013, is one example of this type of platform.

It may be hard to imagine how EPA and its sister state agencies would deal with a DAO where environmental behaviors were written into source codes and executed by thousands of people through a consensus-based algorithm, but this future may not be that far off and may not be a negative development, given our present politics of distrust and lack of transparency.

Despite the future potential for increased efficiency, security, trust enhancement, and organizational redesign, blockchain still faces barriers to widespread use. We already mentioned that some blockchain applications, such as bitcoin, require intensive energy use. Bitcoin’s power demand is only likely to increase as the process for validating transactions becomes more complicated over time. However, other cryptocurrencies and future blockchains might not be destined for the same energy intensity. Researchers at Ethereum, Intel, and Cornell University are developing methods for lowering energy transaction verification that could dramatically cut cryptocurrency power use. Observers suggest that we may soon see a fork in the road where bitcoin continues as an energy glutton while other blockchain technologies pursue more energy-efficient methods for verifying transactions. The question is whether these alternative methods will provide an equally robust level of security.

The increased security of distributed ledger technology is especially important in the environmental sphere, where environmental decisionmaking can be rife with conflict. An immutable platform could be crucial to establishing trust between opposing sides of an impending land-use decision, carbon-trading scheme, or supply-chain dispute. While the inherent structure of a distributed ledger is hack-proof, vulnerabilities on the user-end of blockchain systems are still prevalent. To access a blockchain network, users must only provide a unique private key to access the system. While these keys are nearly impossible to guess, private keys can easily be stolen if not protected properly. And the consequences of key theft are dire: if a hacker gains entry to the blockchain, they have access to the key holder’s account, and can view all information on the ledger. Because of this security issue, there is now an entire cottage industry dedicated to protecting cryptocurrency keys. One company called Xapo uses protected vaults on three different continents to store digital keys.

While blockchain applications are growing, companies have suggested that full-scale adoption is inhibited by a lack of standards. Areas that could require standardization include establishing liability in smart contracts, determining jurisdiction for arbitrating blockchain related disputes, standardizing energy efficiency in order to limit carbon emissions and other impacts, and ensuring privacy rights for blockchain users. Standards for blockchain have yet to be released by any organization but many are under development.

In May, China announced that it would release blockchain standards by 2019. The International Organization for Standardization’s technical committee on blockchain and distributed ledgers currently has eight ISO standards under development (with no projected due date). However, not all standardization or regulation is viewed as helpful. The state of New York requires cryptocurrencies to apply for BitLicenses in order to ensure anti-laundering practices and to protect consumers. Critics complain the expense of the license is a barrier to market entry and that it sets a dangerous precedent: if all states require different licenses for operation, cross-jurisdictional operation would be near to impossible. The lack of clear and agreed upon national and international standards can delay the wide adoption of new technologies by years or decades; greater efforts need to be devoted here to realize the benefits side of the blockchain environmental ledger.

Even with future improvements in energy efficiency, security, and standardization, observers argue that the buzz around blockchain is overblown. In many sectors better alternatives to blockchain already exist that are both less energy intensive and much faster. Visa’s credit card system processes 60,000 monetary transactions per second. Bitcoin can process only seven. Blockchain is useful when it is the most cost effective method for building trust and when there is an incentive to join the platform. Many of the environmental applications mentioned above do not necessarily require high transaction processing capacity but do have a need for trust and security. In order to fully realize the potential of distributed ledgers in the environmental field, professionals should think critically about areas in which blockchain can be most effective.

A larger question lurks behind blockchain, one that we need to ask generally about emerging technologies: Is blockchain another incremental step down the path of what Clayton Christensen at Harvard Business School calls “business process efficiency” — or does it constitute a true product innovation? The limited number of applications and experiments so far sound more like the former, a move toward greater efficiency, maybe even a type of hyper-efficiency, but hardly the disruption brought on by the introduction of the internal combustion engine or the microprocessor.

The radical-value proposition of blockchain, that it could democratize information and decentralize authority, sounds vaguely similar to the prophecies of the early Internet age, before large corporations took control of every bit, byte, and tweet and planted AI-enabled extensions of themselves into our cars and homes. At this point, environmental professionals need to help create and shape an experimental space in the blockchain ecosystem that encourages developing and evaluating needed applications, working with philanthropies, startups, governments, NGOs, law firms, and of course businesses to improve resource efficiency and public health. TEF

ELI PRESS ❧ Environmental professionals need to be part of an ongoing conversation with the software developers and other stakeholders that will shape the social contract affecting bitcoin’s and other applications’ environmental costs and benefits — plus shape emerging policy and governance responses.

Energy Justice
Subtitle
What it means and how to integrate it into state regulation of electricity markets
Author
Aladdine Joroff - Harvard Law School
Harvard Law School
Current Issue
Issue
4
Energy Justice

The evolution of electricity systems raises fundamental questions about how to balance innovation with costs to individuals, particularly those individuals who are less able to participate in or benefit from the innovation. Who bears the costs of modernization, and how we distribute the burdens and benefits, are societal questions with policy implications that underlie the concept of energy justice. Energy justice looks beyond income-based discount rates that, while necessary, are alone too blunt a tool to optimize the underlying dynamics that create the need for such discounts.

Although the long-term goals of modernizing our electricity system, whether the sources of energy or the infrastructure (i.e., the grid), include greater personal control over energy usage and cost savings, there are up-front costs that will often be borne by consumers. Even if total costs do not increase, they may be redistributed as pricing systems evolve to reflect the changing nature of connections and customer usage patterns. Increased or redistributed costs raise concerns about potential impacts, particularly disproportionate impacts, on low-income consumers, who are frequently least able to accommodate higher or volatile energy prices.1 This concern drives questions as to whether decisions about our electricity system are “fair” or “equitable.”

Energy justice is a relatively new concept as compared to environmental justice, and although the ideas are related, they at times diverge in objectives and strategies. Achieving the full range of goals envisioned by both concepts 2 requires anticipating where energy and environmental equity concerns overlap or differ. This Comment proposes a framework for evaluating energy justice, recognizing that there is not, nor need be, a uniform definition of what energy justice means or what it seeks to achieve. The authority and process for implementing this framework will differ across jurisdictions, but the Comment examines some of the questions that state legislatures and ratemaking agencies will face when integrating energy justice considerations into their regulation of electricity markets.

Delving Into the Definition of Energy Justice

There are few stand-alone definitions or objectives for energy justice, and the universal adoption of a single definition is unlikely. Predicting cost-distribution impacts of electricity market developments is often complicated by the fact that many of these policy initiatives and utility proceedings build on new technologies and novel business strategies. An evaluation of equitable impacts thus should go beyond a static consideration of the cost of isolated actions. The following proposed definition thus encompasses principles that address energy equity issues beyond the consideration of discounts for low-income consumers:

Building on the tenets of environmental justice, which provide that all people have a right to be protected from environmental pollution and to live in and enjoy a clean and healthful environment, energy justice is based on the principle that all people should have a reliable, safe, and affordable source of energy; protection from a disproportionate share of costs or negative impacts or externalities associated with building, operating, and maintaining electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems; and equitable distribution of and access to benefits from such systems.

This definition goes beyond using energy burdens as a proxy for energy equity concerns. While reducing energy burdens is a component of energy justice, it is only one of the objectives of energy justice, which include:

  1. Reducing energy burdens on low-income consumers;
  2. Avoiding disproportionate distribution of the costs or negative impacts associated with building, operating, and maintaining electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems;
  3. Providing equitable distribution of and access to real benefits associated with building, operating, and maintaining electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems; and
  4. Ensuring a reliable source of electricity and protecting low-income households, including those on fixed incomes, from price fluctuations.

While all aspects of this framework are worthy objectives, simultaneously making progress on all principles will not always be possible. The following sections flesh out what is meant by each of the above-enumerated principles.

Reducing Energy Burdens on Low-Income Consumers

From an economic perspective, energy burdens refer to the percentage of income households spend on energy costs: low-income households generally have higher energy burdens than other households, primarily because their income is lower but also because their homes tend to be older and less energy-efficient.3 According to a 2016 study of nearly 50 major metropolitan areas in the United States, low-income households devote up to three times as much income to energy-related utility costs as do higher-income households; in more than one-third of the cities studied, one-quarter of low-income households had an energy burden greater than 14%.4 The burden increases when heating costs are considered.5

Energy burdens matter because households facing disproportionately high energy costs relative to income make budget trade offs that can jeopardize health, safety, and housing stability.6 According to a 2005 survey, a significant proportion of households receiving federal energy assistance in the Northeast reported making budget trade offs because they did not have enough money to pay their energy bills: 20% went without food; 28% went without medical or dental care; and 23% did not make a full rent or mortgage payment at least once.7 Children and elderly individuals are often most susceptible to such trade offs.8

As a metric for measuring progress, the economic size of energy burdens is easier to calculate than other “equal protection” objectives of energy justice, but reducing energy burdens will not be the most appropriate driver in all equity discussions. A ratemaking case, where a utility is determining charges for different categories of users, is a logical context to consider mechanisms to reduce energy burdens; however, it may be less appropriate to link the growth of renewable energy to a reduction of energy burdens. For example, when determining whether or how to compensate or charge residential solar owners, it might be sufficient, from an energy justice perspective, to seek to avoid increasing energy burdens, either proportionally or absolutely, as opposed to reducing them.

An example of a potential hybrid approach comes from Massachusetts, where stakeholders petitioned the Department of Public Utilities (DPU) to “restore” the value of the discount rates for low-income consumers because “the cost of on-site generation subsidies which low-income discount customers rarely receive have had the effect of offsetting low-income rate discounts by almost 20%.”9 This request was presented as an adjudicatory petition separate from decisions about
(1) whether to provide a discount for low-income consumers, and (2) how to integrate renewable energy into the electricity system. The outcome could have been an order directing utilities to immediately and/or periodically review, and revise as necessary, their discount rates to reflect any impacts from subsidies for on-site generation (subject to filing and opportunity for review but separate from rate cases). However, DPU declined to open a stand-alone proceeding and instead encouraged petitioners to raise the issue in company-specific base rate case proceedings, an approach with higher transactional costs due to the multiple filings required.

Avoiding Disproportionate Distribution of the Costs or Negative Impacts

This principle looks to the comparative size and shifting of costs or negative impacts between categories of consumers as opposed to the absolute costs. When commentators posit that the effect of solar customers using less energy from the grid and running their meters in reverse is to shift the payment of lost utility revenue onto individuals who do not have solar panels, they are implicating concerns about disproportionate distributions of costs, given that wealthier homeowners are more likely to own solar panels than lower-income consumers.10

This aspect of energy justice is also concerned with nonmonetary impacts. For example, if businesses or communities develop microgrids powered by natural gas, an energy justice analysis queries whether such facilities would negatively impact air quality in neighborhoods where conditions are worse than in surrounding areas or as compared to state averages, even if compliant with relevant standards.

Providing Equitable Distribution of and Access to Real Benefits

As proposed here, an energy justice analysis considers whether consumers have equitable opportunities to take advantage of energy cost-saving measures and other benefits. When all consumers help pay for changes to the electricity system, resulting benefits should accrue or be accessible to all consumers. Such benefits could take the form of reduced environmental impacts, greater control over electricity usage, or reduced bills. Applying this principle may require considering whether benefits should be distributed equally to all consumers, proportionally based on contributions to cost, or disproportionately favoring those consumers most “in need” of the benefits.

When discretionary actions result in benefits, systems should be designed to enable as many people as possible to take the beneficial actions. In some instances, low-income households interested in taking advantage of new technology, such as programmable thermostats, may struggle with the initial investment required to access associated benefits. Policies informed by energy justice principles should account for these initial costs and consider mechanisms that allow low-income consumers to utilize new technologies without increasing their energy burden. To illustrate, to the extent that residential solar power provides cost-savings or benefits to direct users, solar farms and virtual power plants are mechanisms that may provide similar benefits to populations without access to rooftop solar.

Some ratepayer advocates worry that access to benefits simply for the sake of access may not be meaningful, and could in fact be detrimental, such as access to cheap credit.11 But is an energy justice analysis the right context to decide whether providing access to a benefit is a worthwhile objective if utilizing the benefit could have negative consequences? Rather than making a paternalistic decision to preclude such access at the outset, an energy justice analysis instead could be refined to target appropriate use by (1) looking for potential drawbacks of access to benefits, and (2) ensuring that programs are designed in tandem with appropriate education, outreach, and pilot programs.

Ensuring a Reliable Source of Electricity and Protecting From Price Fluctuations

This principle most closely tracks the traditional goal of energy system regulators: to ensure reliable, affordable, and, more frequently, sustainable/clean electricity sources and systems. From a purely economic standpoint, the historical application of this principle would have frequently focused on access to the lowest-cost forms of energy (e.g., nuclear, coal, or gas). A more-nuanced approach is needed in today’s world, given trends such as (1) renewable generators bidding into markets at negative rates, (2) markets lacking adequate storage to run exclusively on renewables, and (3) evolving systems for real-time pricing. For example, a holistic application of this principle would favor actions that help flatten load curves and reduce peak prices, which would implicate issues other than lowest-cost fuel sources.

This energy justice framework focuses on substantive/distributive justice as opposed to procedural/participatory rights. This is not to minimize the importance of equal access and ability to participate in decisionmaking processes. The focus on distributive justice arose from (1) the greater similarities between procedural justice in the energy and environmental justice contexts, and (2) the greater progress made on procedural objectives than substantive equal protection goals.12 However, relevant to both aspects of energy justice is the need for education and outreach. Energy literacy programs are important because the learning curve for understanding and accessing the advantages of an evolving grid can be incredibly steep for any customer, and this is exacerbated when consumers lack access to information about their energy systems or prioritize other needs. Greater knowledge can empower consumers to take greater control over their energy usage and become more involved in energy decisions.

Energy Justice Is a Concept Additional to Environmental Justice

The concepts of environmental justice and energy justice have commonalities, but they are not always consistent and can differ in the people they seek to protect, the harms they seek to avoid, and the strategies they employ to achieve fair results. Traditionally, environmental justice focused on the aggregation of pollution and sources of pollution in lower-income and minority communities.13 Today, many environmental justice initiatives go beyond siting and permitting decisions, and also promote “fairness” or “equity” with regard to matters such as the oversight and enforcement of polluters, the distribution of cleanup grants, and access to funds for open spaces or other “green” benefits.

Moreover, the definitions and objectives of environmental justice laws and policies are not static, and some expressly recognize a need to address energy-related issues that go beyond the siting of traditional energy infrastructure.14 However, given the framework for energy justice outlined above, most existing approaches to environmental justice are not sufficient to protect individuals in their role as energy consumers as well as in their role as community members.

Environmental justice policies typically seek to protect or assist people at the community level, defining protected neighborhoods by reference to factors such as income levels and percentages of minorities, foreign-born residents, and/or non-English speakers.15 Assistance for low-income electricity consumers, on the other hand, is targeted at recipients based on personal or household income levels. These approaches provide protection/assistance to different people. This is illustrated in Table 1, which compares energy and environmental justice subjects in Boston, a large urban area, and in Concord, a well-to-do Massachusetts suburb. (The comparison in the table is not precise, as it looks at “populations” subject to environmental justice policies versus “households” eligible for federal energy assistance, but demonstrates in the aggregate that the programs protect different people.)

Even when proponents of environmental protection and low-income energy consumers seek to protect the same people, they may disagree on what that means. In the solar net metering discussion, for instance, some rate advocates view residential solar as a non-cost-effective measure that, by decreasing utilities’ revenues, reduces their ability to carry out their social responsibilities, including to low-income consumers. Environmental advocates, on the other hand, may argue that, because all electricity consumers will benefit from the societal value of reduced emissions and avoided capacity investments, any equity concerns should be addressed by making solar power widely available.

To promote equitable solutions and innovations, advocates and decisionmakers should consider both environmental and energy equity perspectives in order to identify and take advantage of synergies and resolve potential conflicts. Dialogue and coordination between environmental and low-income/rate advocates could also increase energy literacy, both among advocates and electricity consumers.

Application of an Energy Justice Framework to State Regulation of Electricity Markets

Energy justice considerations will most frequently be addressed at the state level by legislatures and ratemaking entities. The authority and structure of such entities will differ across states, but many will face similar questions when designing and implementing energy justice policies. This section outlines some of these questions, but provides neither a comprehensive list nor answers. Rather, this is presented as a starting point for further discussion.

Table 1. Environmental Justice Populations and Energy Assistance-Eligible Households in Boston and Concord, Massachusetts

Who Has Authority to Address Energy Justice Objectives?

Multiple government entities have authority to make decisions or seek action/relief relevant to the electricity system, from legislatures and ratemaking agencies (e.g., departments of public utilities and public utility commissions) to offices of attorneys general. Determining which entity has the authority to make decisions relevant to energy justice involves a jurisdiction-specific analysis. Some general questions to consider, however, include:

  • When is there a need for additional legislation or changes to existing legislation to address energy justice issues?
  • Do ratemaking agencies have the authority to set statewide tariffs or fees, or can they only make such decisions in the context of individual ratemaking cases?
  • When setting policies or approving rates, how much leeway do ratemaking agencies have to consider, or to base their decisions on, issues like energy justice?
  • Can ratemaking agencies investigate or adopt new policies on their own initiative?
  • Which parties, governmental or private, have standing to petition for actions relevant to energy justice or to challenge decisions based on energy justice considerations?

Given the evolution of concepts like energy justice, environmental justice, and climate change, existing sources of authority may support addressing these issues without explicitly referencing current nomenclature. As an example, the Massachusetts Legislature has stated that “affordable electric service should be available to all consumers on reasonable terms and conditions,” and that “electricity bills for low income residents should remain as affordable as possible.”16 Though not using the term, this language gives the Massachusetts DPU authority to consider energy justice, a conclusion supported by judicial precedent confirming that rate classifications can be based on “[a]ny number of factors” beyond cost of service.17

In What Context Are Equitable Impacts Measured?

Equitable impacts of proposed actions are not isolated effects; they occur in complex electricity systems that already include a number of explicit and implicit cost-shifting features and subsidies that flow in multiple directions. As examples:

  • Utility/ratepayer subsidies: Some states require regulated energy utilities to impose a surcharge on customers to fund discounts on low-income customers’ utility bills.18
  • Government/taxpayer subsidies: LIHEAP is an example of federal funding that assists low-income households with heating, cooling, and weatherization expenses.
  • Implicit cost-shifting: Many electric bills include volumetric charges with set transmission and distribution fees even though a person living next to a power plant has a “real” transmission cost less than that for a person whose electricity travels over 100 miles of wires. Because these two customers pay the same price per unit of electricity, the person next to the power plant, who may be a lower-income individual, is subsidizing the costs of the person living farther away. As another example, where electricity is sold at a single rate, there can be a cross-subsidy between consumers with flatter load profiles and those with peakier load profiles.

Contextual analyses of equitable impacts that consider the full range of existing subsidies and cost-shifting features are more complicated; parameters for analyses that are less than holistic may be appropriate, or at least necessary, especially in time-constrained proceedings.

Geographic and temporal limits can also be relevant. For instance, if the environmental benefits of cleaner energy sources are contemplated as part of the energy justice analysis, decisionmakers need to consider the geographic context in which such impacts are measured. As an example, the addition of solar power anywhere may reduce greenhouse gas emissions (assuming other generation is displaced or avoided), but such global benefits are different than the localized benefits of adding solar power directly in a community with poor air quality.

Who Is Protected by Energy Justice Goals?

It may be appropriate for energy justice policies to protect consumers beyond those that actually receive some form of subsidy on their electric bills. For instance, LIHEAP is not an entitlement program; there is no legal mandate to provide benefits to all eligible households, funding fluctuates, and assistance often reaches only a portion of eligible households. Even when funding is available, not all eligible customers take advantage of discounted residential electricity rates. Energy policies could instead be designed to protect all consumers or households eligible for financial assistance.

However, eligibility criteria for subsidies and other forms of financial assistance vary both within and across programs; there is no single set of participation requirements or income thresholds. Assistance may be targeted to individuals with defined incomes, fixed incomes, and/or specific characteristics (e.g., senior citizens, families with young children, and individuals who have a serious illness or require the use of medical devices). Given the occurring and projected rising number of extreme heat days, it may be necessary, particularly in states where air-conditioning use has historically been low, to expand hardship classifications to include more individuals with heat-related illnesses. How protected populations are defined can impact the scope and cost of equity-driven decisions.

What Information Is Necessary to Evaluate Energy Justice Impacts?

As is often the case when considering electricity system proposals, the information needed for energy justice analyses varies based on the issue under consideration. At times, such analyses will raise questions in rate- or utility-specific proceedings that are often associated with more widely applicable policy discussions. As an example, consider an energy justice analysis for a proposal to implement time-varying rates (TVRs) with either an opt-out or opt-in approach. If the installation of smart meters is tied to decisions about participating in TVR programs, then questions arise as to who makes the opt-out/opt-in decision, and if it is an opt-in program, who pays for the meters. Examples might include:

  • In a rental property, is the opt-in/opt-out decision made by the landlord or the individual tenants19
  • Will landlords be required to install submeters?
  • If an opt-in TVR program charges participants for the smart meters, will tenants or landlords pay for the meters?
  • If the tenant pays for the smart meter installation, what happens to the smart meter when the tenant moves?
  • Would the cost of a meter prohibit participation by low-income consumers and, if so, could the cost be paid over time through savings in energy bills?

Additional information may be needed to design programs that optimize equitable outcomes. With respect to TVRs, although pilot studies continue to be performed, the impacts of TVRs on low-income consumers are not fully understood. Striking the right balance between giving low-income consumers access to the benefits of TVRs and protecting them from high peak costs will not be easy (and there is unlikely to be an approach that uniformly affects all consumers). But regulators should consider innovative strategies to allow those low-income consumers who can benefit from TVRs to do so, while protecting those who would be hurt by TVRs from significant increases in their energy burdens.

Simply carving low-income consumers out of TVR programs would be too blunt a tool and leave potential benefits on the table. Hybrid solutions might entail:

  • Providing exemptions from opt-out programs for particularly vulnerable populations (e.g., individuals dependent on medical equipment that requires electricity), and offering them an opt-in TVR program instead; or
  • Conducting “shadow billings” that allow customers to see the impact TVRs would have on their bills before the TVRs are actually applied. This would give consumers an opportunity to test their ability to respond to TVRs.

Outreach and education will strengthen realization of benefits from new programs such as these. Adaptive and iterative management of electricity systems that is open to innovation and integrates flexibility into traditionally longer-term capital planning will support achievement of energy justice goals.

Conclusion

Whether or not defined as such, the concept of energy justice is not new, but as an analytical tool it is less common than environmental justice analyses. Adopting systemic frameworks for energy justice, and consistently evaluating electricity market decisions from an equity perspective, will support the evolution of electricity markets that meet societal goals of fairness and affordability.

Taken individually, many initial steps in grid modernization and other proceedings may not have a disproportionate impact on low-income consumers. For example, adding advanced sensors and meters or data analysis capacity should have proportional cost impacts if installed uniformly. But smart meters that support the implementation of TVRs could result in rate structures with higher basic service prices, or more risk of price volatility, that may disproportionately impact low-income consumers. Thus, energy justice analyses should consider the impact not only of specific actions or investments, but also the outcomes that these investments lead to or support. TEF

1. See, e.g., Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, Anticipated Policy Framework for Time Varying Rates (June 12, 2014) (D.P.U. 14-04-B) (“the Department is mindful of the concerns raised on behalf of low-income customers and others who are unable to shift a significant portion of their consumption due to extraordinary circumstances, such as medical equipment requirements”).

2. Such goals include ensuring grid safety and reliability, providing universal access to affordable electricity, and reducing greenhouse gas and other emissions from the generation and distribution of electricity.

3. Rental households also experience higher energy burdens. See, e.g., Ariel Drehobl & Lauren Ross, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Lifting the High Energy Burden in America’s Largest Cities: How Energy Efficiency Can Improve Low Income and Underserved Communities 12 (2016).

4. Id. at 3-6. Other studies suggest a more drastic difference.

5. See, e.g., Meg Power, Economic Opportunity Studies, The Burden of FY 2008 Residential Energy Bills on Low-Income Consumers 5 (2008) (reporting energy burdens of nearly 40% for certain low-income consumers in New England), available at http://www.opportunitystudies.org/repository/File/energy_affordability/Forecast_
Burdens_08.pdf
. This report is a snapshot in time; the percent of income spent on energy costs will vary based on factors such as temperatures, energy costs, and average incomes.

6. See, e.g., Diana Hernandez & Stephen Bird, Energy Burden and the Need for Integrated Low-Income Housing and Energy Policy, 2 Poverty & Pub. Pol’y 4, 7-8 (2010).

7. Lauren Smith et al., Child Health Impact Working Group (Boston Medical Center), Unhealthy Consequences: Energy Costs and Child Health 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.hiaguide.org/sites/default/files/ChildHIAofenergycostsandchildhealth.pdf.

8. See, e.g., Hernandez & Bird, supra note 6, at 8 (finding that children in families with high energy burdens are exposed to “nutritional deficiencies, higher risks of burns from non-conventional heating sources, higher risks for cognitive and developmental behavior deficiencies, and increased incidences of carbon monoxide poisoning”).

9. Petition of the Low-Income Weatherization and Fuel Assistance Program Network to Apply G.L. c. 164, sec. 141 (Nov. 17, 2015).

10. This is a simplified summary of net metering arguments, provided for illustrative as opposed to analytical purposes.

11. This concern was raised in interviews that Harvard Law School’s Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic conducted with environmental and energy nonprofit organizations.

12. Experience with environmental justice laws and policies suggests that the procedural components of equity initiatives, such as enhanced outreach and participation, are often easier to address than the substantive components. There are, for instance, fewer benchmarks to determine what type of review or actions are sufficient to implement a substantive environmental justice objective such as equal protection.

13. The origins of environmental justice can be seen in the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s, but its roots as a separate movement are often traced back to the early 1980s, when a siting dispute over a hazardous waste landfill in a minority community in North Carolina brought attention to the issue. The momentum generated by the protests in North Carolina built, in part, on two prior federal actions. The first was the passage in 1964 of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits using federal funds in a way that discriminates based on race, color, and national origin. The second was a 1970 study finding that lead poisoning was disproportionately impacting African American and Hispanic children. In response to this and other studies showing disproportionate exposures to environmental burdens and associated health risks, environmental justice policies sought, and continue to seek, increased procedural and substantive review requirements for the siting and permitting of projects in or near groups or areas defined as environmental justice populations or neighborhoods. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Environmental Law, 24 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 149, 158 (2013); Maryland Department of the Environment, What Is Environmental Justice?, http://mde.maryland.gov/programs/Crossmedia/EnvironmentalJustice/Pages/WhatisEJ.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2017).

14. The federal government as well as all states and the District of Columbia have “some type of environmental justice law, executive order, or policy,” and states “continue to innovate in tackling environmental justice issues and the range of approaches is growing, showing that this area of law and policy continues to mature.” See Robert D. Bullard et al., Texas Southern University, Environmental Justice Milestones and Accomplishments: 1964-2014 (2014); American Bar Association & Hastings College of the Law, Environmental Justice for All: A Fifty State Survey of Legislation, Policies, and Cases (Steven Bonorris ed., 4th ed. 2010).

15. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994), Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12898.pdf (directing federal agencies to ensure that programs, policies, and activities that substantially affect human health or the environment are conducted so as not to exclude participation or deny benefits to people and populations because of their race, color, or national origin); Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, Environmental Justice Policy (2017), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/ej/2017-environmental-justice-policy.pdf (defining environmental justice populations at the neighborhood level by reference to income levels and percentages of minority or “English Isolation” residents).

16. Massachusetts Legislature, ch. 164 of the Acts of 1997, An Act Relative to Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry in the Commonwealth, Regulating the Provision of Electricity and Other Services, and Promoting Enhanced Consumer Protections Therein, §1(b) and (n) (Nov. 25, 1997).

17. See, e.g., American Hoechest Corp. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 379 Mass. 408, 411-12 (Mass. 1980) (“It is ‘axiomatic in ratemaking’ that ‘different treatment for different classes of customers, reasonably classified, is not unlawful discrimination.’”) (internal citations omitted).

18. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 164, §1F(4)(i) (2017).

19. Consideration of tenants is relevant from an energy justice perspective because low-income consumers are more likely to be renters.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER ❧ What it means and how to integrate it into state regulation of electricity markets.

The Debate: Reorganizing the Administration of Public Lands: Zinke’s Proposal to Revamp Interior Department
Author
David J. Hayes - NYU Law School State Energy & Environmental Impact Center
Patty Limerick - University of Colorado Center of the American West
Peter Schaumberg - Beveridge & Diamond, P.C.
Amanda Leiter - American University
Lynn Scarlett - The Nature Conservancy
Doug Wheeler - Hogan Lovells US LLP
NYU Law School State Energy & Environmental Impact Center
University of Colorado Center of the American West
Beveridge & Diamond, P.C.
American University
The Nature Conservancy
Hogan Lovells US LLP
Current Issue
Issue
3
The Debate: Reorganizing the Administration of Public Lands: Zinke’s Proposal to

Secretary Ryan Zinke has announced his intention to undertake a major reorganization of the Department of the Interior, although the exact proposal is a moving target, as he has since amended it after pushback from some western governors who urged him to follow state borders. His initial reform would move field personnel into a new regional structure that would be defined by watersheds or other geographic features.

At the same time, he proposed delegating more authority to the field — including, potentially, giving rotating regional heads decisionmaking authority for the department. Other ideas floated in the proposal include moving one or more bureau headquarters to a western city. Some observers also have even discussed moving the department’s main offices from Washington to the West.

There are good reasons to reorganize the department. Interior has a number of bureaus with sometimes-conflicting missions and, in years past, was described by some as the “Department of Everything Else.” So it is not surprising that Interior reorganization ideas surface on a recurring basis.

We have asked several experienced hands to comment on whether, in their view, Congress and the Trump administration should tackle a reorganization effort and, if so, what it might look like. We asked them to respond to the Zinke proposal and make their own suggestions.

As an initial matter, should Congress take steps to clarify the Interior Department’s primary roles, and align its bureaus and regional structure accordingly? Is now a good time to address the perennial question of whether the U.S. Forest Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration should be part of Interior’s natural resources portfolio, rather than being in the Agriculture and Commerce Departments? What have we learned from prior formal reorganizations (such as the break-up of the Minerals Management Service), or from other management efforts to promote joint decisionmaking among the department’s many bureaus?

In sum, what is the best management structure for a department that administers vast holdings throughout the United States, with an environmental charge as part of its mandate?

Secretary Ryan Zinke has announced his intention to undertake a major reorganization of the Department of the Interior, although the exact proposal is a moving target, as he has since amended it after pushback from some western governors who urged him to follow state borders. His initial reform would move field personnel into a new regional structure that would be defined by watersheds or other geographic features.

At the same time, he proposed delegating more authority to the field — including, potentially, giving rotating regional heads decisionmaking authority for the department. Other ideas floated in the proposal include moving one or more bureau headquarters to a western city. Some observers also have even discussed moving the department’s main offices from Washington to the West.

There are good reasons to reorganize the department. Interior has a number of bureaus with sometimes-conflicting missions and, in years past, was described by some as the “Department of Everything Else.” So it is not surprising that Interior reorganization ideas surface on a recurring basis.

We have asked several experienced hands to comment on whether, in their view, Congress and the Trump administration should tackle a reorganization effort and, if so, what it might look like. We asked them to respond to the Zinke proposal and make their own suggestions.

As an initial matter, should Congress take steps to clarify the Interior Department’s primary roles, and align its bureaus and regional structure accordingly? Is now a good time to address the perennial question of whether the U.S. Forest Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration should be part of Interior’s natural resources portfolio, rather than being in the Agriculture and Commerce Departments? What have we learned from prior formal reorganizations (such as the break-up of the Minerals Management Service), or from other management efforts to promote joint decisionmaking among the department’s many bureaus?

In sum, what is the best management structure for a department that administers vast holdings throughout the United States, with an environmental charge as part of its mandate?

Editor’s Note: We asked Deputy Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt to participate in this Debate, but he declined our invitation.

THE DEBATE ❧ Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke has announced an ambitious plan to reorganize his huge department and the administration of public lands. In particular, he envisions a regional structure that follows watersheds rather than geographic boundaries and moving some bureaus to western cities.

Right on Green
Author
Daniel A. Farber - Center for Law, Energy, and the Environment at the University of California, Berkeley
Center for Law, Energy, and the Environment at the University of California, Berkeley
Current Issue
Issue
3
Right on Green

The founders of modern conservatism saw a role for the state in ensuring environmental quality by regulating polluters. While that changed in more recent decades, there are signs that a new generation of conservatives favors a governmental role in reducing emissions.

Daniel A. FarberDaniel A. Farber is the Sho Sato Professor of Law and codirector of the Center for Law, Energy, and the Environment at the University of California, Berkeley.

Today, conservatism is associated with anti-environmentalism. It comes as something of a shock, therefore, to discover that in the 1960s and 1970s, in the midst of establishing the modern conservative movement, iconic figures such as Ronald Reagan, Barry Goldwater, and William F. Buckley all took staunchly pro-environmental positions, including a willingness to countenance regulations that might be considered too radical for today’s Democrats. Yet today, conservatism has become associated with skepticism about environmental science, enthusiasm for expanding development activities on public lands, a firm belief in the merits of fossil fuels, and an instinctive hatred for regulation.

The process by which these pro-environmental views were forced out began in the 1980s but did not reach fruition until the conservative backlash against the Obama administration. The way was eased for these anti-regulatory views to triumph by large infusions of money from conservative business leaders, especially from the fossil fuel industries — such as the Koch family. Pro-development interests in the western states also played a role, starting with the Sagebrush Rebellion that started in the 1970s. Political and economic forces, more than logic or empirical evidence, gave anti-environmental views ascendancy among conservatives.

Despite the seeming hegemonic dominance of anti-environmentalism within the conservative movement, there are some hopeful straws in the wind. The coal industry is in seemingly irreversible decline, and the major oil companies have begun to moderate their views on environmental issues, including climate change. Meanwhile, the renewable energy sector is becoming an increasingly powerful economic and political force, even in red states such as Texas, Iowa, and Kansas. Some western states have begun to diversify their economies and no longer view mining and oil as unmitigated benefits. And a handful of conservative thinkers have started to rethink the anti-environmental verities they learned from an older generation. Indeed, just before this article was written, Congress passed a defense spending bill that calls climate change a serious threat to national security. In the House, 46 Republicans crossed the aisle to vote in favor of that provision.

Rediscovering this lost history is important because it shows that vigorous environmental protection can be consistent with strong conservative values. A revival of this school of thought could enrich discourse within the conservative movement and help heal the growing schism between conservatives and scientists. It would also begin to depolarize debates over environmental policy, helping to defuse knee-jerk reactions on both sides and move policy debates in a more constructive direction. If the signs of a conservative-environmentalist revival come to fruition, the result could be a healthier political atmosphere and a more stable, better-designed regulatory regime.

This article will follow a largely chronological path, beginning with the surprisingly pro-environmental views of the founding fathers of modern conservatism. The focus then turns to the backlash that began in the late 1970s and has carried through to the present. Finally, we will turn to examine some hopeful signs that may herald the beginning of a shift in conservative values.

Conservative thought in some form or another goes back to the ancient Greek philosophers, but modern American conservatism has more recent roots. The movement arose from William F. Buckley’s efforts to fuse three strands of conservative thinking: libertarianism, traditionalism, and anti-communism. Buckley’s podium, the National Review, remains the leading conservative journal today. Yet, even before environmental issues received attention from Congress, Buckley himself viewed environmental problems very seriously — and as prime prospects for regulation.

Buckley ran for mayor of New York in 1965 with a campaign designed to educate the public about conservative views rather than securing electoral victory. (When asked what he would do if by chance he won, Buckley quipped, “Demand a recount.”) Buckley took a strongly environmentalist position. He called pollution control “a classic example of the kind of thing that government should do . . . because the people cannot do it themselves.” He proposed that all cars sold in the city or entering the city be required to comply with California’s new, stricter air pollution standards for vehicles. In order to reduce traffic, he advocated a toll to discourage cars from entering Manhattan and an elevated bikeway for 125 blocks down Second Avenue.

Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign marked the emergence of modern conservatism on the national stage. His followers began the conservative takeover of the Republican Party and established institutional structures, rhetoric, ideology, and political strategies such as mass fundraising efforts that prevail even today. Goldwater was generally a harsh critic of federal regulation, so his views on the environment may come as something of a surprise. His 1970 book The Conscience of a Majority has a chapter entitled “Saving the Earth.” “Our job,” he said, “is to prevent that lush orb known as the Earth . . . from turning into a bleak and barren, dirty brown planet.” Continuing to paint environmental problems in stark terms, he added: “It is difficult to visualize what will be left of the Earth if our present rates of population and pollution expansion are maintained.”

Goldwater said the pollution issue “should be much more than a political football for aspiring office-holders or office-keepers.” He said, “Although I am a great believer in the free, competitive enterprise system and all that it entails, I am an even stronger believer in the right of our people to live in clean and pollution-free environments.” Thus, he said, “When pollution is found, it should be halted at the source, even if this requires stringent government action against important segments of our national economy.” He added that the American people might need “to make some unhappy and large-sized sacrifices in order to preserve their environment.” For instance, he said, it might be necessary to crack down on pollution from coal-fired power plants, and that in turn might require sharp cuts in electricity use.

Ronald Reagan, too, embraced environmentalism. In 2015, a writer in the Los Angeles Times called Reagan “the most environmental governor in California history — protecting wild rivers from dams, preserving a Sierra wilderness by blocking highway builders, creating an air resources board that led to the nation’s first auto smog controls.” This may be an overstatement, but there were indeed some major environmental achievements during his tenure. Concern about the environment was not just a political gambit for Reagan. His childhood along the Rock River in Illinois and his experiences in filming movies in the West had left him with a warm regard for nature.

One of Reagan’s accomplishments as governor was safeguarding Lake Tahoe from impacts of surrounding development. Although he had a strong preference for local control of land use, once he had seen the lake’s condition he agreed that an interstate solution was required, and he signed a compact with the governor of Nevada establishing a joint regional planning authority.

There were other examples of Reagan’s efforts to protect nature. A particularly arresting example of his environmentalism involved a dramatic horseback ride through the Sierras to stop a federal highway project. He also blocked dam proposals on the Eel River and on the Middle Fork of the Feather River. Perhaps more notably, he signed California’s wild and scenic rivers legislation. During the Reagan years, California also added 145,000 acres of land to its state park system along with areas of the Pacific Ocean. And even more notably, Reagan signed the California Environmental Quality Act, which has been a thorn in the side of development interests ever since.

Reagan also signed legislation creating the California Air Resources Board, one of the strongest state regulatory agencies in the country. During Reagan’s term as governor, CARB set air quality standards for stationary sources such as power plants and adopted the nation’s first nitric oxide standard for vehicles.

This liaison between conservatives and environmentalism was not to last. Instead, regulatory backlash increasingly dominated both the conservative movement and the Republican Party. It is important to understand the roots of this backlash and especially the role played by business interests and wealthy political donors in catalyzing the metamorphosis.

In response to the new regulatory climate, a symbiotic relationship began to emerge between anti-regulatory ideologues and parts of the business community (particularly manufacturing, mining, and oil). This alliance between business and movement conservatives — of which Reagan would become an exemplar — can be seen as early as the 1960s, when Fred Koch (father of today’s Koch brothers) ordered copies of Goldwater’s conservative manifesto, Conscience of a Conservative, for every library and newspaper in Kansas. By the time Reagan left office, the Koch family had also launched the Cato Institute, which “promoted the purest strands of libertarian thinking.”

A memo by soon-to-be-Justice Lewis Powell for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce became a manifesto for corporate resistance to regulation. Shortly before going on the bench, Powell wrote the influential memo decrying what he considered an anti-capitalist intellectual climate and calling for the chamber to finance cadres of more sympathetic scholars. The Powell memo received considerable attention from conservative elites. Although the chamber did not take action, others heeded the call to develop a counterweight to liberal academics.

The anti-regulatory movement led to the establishment of major Washington think tanks. The American Enterprise Institute had been created years earlier by the chairman of the country’s largest asbestos manufacturer, but its budget increased tenfold during the 1970s. Even more important was the Heritage Foundation, which bills itself as promoting “conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.” Heritage and AEI provided key staff for the Reagan administration and later for George W. Bush and Donald Trump. Both foundations experienced surges of funding in the mid-1970s, but Heritage outdid AEI by developing a new model of politically engaged, less-academic activity.

By the late 1970s, the Republican Party had begun to move away from environmental protection. Instead, renewed stress was placed on increased resource development and introducing balance between environmental and economic values. By 1980, the change from an early embrace of environmental protection was dramatic. The Republican Platform that year blamed “excessive regulation” for “our nation’s spiraling inflation” and for stifling “private initiative, individual freedom, and state and local government autonomy.” The platform reflected both the influence of the business community and a backlash of rural interests in western states against conservation.

Reagan’s positions in the first few years of his presidency were in tune with the GOP platform and strikingly at odds with his actions as governor. But he revamped his approach when the initial anti-environmental initiatives ran into trouble. In the end, he went along with a considerable number of new protections for the environment. He accepted significant environmental legislation from Congress, toughening regulation of hazardous waste (the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) and requiring public disclosures of the use and discharge of toxic chemicals (the Toxics Release Inventory).

On at least one major occasion during his presidency, Reagan personally championed environmental protection. He signed the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer, calling it a “monumental achievement.” The president sided with EPA and the State Department on regulations to phase out ozone-destroying chemicals over the objections of cabinet members who argued for distributing hats and sunglasses as a cheaper alternative to preventing skin cancer. In his diary, he referred to the ozone protocol as “an historic agreement.”

Reagan also signed legislation addressing climate change. In 1983, EPA had warned about the risk of a runaway greenhouse effect, though others in the administration considered this alarmist. The Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 contains congressional findings about the possible risks of climate change. The law goes on to state that “necessary actions must be identified and implemented in time to protect the climate.” It calls for international agreement and requires the president to “present a coordinated national policy on global climate change” to Congress. In the House, conservative stalwart James Sensenbrenner said he “support[ed] the development of a coordinated national policy so this country can continue its effective participation with other nations to address this important issue.”

The 1987 Global Warming Act grew out of a summit between Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev earlier that year. The two leaders agreed they would “continue to promote broad international and bilateral cooperation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.” In a letter to the New York Times, the head of a scientific organization called this agreement “the best-kept secret of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit — and potentially the most portentous for global well-being during the 21st century.”

The dominant strain in current conservative thought, and in an increasingly conservative Republican Party, is vehemently anti-environmental, coupled with seemingly unbounded enthusiasm for developing public lands and fossil fuel resources. As in the 1980s, this rightward push has been supported by funding from energy interests and enthusiasm by rural western voters. Yet some of these forces may now be abating, at least a little.

There is no doubt that the interests of the fossil fuel industry still carry important weight in American politics. But part of the fossil fuel coalition has been seriously weakened by economic changes. The coal industry’s economic plight is well known. In 2016, coal production was the lowest since a major strike 35 years ago, and coal use dropped over 25 percent from the previous year. In April 2016, Peabody Coal filed for bankruptcy, joining most of the other major firms. Coal production rebounded slightly in 2017, mostly due to an uptick in exports. Economists expect continued decline in the industry, notwithstanding the efforts of the Trump administration to prop it up. Moreover, the fleet of coal-fired power plants is rapidly aging, with new generation now relying almost wholly on other energy sources such as natural gas, solar, and wind. In 2016, for the first time, more Americans were employed in clean-energy jobs than in oil and natural gas extraction or coal mining.

The oil industry, while far from showing signs of similar decline, has begun to readjust its views of climate change. The major oil companies acknowledge the reality of climate change, and many endorse the need for government action. For instance, when he was CEO of ExxonMobil, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that “for many years ExxonMobil has held the view that the risks of climate change are serious and do warrant action.” The energy giant’s assessment of new projects assumes that eventually it will have to pay a carbon tax or some other cost for a project’s carbon emissions.

Meanwhile, some conservatives are beginning to rethink their reflexive opposition to environmental protection. One hopeful sign can be found in the writing of “reform conservatives,” many of whom are profoundly disenchanted with the Trump administration. Newspaper opinion writers such as Ross Douthat of the New York Times and Michael Gersen and Jennifer Rubin of the Washington Post have rejected denial of climate science as an untenable conservative position. The idea of a carbon tax is also getting a serious hearing among some conservatives, such as the libertarian Niskanen Center. Indeed, Niskanen filed an amicus brief in a federal lawsuit filed by children claiming that unrestricted emissions violate the public’s property rights under the Public Trust Doctrine.

Within the legal academy, there are also some signs of change. Perhaps the most sustained effort to elaborate a new conservative environmentalism has come from a younger libertarian law professor, Jonathan Adler. Adler laments that “the dominant alternative on the political right has been reflexive — almost reactionary — opposition to anything green,” characterized by the view that “whatever the Sierra Club or Al Gore supports must be opposed.”

Indeed, he says, “This reactionary posture has expanded beyond reflexive opposition to environmental policy proposals to encompass a reflexive denial that environmental problems, of whatever sort, actually exist.” Adler endorses the polluter-pays principle, calling for emissions fees, including a carbon tax. Notably, Adler has argued that sea-level rise caused by climate change is a violation of private property rights of coastal landowners. Adler does not stand alone, as a number of younger legal scholars are beginning to rethink conservative viewpoints.

It is too soon to say whether these new voices and the changing configuration of business interests will alter the tenor of conservative environmental views. But at the very least, they do offer grounds for hope.

Today’s anti-environmental stance is not an unalterable component of conservative thought. As we’ve seen, the founding fathers of modern conservatism took a strikingly different stance in the early days of the modern environmental era. Buckley, Reagan, and Goldwater, the iconic figures of modern movement conservatism, apparently saw no contradiction between right-wing philosophies and enthusiastic support for environmental protection. Even after changing times had pushed them in the other direction, they still showed flashes of environmentalism, such as Reagan’s support of the Montreal Protocol.

Much of the pressure against environmentalism came from the fossil fuel industry and from extractive industries in the western states. Those pressures could now be abating, as the coal industry’s long-term influence declines, and the oil industry repositions itself in response to rising pressures to address climate change.

A thaw in conservative views about the environment could enrich a public discourse that has seemingly become trapped in tribalism. Liberals would benefit from more thoughtful responses, while the conservative movement would benefit from more fruitful internal debate. In short, both the right and the left have something to gain if pro-environmental views were once again more prevalent among conservatives. TEF

COVER STORY ❧ The founders of modern conservatism saw a role for the state in ensuring environmental quality by regulating polluters. While that changed in more recent decades, there are signs that a new generation of conservatives favors a governmental role in reducing emissions