California Breaks New Ground With Climate Accountability Laws
Author
Linda K. Breggin - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
1
Linda K. Breggin headshot

A groundbreaking pair of new California laws mandating greenhouse gas emissions reporting and climate risk-related financial disclosures will resound well beyond state borders. The laws fill a gap left by a gridlocked Congress and federal regulatory agencies that are moving only slowly to address climate change.

The laws cast a wide net, regulating both public and private large U.S. companies that “do business” in California. The Climate-Related Financial Risk Act regulates businesses with total annual revenues over $500 million—about 10,000 companies. By 2026, covered businesses are required to submit biennial climate-related financial risk reports that disclose both the risks and measures adopted to reduce and adapt to them.

“Climate-related financial risk” is defined as “material risk of harm to immediate and long-term financial outcomes due to physical and transition risks” and can include, for example, risks to shareholder value and consumer demand. The law recognizes that “thousands of companies already disclose climate-related financial risks,” but concludes that “current disclosure standards are voluntary, and thus inadequate, for meeting rapidly accelerating climate risks.”

The second law, the Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act, applies to businesses with annual revenues over $1 billion—about 5,300 companies. The goals are to “inform investors, empower consumers, and activate companies to improve risk management.”

Businesses are required to report annually to an emis­sions reporting organization (contract­ed by the state) following the Greenhouse Gas Protocol standards and guidance developed by the World Resources Institute and the World Business Council for Sustainable De­velopment. Starting in 2026, businesses must report their Scope 1 emissions (from owned or controlled sources) and Scope 2 emissions (from purchased or acquired energy use) and in 2027 their Scope 3 emis­sions (indirect upstream and down­stream emissions from sources not owned or directly controlled by the business).

In addition, businesses are required to engage an independent third-party assurance provider for their public disclosures. The assurance engagement for Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions must be performed at a “limited assurance level” beginning in 2026 and at a “reasonable assurance level” beginning in 2030. The assurance engagement for Scope 3 emissions must be performed at a “limited assurance level” starting in 2030.

The requirement to report Scope 3 emissions is trailblazing and emphasizes that corporations should account for customer, supplier, and employee emissions. At the same time, the law recognizes the attendant challenges by providing a relaxed timeline for reporting and referencing the need to follow Scope 3 emissions calculations guidance on topics such as the use of primary and secondary data sources.

Johnson Controls’ Katie McGinty recognizes that “it is vital that investors have visibility to the climate risks and opportunities faced by companies they might invest in,” but she emphasizes “it is important that the laws recognize the difference in the rigor of data related to emissions under the control of companies as compared to emissions that are not under the control of companies and to which they may have little or no direct visibility.” She cautions: “Let’s not undermine the need for quality climate data for investors by pretending Scope 3 data is more rigorous than it is or can be.”

Both laws emphasize the importance of ensuring that public disclosures are easily understandable and accessible. For example, the creation of a publicly accessible digital platform is mandated—and must be capable of featuring individual reporting entity disclosures and allowing users to view data elements aggregated in a variety of ways.

Implementation of the laws will be no easy feat. For example, in his signing statements, Governor Gavin Newsom flagged two issues of concern. He emphasized the need to reconsider the implementation deadlines and to closely monitor the potential cost impacts on businesses. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s pending reporting and disclosure regulations as well as the likelihood of legal challenges to the laws could affect implementation efforts.

Nevertheless, other states may follow suit. The laws are likely to have an outsized influence, given the size of state’s economy and number of corporations that conduct business in other states as well as California. As Arizona State University Professor Lily Hsueh explained in The Conversation: “California is in effect exercising its immense market leverage to establish climate disclosures as standard practice in the U.S. and beyond.”

California Breaks New Ground With Climate Accountability Laws.

Bridging Science and Law for Democratic Decisionmaking
Author
Sandra Nichols Thiam - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
6
Sandy Thiam

We enjoy a comfortable standard of living today, thanks to the marvels of technology. Numerous innovations can be traced to basic scientific research. This research eventually contributes to the shapes of our lives after being filtered through legal and policy decisions. And while decisions follow established processes, in many cases they are influenced by factors beyond the matter at hand. At ELI, advancing science-based decisionmaking is part of our core mission.

Science is embedded in the work we do advancing law and policy solutions. Bridging science and law is not only implicit in the content of our work, but explicit through the scientists on our staff, and through our collaborations with leading scientific researchers, agencies, and institutions.

These attributes can be seen in the work that Senior Science and Policy Analyst Rebecca Kihslinger does protecting wetlands and promoting climate resilience. Partnering with scientists in academia, government, and non-profits who have developed methodologies to prioritize sites for restoration, she promotes efforts to ensure nature-based solutions are given equal consideration.

Scientists in state environmental agencies are partners in the water quality work led by ELI’s Adam Schempp, and for over 35 years, our Wetlands Awards Program has highlighted their accomplishments.

The technology and innovation program led by Simone Baldwin facilitates networks of scientists identifying approaches for improving society’s understanding of the effects of the digital economy on energy and the environment. And Jay Austin has long led a partnership with the National Science Foundation, on communicating science to policymakers to advance resilience to sea-level rise.

ELI also focuses on the decisions judges have to make in cases turning on scientific information about climate change. Together with leading scientists and scientific institutions such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science, as well as leading judicial education institutions, and our Science Fellow John Doherty, our Climate Judiciary Project has trained over 1,400 judges across the country on climate science.

Our understanding of science determines the climate solutions we pursue. It’s an ideal time for ELI to be giving its annual award to Dr. J. Marshall Shepherd, a climate scientist who has indelibly marked public policy through his scholarship on issues such as the effects of urban heat islands and increased flooding in disadvantaged communities, and through his advice to governments and engagement with the public. We will only meet the climate challenge if we respond with all of the facts, as revealed by science.

ELI will continue to work to ensure society can meet today’s environmental and climate challenges with science-based solutions.

On Science and Decisionmaking

Just Transitions for Labor and Climate Activists: Views From the State and Local Levels
Author
Todd E. Vachon - Rutgers University
Rutgers University
Current Issue
Issue
6
Clean Air and Good Jobs

Synopsis: As we confront global warming, the discourse often pits workers against climate activists. This makes it challenging to seek environmental justice as well as a stable biosphere. How can we make a just transition from fossil fuels, while also compensating for the human cost when jobs are lost or displaced?

In Clean Air and Good Jobs (Temple University Press), Todd Vachon examines the Labor Climate Movement and demonstrates what can be accomplished when climate justice is on labor’s agenda and unions work together with other social movements to formulate bold solutions to the climate crisis. In this excerpt, the author describes this growing alliance’s activities at the state and local levels building Green New Deals from below.

In mid-September 2021, Illinois passed the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act—a law to move the state to 100 percent clean energy by 2050 while creating thousands of new jobs. The legislation is the product of a multiyear effort by labor, environmental, and Labor Climate Movement activists in the state and months of negotiations between the Clean Energy Jobs Coalition (an alliance of environmentalists, climate activists, faith-based activists, and environmental justice activists), the renewable developers’ Path to 100 Coalition, and the recently formed labor coalition Climate Jobs Illinois. According to Climate Jobs Illinois, the law “sets the strongest clean energy labor standards in the country” and “promises to raise the bar for other states seeking to enact new labor and employment policies for building and maintaining clean energy developments.”

According to an organizer with Unions for Sustainable Energy, “What happened in Illinois is the result of years of deep organizing work, hard conversations, real compromises, and a collective commitment to responsibly addressing climate, jobs, and equity. There’s a lot to learn from the Illinois experience—and a lot on the line to ensure that everyone is held accountable for successful implementation of this ambitious bill.” Pat Devaney, secretary-treasurer of the Illinois AFL-CIO, said, “We have a lot of jobs in the energy sector and particularly in fossil fuel generation, so for us to come forward with a proactive plan [for transitioning] from fossil generation to clean energy, I think, really says a lot about labor’s commitment to combating climate change.”

According to Climate Jobs Illinois, the bill will create thousands of new clean energy union jobs, expand union apprenticeships for Black and Latinx communities, increase energy efficiency for public schools, and safeguard thousands of union workers at the state’s nuclear plants. The Climate Jobs Illinois Executive Committee includes union representatives from virtually all industries, including the Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters, Illinois Education Association, Illinois Federation of Teachers, the Ironworkers, the Insulators, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers State Council, IBEW Local 134, International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150, Laborers International Union of North America Great Lakes Region, LIUNA Midwest Region, Service Employees International Union State Council, and United Auto Workers Region 4. Some LCM activists initially critiqued the weakness of the bill in the area of providing for a just transition for workers and communities. However (at the time of this writing) the Climate Jobs Illinois coalition is working on follow-up legislation that if passed would ensure equity in the transition, including investments in transition assistance programs, workforce development, and more.

In Connecticut, Labor Climate Movement (LCM) activists spearheaded the development and introduction of Connecticut SB 999, “An Act Concerning a Just Transition to Climate-Protective Energy Production and Community Investment.” The act, passed by the state legislature and signed into law by Governor Ned Lamont on June 14, 2021, will ensure that green jobs created in Connecticut pay fair wages and are filled by skilled Connecticut workers. It also ensures that people in the communities where projects are located have access to the training they need to benefit from those jobs. As a local LCM activist from a manufacturing union told me, “The bill will promote the development of a stable, highly trained clean technology workforce so that Connecticut’s workers are not left behind in the transition to a low-carbon economy.”

The act, also called the Climate and Community Investment Act, is a climate jobs bill that includes provisions for prevailing wages, community benefits agreements, and workforce development to ensure a just transition to a clean energy economy by protecting the rights of renewable energy industry workers. Regarding workforce development, the act helps working-class families in Connecticut access clean technology careers by requiring developers to partner with approved in-state apprenticeship and pre-apprenticeship programs. Previously, renewable energy developers regularly hired out-of-state workers. The prevailing wage requirement for utility-scale or grid-connected projects guarantees competitive living wages for all workers employed on projects funded in whole or in part by the state. The community benefits agreement provision provides that host communities of renewable energy projects receive benefits from those projects by requiring developers to negotiate community benefits agreements, codifying what is seen as the industry best practice for community outreach. These initiatives, in conjunction with the greenhouse gas emission targets enshrined in a previous state law, represent the foundational elements of a proactive transition plan in Connecticut.

In Colorado, in early 2018, a state legislator informed the state labor federation that he was planning to submit a bill to take Colorado to 100 percent renewable energy by 2035. This bill was the impetus for the Colorado labor movement to take the lead on energy and environmental policy rather than resisting or trying to block seemingly unavoidable policy proposals such as this—again reflecting the LCM’s message that an energy transition is inevitable and that labor should therefore be at the table or risk instead being on the menu. The decision, which was based on a series of interunion discussions, was also informed by existing relations among unions and environmental justice, faith-based, and national and local environmental groups that started with the People’s Climate Movement in 2016. Throughout 2018, several Colorado unions continued their internal deliberations and ultimately decided to commission an independent researcher to conduct a just transition study for the state. The unions also participated in a series of cross-movement discussions with environmentalists and environmental justice activists that were moderated by a professional facilitator. These discussions succeeded in advancing a mutual understanding of the interconnected problems of climate and inequality.

As a result of the study and these cross-movement discussions, the group crafted a just transition bill to accompany the decarbonization bill that was to be introduced at the 2019 session of the General Assembly. The decarbonization bill aimed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 90 percent of the levels of statewide emissions that existed in 2005 and would thus affect fossil fuel workers. The just transition bill covered workers in the coal industry and coal communities. While the number of workers affected is only around 2,200, coal is significant in the counties and communities affected, mostly on the Western Slope. Both bills were passed and signed into law in 2019.

The just transition bill set up a Colorado Office of Just Transition (OJT), which became operational in early 2020, and a Just Transition Advisory Committee—consisting of unions, corporations, economic development specialists, representatives of affected counties and disproportionately affected communities, political leaders, and government officers—with a mandate to solicit input for a draft plan for workers and communities. The committee started its work in late 2019 and held two large community meetings just before the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a ban on public meetings, but the work was ultimately completed online, and a draft plan was submitted to the OJT in August 2020. However, although a plan is in place, funding remains an issue to be resolved. The major financial obstacle is the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, a 1992 constitutional amendment that limits state spending and requires voter consent for new taxes in Colorado. This financial challenge has made it increasingly clear that federal support is likely necessary. However, a stronger OJT, along with the continued commitment of unions, environmentalists, and community activists, can help ensure that just transition remains on Colorado’s agenda.

In addition to these successes, other attempts at crafting just transition legislation were initiated but ultimately failed. Perhaps the most notable was the collaborative effort of labor, environmentalists, environmental justice advocates, and Indigenous groups to develop the highly aspirational Initiative 1631 in Washington state in 2018.

While the Labor Climate Movement continues to promote a Green New Deal at the state and national levels, LCM activists have also participated from below in a wave of local initiatives through community groups, unions, city and state governments, tribes, and nonfederal institutions designed to contribute to the Green New Deal’s goals for climate protection and social justice. Given the closing political opportunity structure at the national level after the election of Donald Trump in 2016, many LCM activists and organizations shifted their focus to local campaigns and actions. By the time of COVID-19 and then the election of Joe Biden, many of these campaigns had matured and were on the cusp of bearing fruit. While there are more local efforts than could be described in the limited space here, I will share a few to illustrate the types of local work LCM activists have been doing to promote a Green New Deal from below in the Trump and post-Trump era.

In Washington, D.C., unionized railroad workers successfully pressured their employers to redesign their diesel locomotives to be more energy efficient, less polluting, and safer for workers. Recology, a unionized zero-waste recycling co-op in the Bay Area initiated by the Teamsters, provides services to 725,000 residential and 110,000 commercial customers in California, Oregon, and Washington. In Connecticut, Amalgamated Transit Union bus drivers successfully campaigned for conversion to electric buses to reduce GHG emissions while improving driver and passenger health and safety. National Nurses United and the American Federation of Teachers have advanced energy efficiency and clean energy programs in their workplaces—hospitals and schools. SEIU property management Local 32BJ in the New York metropolitan area runs a Green Supers program to provide a professional building service workforce capable of reducing energy use, conserving water, saving money, and providing cleaner and healthier buildings to live in.

Several teacher and faculty unions have been pursuing local Green New Deals at their institutions of employment. For example, after persuading Rutgers University to develop a climate action plan (including plans to electrify the considerable bus fleet and install solar arrays on rooftops and over parking lots), the Climate Justice Committee of the local faculty union at Rutgers set its sights on making the university an anchor institution for a partnership with community groups in Camden, Newark, and New Brunswick, New Jersey, to build community solar cooperatives. The goal is for the projects to be built with union labor and for the majority-minority communities adjacent to the major campuses, which are sites of environmental injustice historically, to own the new solar installations. Another goal is to pressure the university to create local “resilience hubs” for residents to access potable water, electric charging for vital communication and medical devices, and refrigerators for life-saving medical and dietary needs during the ever more frequent climate-related power outages. An additional goal includes the creation of a pre-apprenticeship program and pipeline for workers from the environmental justice community to access good union careers in the renewable energy sector. The union committee continues to organize with neighborhood associations; climate justice organizations, such as the Ironbound Community Corporation; and local community groups, including the local worker center, New Labor, to pursue these goals.

Notably, the unions mentioned thus far are largely situated on the Clean Air and Good Jobs half of the labor–climate spectrum, but some unions in other industries have been pursuing Green New Deals from below as well. For example, the United Mineworkers of America is partnering with energy startup SPARKZ to build an electric battery factory in West Virginia, recruiting and training dislocated miners to be the factory’s first 350 production workers. IBEW Local 11 and the Los Angeles Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association established and maintain a Net Zero Plus Electrical Training Institute, which, when it was built, was the country’s largest Net Zero Plus commercial retrofit, generating more energy than its own annual energy demand. The project unites energy efficiency practices, new clean energy technologies, improved grid resiliency, and career development. The training center showcases cutting-edge energy efficiency measures and provides training on their installation and maintenance, including classes on electrical vehicle charging, high-efficiency HVAC, battery storage, microgrids, energy dashboards, lighting, and exterior shading. The program aims to “transform commercial markets by employing the newest electrical technologies and training the most skilled workforce in the United States.”

The Climate Jobs National Resource Center, which originated in New York state and then spread into Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, and Texas, is organizing to ensure that addressing climate change creates good union jobs by investing in renewable energy. The campaign seeks to expand support from building trades and other unionists for climate protection by advocating for more climate jobs—but also for labor standards, project labor agreements, and community benefit agreements to help make sure that climate jobs are good jobs. LCM activists in New York advocated with dozens of grassroots organizations, including NY Renews, a coalition of over 180 environmental, community, and labor organizations, to pass the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, which established the nation’s strongest GHG emissions limits. The law contains several environmental justice provisions as well, including a mandate that disadvantaged communities must receive no less than 35 percent of the benefits from the state’s climate programs. The Climate Jobs Campaign continues to advocate for strong labor standards and similar project labor agreements in the budding offshore wind industry.

United Steelworkers Local 675 worked with Jobs to Move America, a strategic policy center that aims to transform public spending to advance good jobs and healthier communities, to organize one of several electric bus manufacturing plants in Los Angeles County. Their partnership came out of a decade-long effort of several unions working together to develop sustainable businesses that could support good union jobs. JMA uses public procurement agreements with government entities to leverage incentives for businesses to work with unions and develop apprenticeships and community benefits programs in their contracts. The IBEW and the Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation union have also organized electric vehicle factories with similar strategies. Since the USW members do not have access to many of the opportunities the building trades have in solar, wind, and other construction-based occupations, the Proterra Bus contract provides a manufacturing option to displaced refinery workers and a chance for USW membership to grow. Once USW won the organizing drive, the work of winning the first contract began. JMA helped negotiate the community benefits agreement that commits the employer to hire from marginalized communities.

BOOK EXCERPT In Clean Air and Good Jobs (Temple University Press), the author examines the Labor Climate Movement and demonstrates what can be accomplished when climate justice is on labor’s agenda and unions work together with other social movements to formulate bold solutions to the climate crisis.

The Diplomacy of Climate Geoengineering
Author
Mark J. Spalding - The Ocean Foundation
The Ocean Foundation
Current Issue
Issue
6
Parent Article
Mark Spalding

Proponents say we must pursue climate geoengineering because international cooperation on emissions mitigation has failed. But if we can’t cooperate to reduce emissions, how are we going to cooperate to ensure the safe and sustainable implementation of these untested technologies?

The recent UN global stocktake report says we are indeed failing to reduce emissions. The secretary general says that efforts to address human disruption of the climate have come up “abysmally short” and calls on countries to stop expanding coal, oil, and gas production. Similarly, we are off track on fulfilling the UN Sustainable Development Goals. At the halfway point, only 12 percent of the targets set under each of the 17 goals are likely to be met by 2030. More than double that are moving in the wrong direction.

So, it would seem that international commitments are not being met on common goals for the good of all humanity and the life systems on which we depend. International governance systems are not enough to accelerate positive change without the political will to actually move forward.

Thus, this same international system cannot logically be relied upon to govern climate geoengineering—especially given that the various proposed technologies are minimally tested, very expensive, and their consequences largely not understood. How can we consider deploying various forms of Solar Radiation Modification with any certainty that it will be benignly and carefully managed?

Likewise, if we start from the negative premise that SRM as proposed is not governable in a globally just and equitable manner within the current international system, then we need to consider banning it outright. Can we use the international governance system to put in place a global non-use agreement?

We should be thinking about SRM in the context of current geopolitics and power. For example, we’re unlikely to see improvement in collaborative governance among the nation states with permanent seats on the UN Security Council. Thus, the more likely scenario seems to be unilateral development, testing, and possibly deployment of SRM by those nations with the financial and technological capability, as well as the ability to deploy and project force necessary to protect a continuing operation against opposition from other states.

It is possible that a nation might suggest it will be harmed by such unilateral activity, and Article 51 of the UN Charter could be used to argue in favor of allowing counter weather modification, or even preemptive use of military force. Thus, unilateral use of SRM may be conducted so as to affect only weaker nations who are unable to prevent the deployment (a serious climate justice concern), or in the areas above the (also defenseless) ocean with the potential for disrupting life-giving ecological services.

Given the likelihood of inequity and conflict arising from the consequences of climate geoengineering, we should develop a U.S. code of conduct for research, testing, and deployment as we have for other threats, such as chemical and biological warfare. At the same time, it has to be recognized that the United States will preserve its unilateral right to act to optimize its climate zones without interference. Or perhaps mitigation will emerge as a preferred alternative to the threat of harmful consequences from deliberate weather modification, including SRM.

In other words, fear of SRM might motivate emission mitigation under the international governance system we already have. Yet we have no real basis for asserting that mitigation will be incentivized by the deployment of SRM, even if interpreted hostilely.

As the United States proceeds to do research on the risks and efficacy of SRM, it must do more to highlight that these techniques are a very expensive, uncertain way to address just one symptom of climate change. SRM does not address the causes, is not a permanent fix, and further does not address non-climate effects of carbon dioxide emissions such as ocean acidification. If we emphasize these flaws in deploying SRM, we can hope to motivate continued greenhouse gas mitigation.

Turning the Moral Hazard on Its Head
Author
Gernot Wagner - Columbia Business School
Columbia Business School
Current Issue
Issue
6
Parent Article
Gernot Wagner

Moral hazards are ubiquitous. Green ones typically involve technological fixes, which can absolve actors from systemic solutions. Solar geoengineering is only the latest example. But dismissing it on moral hazard grounds is unproductive. Those opposed to the technology should use geoengineering proposals as an opportunity to expand the attention paid to the underlying environmental problem.

Typical climate discourse is already polarizing enough, but mention technologies that could offset some of the effects of climate change, and watch the world split into two camps. You are either a techno-optimist with faith in unproven innovation, or you believe behavioral change is the key to stopping climate change.

Some of this fear of geoengineering is justified. Talk of solar technologies that would reflect sunlight into space and cool the planet has indeed been used as a distraction by those opposed to climate action. In June 2008, at the height of the failed Obama-era push to pass comprehensive climate legislation, former U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich penned an opinion piece arguing solar geoengineering means that CO₂ emissions cuts are not needed.

If only.

Neither solar geoengineering nor carbon removal—confusingly also often subsumed in the geoengineering category—are replacements for cutting CO₂ emissions. In the case of solar geoengineering this is because it simply is no replacement: at best, it’s a Band-Aid or perhaps a pain killer that quite literally masks the underlying problem of carbon pollution. The trouble with carbon removal, by contrast, is that currently it’s still very expensive. To the surprise of no one, it costs more to suck CO₂ out of thin air via chemical processes than to do so in concentrated form from smokestacks as part of carbon capture and storage technologies—or especially when compared with avoiding emissions in the first place through conservation and efficiency.

Yes, planting trees and other “natural” climate solutions removes CO₂ from thin air. And yes, we should be planting many more trees and avoid cutting those now standing. But no, even planting a trillion trees alone will not be enough. Republican proposals that focus on planting a trillion trees are a distraction from serious climate legislation.

Talk of trees, carbon removal, carbon capture, and solar geoengineering in the same breath shows how a lot of the confusion in the geoengineering debate comes about. Avowed opponents of solar geoengineering do themselves no favor by confusing things even further.

A map put together by Geoengineering Monitor and funded, in part, by the Heinrich Böll foundation affiliated with the German Green Party lists over 1,500 “geoengineering” projects. Among the culprits: the International Energy Agency, just by looking into policy options for carbon capture. Another: New York City’s CoolRoofs Initiative, for painting roofs white to reflect back sunlight and cool the building.

There is, of course, a clear difference between white rooftops dotting Brooklyn brownstones or Mediterranean villages on the one hand, and actual solar geoengineering research on the other. Research into whether deliberately introducing tiny reflective particles into the lower stratosphere could help cool the planet must spark a serious conversation about how far we have come—and how important it is to cut CO₂ and other greenhouse gas emissions instead of relying on an eventual technofix whose side effects we do not completely know.

Many—perhaps most—of those opposed to geoengineering research are afraid of moral hazard. Merely looking into geoengineering technologies, the logic goes, would be a distraction from cutting emissions.

But if serious scientists are looking into these technologies, and often reluctantly so, perhaps climate change is indeed worse than most of the polarized public discourse seems to suggest. That means it’s high time to cut CO₂ emissions in order to avoid the worst, which might indeed create the dire need to deploy solar geoengineering at scale.

Excerpted from the “Risky Climate” column on Bloomberg Green.

Don't Shade the Ocean
Author
Madeline Warner - The Ocean Foundation
Bobbi-Jo Dobush - The Ocean Foundation
Mark J. Spalding - The Ocean Foundation
The Ocean Foundation
The Ocean Foundation
The Ocean Foundation
Current Issue
Issue
6
Don't Shade the Ocean

The novel Ministry of the Future opens with the death of more than twenty million people in India as a result of an intense heat wave. To prevent further loss of life, the national government sprays sulfate particles into the stratosphere to reflect sunlight back into space and lower the subcontinent’s surface temperature. Ministry of the Future is science fiction, but the technology, known as Solar Radiation Modification, is increasingly real. SRM proposes shading the planet to decrease global temperatures, but there are a host of unknowns about the positive, negative, or mixed effects on land and ocean. Meanwhile, the National Academy of Sciences published a report in 2021 stating that SRM is the only way to cool the planet. In 2022, Congress appropriated money for the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to study SRM applications. Two attempts at deploying the technology have been started and stopped by governments in the last few years—one in Sweden and one in Mexico. A robust code of conduct to govern SRM research that considers ocean health and related equity issues cannot come soon enough.

Emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases must be drastically reduced to moderate global temperature increases. To date, the rate of reductions has not been fast enough to prevent such effects as changes in the ocean’s depth, chemistry, and temperature, and in turn, its role in moderating the global climate. For example, the summer 2023 average daily global sea surface temperature reached 69.73 degrees Fahrenheit (over 100 degrees off Florida)—both far above the average. Warmer waters can accelerate the melting of glaciers and thus sea-level rise, while also reducing the ocean’s ability to absorb carbon dioxide. Instead of embracing a critically needed systems change, one that would drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions—with numerous ancillary benefits, such as huge reductions in criteria pollutants and the millions of annual deaths those emissions entail worldwide—many are looking for ways to perpetuate the economic and social status quo. Enter climate geoengineering—an attempt to reverse, stall, or mitigate GHG impacts, primarily excess heating. By redirecting incoming radiation to decrease planetary temperatures, SRM and other techniques attempt to partially mask symptoms of human-caused climate change rather than address its drivers.

Through natural systems, the Earth both reflects and absorbs sunlight to maintain a stable climate. SRM is based on the idea that increasing reflectivity will decrease the amount of sunlight that makes it through the atmosphere to the Earth’s surface, artificially reducing the warming that is underway. However, this proposal has the potential to upset natural processes that depend on direct sunlight—such as photosynthesis by all ocean and terrestrial plants. In addition to spraying reflective particles, there are also SRM strategies to change or increase cloud cover, threatening natural precipitation patterns on which many nations’ food supplies depend. Common sense dictates careful consideration of any potential human activity that affects the life-support roles of the ocean to generate oxygen, absorb carbon dioxide emissions, and moderate the climate.

As in Ministry of the Future, the real world aim of SRM is to increase the amount of sunlight reflected back into space to slow the warming of the planet. The technology’s apologists reason that the limited global action on reducing carbon emissions necessitates speedy approval of SRM research proposals and deployment. However, geoengineering methods can have wildly uneven effects on the ocean and, in turn, on individual countries and regions. They also pose a moral hazard if they reduce the urgency to transition away from fossil fuels and divert effort away from the necessary GHG emission-reduction strategies. This moral hazard problem has particular resonance for the marine ecosystem, which is quietly absorbing excess carbon and altering seawater’s chemical balance in the process, threatening numerous unseen animals and plants at the base of the food chain. Without dramatic GHG reductions, the future of the oceanic environment—and all that means for humanity—is at stake.

Currently proposed SRM projects range from using particulate matter to reflect sunlight to the installation of mirrors in space. Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, the tech used in the novel, is the targeted release of airborne sulfate particles to increase the reflectivity of the Earth, reducing the amount of sunlight that reaches the ground and the heat trapped in the atmosphere. It is, theoretically, similar to a huge, semi-transparent sun umbrella. SAI is not the only type of SRM that would directly reflect sunlight and solar radiation. Another proposes to increase the ability of the surface of the Earth to reflect radiation back into space. Surface-Based Brightening/Albedo Modification aims to decrease the amount of solar radiation that remains in Earth’s atmosphere. Rather than using chemistry or molecular methods, surface-based brightening seeks to increase the reflectivity of the planet’s surface through physical alterations to urban areas, roads, agricultural land, polar regions—and the ocean. This may include covering these areas with reflective materials to redirect sunlight back out to space—in many cases wiping out the local ecology.

Two other methods propose to alter cloud cover. One seeks to thicken lower clouds to prevent radiation from reaching the land and sea, while the other aims to thin high-level clouds to increase the escape of radiation. Marine Cloud Brightening pumps sea spray to seed low-level clouds over the ocean, intending to catalyze a brighter and thicker cloud layer. These low clouds prevent incoming radiation from reaching the land or sea below. The second involves upper-level cirrus clouds, which absorb and reflect heat back to the Earth. Scientists have proposed such Cirrus Cloud Thinning to reduce the thermal energy reflected by these clouds and allow more heat to exit the atmosphere. CCT means spraying these kinds of clouds with particles to reduce their life-span and thickness.

There are methods that are outliers even in the science-fiction-like SRM arena. The Space Mirrors proposal would place highly reflective objects in orbit to redirect incoming sunlight. Moon Dust is a newly proposed method that works in a similar method to SAI. Rather than injecting particles into the atmosphere to reflect sunlight, this concept suggests sending mined particles from the Moon into orbit well above Earth’s atmosphere.

All of these proposals represent the diversion of significant funds away from research and deployment of known strategies to reduce GHGs through renewable energy powering an electric economy.

Apart from the fundamental need to continue reducing carbon emissions, climate geoengineering projects must be tested with an eye to ensuring their safety for all life on Earth. SRM will have effects that extend beyond any nation’s borders. Important to our discussion, any of these methods, if deployed, would also affect the ocean and thus the terrestrial biosphere as a whole. Yet the ocean is absent from most conversations about SRM (and climate geoengineering generally). Many of these proposed projects would, at the very least, dump particles of foreign matter into the marine environment at scale. Further, if functional, all would cause the ocean to receive less sunlight. Less sunlight may reduce photosynthesis, and in turn, affect carbon uptake and storage, oxygen production, and the ocean food web. If some larger nations were to deploy SRM projects to shade their lands, the ocean will continue to get warmer, helping one part of the globe while hurting the other. Consequences may disproportionately fall on small island nations threatened by sea-level rise, now also challenged by shifting nutrient loads, changing precipitation patterns, and exacerbating changes in ocean chemistry.

The ocean is a natural carbon sink, capturing 25 percent of atmospheric carbon dioxide emissions. It is also a heat sink, retaining 90 percent of the Earth’s excess heat. However, fossil fuel emissions and other human activities are disrupting these critical ocean services. SRM strategies conceal the non-heat-related effects of climate emissions and may actually increase GHG totals through their construction and deployment. Because the technology remains speculative and ill-defined, the consequences remain unknown. Thus, it is impossible to fully evaluate the side effects, particularly of the impact of proposed SRM deployments on the oceanic and land-based environments. But the seas’ interconnectedness makes it likely that any SRM impacts on the marine environment would be transboundary and global.

Last June, the White House issued a report to respond to a congressional mandate calling for a research plan for SRM and an initial research governance framework. The report highlights the risks and unknowns about this technology as well as the supposed benefits. It details the major gaps on which to focus research and confirms that a question about SRM is not just one of science efficacy or unintended environmental harm. It is also a question that must encompass societal dimensions, including environmental justice, public perceptions, human health and well-being, food and water systems, ecosystem services, economic infrastructure, and geopolitics. The White House report stresses the need for a comparative analysis to identify the differences between the risks associated with SRM compared with the risks of climate change in the absence of geoengineering.

The report misses a key point on evaluation and the potential for termination shock. In addition, it does not explicitly address the potential that SRM will reduce incentives to cut carbon emissions, which will have a huge negative effect on the marine environment. It does speak to intergenerational equity, which might open the door to examining the risk posed by such a moral hazard. Overall, the White House emphasizes the need for transparency in SRM research for the sake of the public’s trust, whether or not that research transitions into deployment.

Such transparency can be gained through the development of a legal framework to govern the research and deployment of any geoengineering technology. Such a system must take into account the security and well-being of individual nations as well as the global ocean on which all life depends. It thus should include consideration of the risk to the natural environment and the exacerbation of geopolitical tensions and global inequities.

Physical and environmental repercussions exist for each SRM method that has been proposed. Whether it is the introduction of sulfate or calcium carbonate particles into the atmosphere (and thus into the ocean) or shifting cloud (and precipitation) patterns, impacts on land-based and marine ecosystems and food systems are likely. At the same time, such effects cannot be fully anticipated, and experience counsels they are likely to be underestimated. Only the most precautionary legal regime can mitigate harm.

Beyond physical risk, the many unknowns regarding positive or negative impacts of SRM introduce actual and perceived equity risks that may exacerbate geopolitical tensions. There is currently no international governance regime for geoengineering. Indeed, discussions on such an agreement have yet to begin. In this regulatory vacuum, countries and other entities have space for unilateral action that could result in unjust or inequitable outcomes. In fact, SRM actions to date have lacked the foresight for the needed consultation on this global problem. Without this consultation, the potential for spillover effects is high, and much larger with anticipated action on a national level. On a country-by-country scale, the world’s political borders would do little to stop positive or negative overflow effects into neighboring countries or environments. The Earth’s land, sea, and sky are intrinsically connected through many natural systems that supersede human governance.

As work continues on SRM, the countries with the ability to research and develop projects are likely to be those wealthy and powerful nations with the greatest responsibility for historic carbon emissions. Any individual country’s ability to address negative effects from other nations’ SRM projects would depend on its wealth and the extent to which those negative effects harm that country’s human communities and natural resources. There would be no viable means of redress for injured private parties, communities, or governments. Rather, harm from SRM projects may result in diplomatic tensions and, possibly, military conflicts. Even in the absence of real effects, tensions could arise over perceived negative impacts. SRM—or the threat thereof—could thus be weaponized.

If climate geoengineering projects were to go forward, the side effects would be far reaching, affected by the complex interactions of systems—both human and natural. For this reason and others, SRM research must be guided by a code of conduct to ensure equitable solutions to the climate crisis—and be governed by enforceable law that prioritizes environmental justice and conservation of natural resources. Thus, a priority must be placed on protecting the marine systems and restoring abundance to help the ocean heal itself. All potential interventions should be considered in the context of free, prior informed consent by stakeholders at all stages —including extraction, transport, and implementation. Additionally, the ability of projects to measure, monitor, verify, and report their successes or failures, and promise equitable benefit sharing must be taken into account.

Decisionmakers can rely on well-established legal principles to inform governance on climate geoengineering proposals. These include the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle, the do-no-harm expectation, and all three considered through an ecosystem approach.

The precautionary principle requires the party seeking to test the proposed SRM activity to prove it will cause no harm. As the ocean’s currents connect all waters and continents, applying this principle would require research to determine how any physically released particulate matter (as an example) would affect biodiversity, ocean functions such as oxygen production and carbon and heat uptake, and the downstream or upstream impacts of shading one region of the world over another.

The polluter-pays principle requires consideration of the potential harm from and liability for introducing any substances to the ocean as part of a climate geoengineering activity. Similar to when applying the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle must underpin permissions for any projects that release foreign substances into the atmosphere or Earth orbit.

The do-no-harm expectation is customary under international law and, in the context of the ocean, this principle would require projects to ensure the safety of marine life, ocean ecosystems, and human-ocean relationships.

Finally, an ecosystem approach would require any climate geoengineering activity to not endanger marine life or the ecological relationship as a whole among living marine resources, coastal systems, and the ocean’s life-giving global functions.

Governance can also begin with existing international frameworks for promoting human rights, security, and healthy ecosystems. Given the unknowns posed by SRM, international treaties offer opportunities to mitigate the impact of climate geoengineering at a global level even as more specific agreements are negotiated. Multiple international treaties include provisions to protect the ocean and its co-benefits for ecosystems and humans.

The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is the “shared blueprint” that recognizes that ending poverty and other deprivations must go hand-in-hand with strategies that improve health and education, reduce inequality, and spur economic growth—all while tackling climate change and working to preserve our ocean and forests. The guidance offered by the 17 associated Sustainable Development Goals can be broadly applied to SRM. In particular, SDG 14 requires that we “conserve and sustainably use the ocean, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development” by reducing pollution, protecting and strengthening resources, and minimizing ocean acidification. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions certainly supports those strategies. SRM does not.

The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (and its 2022 agreement) establishes a de facto moratorium on ocean climate geoengineering unless various preconditions have been met. The 1991 Espoo Convention established rules for transboundary environmental impacts and may provide an example of one or more methods to govern and enforce transboundary impacts from SRM projects. The Antarctic Treaty System creates an obligation to avoid significant changes to the Earth’s atmospheric, terrestrial, oceanic, or glacial environments.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea mandates protection and preservation of the marine environment. With the release of particulate matter or other SRM methods, that mandate may be applied to international discussions guiding SRM activities. The Commission of Small Islands States on Climate Change and International Law has petitioned the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea on the obligation of UNCLOS parties to protect the ocean from climate change. Decisionmakers will need to consider SRM in this context, within a just transition to economies that no longer rely on fossil fuels.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change began hosting Ocean and Climate Change Dialogues in 2022, providing space for countries around the world to discuss impacts on the ocean and consider the best marine-based solutions to climate change. While it is currently unknown to what extent SRM projects will change the Earth’s environments, it is clear that these protective frameworks should be used to guide research, testing, and deployment.

Beyond environmental considerations, SRM may adversely affect human rights, raising justice and equity concerns for developing nations and minority communities. In March, the UN General Assembly submitted a request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, essentially requesting the court render an opinion on the obligations of states under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasses.

SRM also may present a variety of security concerns. International precedent on the militarization of such technology is currently covered under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. The modification of a neighboring country’s immediate atmosphere, land, or sea may be seen as aggressive. Both the liability for such negative impacts and the process for establishing the degree of harm need to be incorporated into any process for reviewing SRM research and testing.

Within the United States, decisionmakers could look to the precautions under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Wilderness Act, and the Endangered Species Act or the pollution prevention frameworks under Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, as well as Superfund and other toxics laws to anticipate and address some effects of SRM. Policy could further be informed by the White House Environmental Justice Interagency Council, the administration’s Justice40 Initiative, and the EJ Screening Tool & Scorecard.

SRM should be also evaluated through the lens of a growing body of nature- and climate-positive financial and investment decisionmaking tools such as the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure, known as TCFD, and the Task Force on Nature-Related Financial Disclosure, TNFD. Public and private financiers should consider whether and, if so, with what qualifiers, geoengineering projects would comply with their lending policies.

Despite the array of forums where discussions on climate geoengineering and governance may be relevant, none is an exact fit for the questions posed by SRM projects. Efforts are underway to develop more tailored frameworks to address the legal issues raised by climate geoengineering.

In 2021, the Aspen Institute issued “Guidance for Ocean-Based Carbon Dioxide Removal Projects: A Pathway to Developing a Code of Conduct” and expects to release such a code in the coming months. Parallel to the Aspen effort, the Sabin Center at Columbia University School of Law and Climate recently published model federal legislation to govern ocean Carbon Dioxide Removal. While the model does not cover SRM, it is a welcome addition to this field, and an analogous document focused on SRM to consider potential effects on the ocean would be a major step forward. Both the Aspen Institute and the Sabin Center argue for a code of conduct or legislation to govern ocean climate geoengineering, in support of equity in impact, outcome, and benefits, as well as to prevent harm to life on Earth.

The Aspen Institute guidance argues that a code of conduct created to manage geoengineering projects and protect life on Earth must include three main considerations. First, stakeholders must give prior informed consent at all stages of a project. Second, SRM projects must be transparent: sharing monitoring, verification, and reporting on outcomes and effects, with independent observers in place to ensure that these activities meet consistent standards. Third, any project must also have equitable benefit-sharing, including co-benefits, for those affected by the project. The potential widespread impact of SRM projects must allow for the equitable distribution of any positive benefits.

An effective SRM code of conduct must incorporate the voices of all stakeholders. Black, Indigenous, and other people of color, the small island developing states, and other climate-vulnerable communities must be engaged and heard. Ethical concerns may improve the precautionary element. For example, in 2021, an SAI project in Sweden was paused following concerns raised about human intervention in the climate by the Saami Council, a representative body of Indigenous people of arctic Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia. The council’s vice president, Åsa Larsson Blind, stated that solar engineering clashed with the values of the Saami to respect natural processes.

The principles of the UN’s sustainability goals must underpin the design of SRM policy. Within these conversations, the source-to-deployment costs, energy and environmental footprint, and realistic potential of SRM needs to be carefully evaluated with an eye toward preventing harm and ensuring equity while pursuing sustainable economic development.

SRM proposals and processes should be transparent so decisionmakers can be well informed about its risks. The time to acknowledge and fight the potential for SRM greenwashing is now, with all the legal tools that can be deployed. SRM proposals should not be presented to investors as the new shiny Environment-Social-Governance gambit. From a financial perspective, it must be made clear that mechanical and chemical climate geoengineering like SRM does not fit in a sustainable blue economy portfolio for investment, lending, or other finance. Financial disclosure requirements should be designed to require evaluation of the potential downsides of projects posited as climate solutions.

SRM advocates propose such projects as the key to solving the climate change crisis by trying to mitigate its effects rather than addressing its known causes. The very real potential that manipulating Earth’s atmosphere will cause far more harm than good necessitates a strong national and international legal framework at every level. The environmental law community can draw on its unique skills to support the development of a code of conduct, alongside laws, policies, and international agreements, that prioritize precaution, global and intergenerational equity, and protection of the ocean’s life-support systems.

COVER STORY We need sound legal tools to address side effects from climate geoengineering projects that could endanger the marine environment. These unwanted impacts include the ability of the seas to produce food and oxygen and absorb carbon dioxide and excess heat.

D.C. Circuit Reaches Different Results on NEPA and GHG Rules
Author
Ethan Shenkman - Arnold & Porter
Arnold & Porter
Current Issue
Issue
6
Ethan Shenkman

Readers of this column are well familiar with the roller coaster ride that environmental practitioners have been recently experiencing at the intersection of energy, climate, and NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act. Nowhere is this more evident than in a pair of recent D.C. Circuit rulings on the scope of direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions that must be analyzed in the context of energy infrastructure projects.

In Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC, the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation received authorization to build a system of natural gas facilities, including an 800-mile pipeline bisecting Alaska from the North Slope to Cook Inlet and new liquefied natural gas facilities for exports. The D.C. Circuit affirmed FERC’s decision, rejecting challenges to its analysis of the GHG-related impacts of the project.

First, the appeals court ruled that FERC was not required to analyze the indirect, downstream GHG emissions associated with the combustion of natural gas in the countries of destination. It reasoned that the Department of Energy, as opposed to FERC, has exclusive jurisdiction over approvals of natural gas exports, and therefore the commission does not have authority over, and therefore need not address the effects of, the anticipated exports. “FERC properly recognized the limits of its delegated statutory authority,” the court reasoned, “and cabined its NEPA analysis accordingly.” Moreover, it explained, an agency need only consider a project’s “reasonably foreseeable” effects, and here the “indirect emissions are not reasonably foreseeable if the commission cannot identify the end users of the gas.”

Second, for the GHG emissions that FERC did account for, the court held it was sufficient to compare anticipated emissions with state and national GHG emissions inventories, and that the commission was under no obligation to apply the Social Cost of Carbon metric to derive a monetary estimate of potential climate change impacts. The court agreed that applying the SCC would lead to confusion rather than clarity, given “the lack of consensus about how to apply the Social Cost of Carbon on a long time horizon,” and the fact that the metric “places a dollar value on carbon emissions but does not measure environmental impacts as such.”

But the story does not end there. Several months later, in Eagle County v. Surface Transportation Board, a different panel of D.C. Circuit judges set aside a decision by the STB to approve a new 80-mile rail line in Utah to connect the Uinta Basin to a national rail network. The new line’s primary purpose would be to transport waxy crude oil to refineries in Houston, Port Arthur, or to the Louisiana Gulf Coast. The court vacated the STB’s order on the grounds, among others, that the environmental impact statement improperly ignored certain upstream and downstream GHG impacts.

The appeals court acknowledged that impacts from upstream energy production and downstream combustion are not always “a reasonably foreseeable effect of a project.” However, in this context, the court rejected the board’s excuses for declining to analyze upstream and downstream combustion emissions—that additional oil development and the ultimate destination of the oil were unknown. While an agency “need not foresee the unforeseeable,” it reasoned, “by the same token neither can it avoid” its obligations under NEPA “simply because describing the environmental effects of and alternatives to particular agency action involves some degree of forecasting.”

The court also rejected the board’s argument that it had no obligation to consider the downstream impacts of oil refining on Gulf Coast communities based on a lack of authority to regulate such impacts. The court found that the STB “has authority to deny an exemption to a railway project on the ground that the railway’s anticipated environmental and other costs outweigh its expected benefits,” so the board’s lack of jurisdiction over refining activity was irrelevant.

Is this pair of cases reconcilable? The second panel thought so. In an attempt to distinguish the cases, the three judges highlighted the numerous uncertainties in FERC’s decision and found “there are no such uncertainties” in STB’s decision. Whether private practitioners and government lawyers will find the D.C. Circuit’s explanation helpful, as they advise their clients moving forward, is another story.

As for the court’s holding that agencies are under no obligation to apply the SCC metric as part of their NEPA analysis? As this column went to press, President Biden issued an announcement that he will henceforth be “directing agencies to consider the [SCC] in environmental reviews conducted pursuant to [NEPA] as appropriate.” How the government grapples with these distinctions will be closely watched.

How the government grapples with these two decisions will be closely watched.

D.C. Circuit Reaches Different Results on NEPA and GHG Rules

Applying the Social Cost of Carbon Broadly Across Whole Government
Author
Joseph E. Aldy - Harvard Kennedy School
Harvard Kennedy School
Current Issue
Issue
6
Joseph E. Aldy

In 2010, the federal government published estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon for use in regulatory impact analyses. The SCC accounts for the benefits of reducing one ton of carbon dioxide emissions, which could enable more stringent regulations under some authorities, such as for fuel economy and appliance energy efficiency. In September, the White House tasked agencies to apply the SCC to a much broader set of government actions, including budget planning, procurement, and environmental reviews.

Explicitly accounting for the climate impacts of budgets, acquisitions, and permits would inform agency decision-makers and the public of the climate benefits—or harms—associated with envisioned federal actions. Employing a common SCC across the government can illustrate the relative magnitudes of the impacts of actions and decisions and highlight those cases with important trade-offs. As a performance metric, the SCC could spur agency innovation by encouraging staff to explore new ways of delivering services such that they reduce the risks of a changing climate.

In the budget development process, the existence of the SCC means agencies can quantify the emission impacts of their proposed spending and monetize them. In doing so, the metric presents a key performance index as an environmental outcome and in units that enable comparisons with other economic outcomes. Analysis of the emission implications of an agency’s spending could become part of the executive branch’s budget justification. Such analysis could likewise inform both deliberations over and public communications about pending appropriations legislation.

The SCC in agency budget planning would be analogous to how some corporations employ “internal carbon prices” in their development of long-term strategy and assessment of near-term investments. By requiring consideration of climate change damages throughout a company’s decisionmaking, internal carbon prices transform what may have been solely the purview of regulatory compliance into part of running the everyday business.

Just as a major corporation may attempt to green their supply chains and reduce Scope 3 emissions under the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, the federal government can promote the greening of its supply chain through its procurement policies and regulations. The U.S. government is the largest customer in the national economy. This buying power gives the government potential leverage over suppliers. Last year, the government proposed the Federal Supplier Climate Risks and Resilience Rule, which would require major suppliers to disclose their emissions and adopt reduction targets. Going the next step of using the SCC in procurement—or requiring each supplier to use an internal carbon price based on the SCC in the operation of its business—could deliver emission-mitigation incentives to the private sector.

Just as using the SCC in budgeting imposes a discipline to consider quantitatively the climate change impacts of an agency’s programmatic activities, requiring businesses that contract with the government to use an internal carbon price linked to the SCC would also encourage such discipline in their private decisionmaking. As a starting point, the government could require contractors to disclose their internal carbon prices and then mandate an eventual transition toward convergence with the SCC. Such a transition toward harmonization can facilitate lower-cost compliance over the near term and ensure cost-effectiveness through a common price over the long term. In effect, this could enable de facto carbon pricing on corporate emissions among those companies that choose to do business with the government.

Integrating the social cost of carbon in the environmental reviews of federal permitting and other federal projects would make more concrete the potential implications and trade-offs of these government actions. Consider the case of a proposed infrastructure project that would deliver local economic benefits, but increase carbon emissions. Monetizing these emissions with the SCC could show that the climate change damages exceed the project’s benefits. Or consider the case of a wind farm that would reduce emissions but harm migratory waterfowl. Monetizing the climate benefits of the wind farm with the SCC could enable a more careful weighting of the multiple environmental impacts in public discussions of the project.

The federal government undertakes a broad array of actions that have climate change implications. Employing the SCC in analyses of how the government operates programs, acquires goods and services, and reviews the permits and other actions under the National Environmental Policy Act can produce rigorous evidence showing how the government makes sound climate-related decisions on behalf of the American taxpayer.

Applying the Social Cost of Carbon Broadly Across Whole Government.

Election Will Be Critical for Biden’s National Climate Emergency Effort
Author
David P. Clarke - Writer & Editor
Writer & Editor
Current Issue
Issue
6
David P. Clarke

In August, President Biden said that “practically speaking,” he already had declared a national climate emergency, although not formally, as some want. The Inflation Reduction Act’s $369 billion in climate and clean energy funding was a good start, he said. And certainly EPA’s proposed rule for controlling power plant greenhouse gas emissions also counts as a salient administration bid to deal with what Biden calls an “existential threat.”

While the IRA is still in its early stages and faces significant hurdles, such as massive transmission needs, the law could go a long way toward achieving Biden’s goal of net-zero GHG emissions by 2050. In August, the American Clean Power Association—representing 750 large wind, solar, and other clean energy companies—issued a report finding that over the prior 12 months federal support had spurred $271 billion in clean energy and manufacturing investment—exceeding total investment over the previous eight years. But as the presidential election moves forward, an effort called Project 2025 is hoping a GOP president will repeal the IRA and eliminate all GHG-reducing regulations.

EPA’s power plant proposal, expected to be final in June 2024, isn’t even out of the gate and already is facing strong GOP opposition. In an August letter to EPA administrator Michael Regan, 39 senators called for withdrawing the proposal. They invoked the Supreme Court’s West Virginia v. EPA ruling to argue that the agency must have clear authorization from Congress to regulate a “fundamental sector of the economy,” and said EPA had “overstepped its authority.” Likewise, House GOP critics denounced the agency’s proposal as an effort to restructure the U.S. power sector and a threat to the electricity system’s reliability.

Among the more than one million public comments EPA received on its proposal, commissioner James Danly of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission suggested that the rule, together with “numerous other public policies,” would increasingly jeopardize the bulk power system. At FERC’s scheduled annual Reliability Technical Conference this fall, the proposal’s potentially “substantial consequences” for reliability will be considered, Danly wrote, and urged EPA to include the conference proceedings in its record.

Although conceding the necessity for GHG reductions, large business interests nevertheless disagree with EPA’s proposed pathways to that goal. The Edison Electric Institute, representing all U.S. investor-owned electric companies, commented that it supports EPA’s decarbonization goal, but added that the technologies the agency is promoting to clean up new and existing fossil-based power generation, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and hydrogen blending, are still unproven. Six major industrial trade groups echoed EEI’s views, warning that EPA’s rule, in directly and indirectly reshaping the power sector, could impact reliability and damage U.S. manufacturers’ competitiveness.

Tackling claims that CCS is unproven, the Clean Air Task Force and the Natural Resources Defense Council in their comments argue that since 2015 CCS has been increasingly tested and proven and is “ripe” for certain coal-fired plants to adopt for compliance by 2030 with an EPA performance standard and is the best control system for large, existing gas-fired plants. Blending low-GHG hydrogen in new natural gas units is also “adequately demonstrated,” they note, and urge even stricter performance standards for such units. Although CCS remains highly controversial, the groups argue that IRA’s substantial CCS and clean hydrogen tax credits will certainly lower costs.

CATF and NRDC also dispute claims that the agency’s proposal runs counter to the West Virginia ruling. Rather, the ruling endorses the source-specific, technological approaches under the Clean Air Act’s Section 111 that EPA is relying on. The Union of Concerned Scientists comments that EPA in its proposal “diligently attended to constraints” the ruling imposed.

UCS, CATF, and NRDC insist that the agency’s proposal won’t undermine grid reliability, noting, for example, the extensive network of procedures and organizations, including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, grid operators, and others, that ensure reliability. Further, EPA’s rule allows that some gas generators may be needed during peak electricity demand periods.

As emphasized by the New York State Reliability Council, however, many in the electric industry want EPA’s rule to provide greater authority to extend generation facilities’ operation if needed for reliability. With many sectors rapidly electrifying, requirements for reliable electrical systems will increase, with “severe societal consequences” if power failures occur.

Legal and political battles will likely ensue over EPA’s proposal, but, as CATF and NRDC underscore, the worsening climate crisis necessitates the “fastest possible” power plant GHG reductions.

Election Will Be Critical for Biden’s National Climate Emergency Effort.

Migration Is a Problem of the Present
Author
Brian Falk - PLACE Initiative
PLACE Initiative
Current Issue
Issue
5
Parent Article
Brian Falk

Like sea-level rise, most people see climate migration as an immense concern—waves of people flooding communities. But climate migration is also considered a problem of the future. Most of us expect it, but the timeframe leads us to avoid and neglect the issue, leaving it to be addressed by later generations. We have other problems needing more immediate attention.

Climate migration is already happening, though, just not yet in overwhelming numbers in the United States—hurricanes Katrina and Maria and some other events excepted—allowing us to continue blithely along.

We owe a collective debt to the multitude of people and organizations who have successfully convinced the populace that climate migration will one day be a problem. But those messages have focused mostly on the negative aspects of the communities people will leave rather than the effects on communities where they will go. We need to supplement those messages with a focus on the places that will receive climate migrants, on the urgency to begin preparing those places now, and on the benefits of preparation for both communities and migrants.

The urgency comes from the unpredictable timeframe. Mass migration isn’t likely to happen as suddenly as a storm hits, but like the communities the migrants leave, the places they relocate to are likely to be caught off guard. Working proactively is certain to be cheaper, easier, less stressful, and more effective than reacting in the middle of an influx. The urgency also comes from the opportunity to reap the ancillary benefits of thoughtful preparation.

Space here limits a full discussion of the numerous benefits of preparing climate receiver places to house, school, and provide work for thousands of new residents. Chief among the benefits, of course, is mitigating economic, social, and environmental problems that come with an inundation of migrants. Receiver places can also change their communities in ways that reduce some causes of climate change. They can avoid the overconsumption of land, water, and other resources and the scarcity of food, housing, and jobs for arrivals while preserving opportunities and quality of life for existing residents.

Even better, preparing for climate migrants not only gives receiver places hope for a better future, but also yields benefits today. Places that need to grow right now can begin attracting people and creating jobs. They can improve economic opportunity and resilience. They can expand civic engagement. Receiver places can increase tax revenue and reduce expenses now, while increasing the efficiency of infrastructure and reducing liabilities.

In addition to raising awareness, we need policies, strategies, and other tools to help receiver places prepare. To meet the number of places and the scope of the effort, we need to consider scales of all kinds—government initiatives at the federal, state, regional, county, and municipal level, working from the top down and the bottom up, for places large and small. We need to work for the short and the long term. We need a variety of funding sources, from governmental and philanthropic to corporate and private.

Urbanism offers a unique and useful lens through which to approach this issue. It provides an understanding of many of the components and systems that govern and contribute to successful places. These include the physical of course, but also environmental, social, and economic.

PLACE Initiative is a nonprofit organization of volunteers from a wide range of backgrounds and professions, most falling under the banner of urbanists, with expertise in land use codes and policy, urban planning and design, and a deep understanding of how the built environment relates to issues of climate and equity. The organization has begun the Climate Receiver Places Project, producing tools to help identify potential receiver places, to enumerate and explain important principles, and to help receiver places assess current conditions and progress made.