Cut Methane Now or Doom the Planet
Author
Durwood Zaelke - Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development
Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development
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3
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The climate emergency is here, and the only way to stop the downward slide to chaos is to cut methane and other super climate pollutants as fast as possible, while also dramatically reducing carbon dioxide emissions. One message has been made clear by the United Nations Environment Programme and Climate and Clean Air Coalition’s Global Methane Assessment, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment reports: Cut methane now or doom the planet.

According to the recent IPCC reports, every added increment of climate pollution causes further irreversible harm. As just one example, the Arctic is now warming four times faster than the rest of the world. In March, both the Arctic and Antarctic experienced unprecedented heat, with the Arctic 30 degrees Celsius above normal, and the Antarctic 40 degrees above normal.

Tipping points are notoriously hard to quantify, and hence frequently excluded from climate models. But the probability that we’ll pass critical thresholds in a matter of years to decades is increasing every day.

In this do-or-die moment, the biggest immediate opportunity to slow warming is to cut methane and other short-lived climate pollutants, including hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) refrigerants, tropospheric ozone, and black carbon soot. Addressing these emissions is the single most impactful and fastest way to slow warming over the next two decades. It also gives us the best and probably only chance of keeping the 1.5 degrees Celsius goal in sight. This strategy could slash the rate of overall global warming by half, and the rate of heating in the Arctic by two-thirds. The good news is we already know how to do this, and can thus realize the benefits to health, productivity, and food security.

As explained by the Sixth Assessment report from IPCC Working Group III, “Due to the short lifetime of methane in the atmosphere, projected deep reduction of methane emissions . . . effectively reduces peak global warming.” This aligns with calculations from the Global Methane Assessment that indicate reducing methane emissions by 45 percent by 2030 would avoid almost 0.3 degrees Celsius of warming globally and 0.5 degrees Celsius of warming in the vulnerable Arctic by the 2040s. The assessment further finds that this reduction would prevent 255,000 premature human deaths every year, 775,000 asthma-related hospital visits, 73 billion hours of lost labor from extreme heat, and 26 million tonnes of crop losses globally.

While decarbonization is essential, such measures will cause warming over the next decade by reducing the cooling particles that are co-emitted during the burning of coal and diesel—which has the effect of “unmasking” existing warming and cancelling the cooling benefits of carbon reductions until around mid-century. The Sixth Assessment report makes this clear: “The projected reduction of cooling and warming aerosol emissions over time leads to net warming in the near- to mid-term . . . mostly due to reduced fossil fuel combustion that was not equipped with effective air pollution controls.”

Both the United States and the EU are taking steps to slash their methane emissions, including by leading the Global Methane Pledge, which has been signed by 111 countries. The pledge commits to cutting global methane emissions by at least 30 percent below 2020 levels this decade. If achieved—and combined with rapid decarbonization—such reductions would put the world on a pathway consistent with limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius by the end of this century, with limited or no overshoot.

But the voluntary pledge is not sufficient in the face of the fast-unfolding climate emergency. The EU and United States need to work together to develop a global methane agreement that is inspired by the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, and that borrows key aspects of what is widely regarded as the world’s most successful multilateral environmental agreement. The European Parliament has already started calling for such an agreement, which presumably would focus initially on stopping leaks from the fossil fuel sector.

As we tighten the screws on methane leaks, we also need to transition as quickly as possible from fossil fuels to verifiably clean energy—which doesn’t include forest bioenergy. With Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the war crimes we see on television, it’s untenable for Europe to continue buying gas from Russia, paying an estimated $340 million each day, according to the Financial Times. So far, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have committed to ending Russian gas imports, and pressure is building on other European countries to follow suit. For the climate and security, it’s essential to hasten the shift from “petrostates” to “new electrostates,” in the words of The Economist.

As Europe shifts from Russian gas, which has the highest methane leak rate in the world, it’s important that any replacement gas has a low leak rate. An immediate agreement to reduce methane leaks among the countries sending replacement gas to Europe could be the on-ramp for achieving gas with a low leak rate, and could build the foundation for a global methane agreement. This should be a key goal of the Task Force on Energy Security set up under the March 25, 2022, Joint Statement between the United States and the European Commission on European Energy Security.

Durwood Zaelke is founder and president of the Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development, and adjunct professor at University of California, Santa Barbara. The author thanks Romina Picolotti for her significant contribution.

We Can't Afford Not to Cut Methane
Author
Drew Shindell - Climate and Clean Air Coalition
Climate and Clean Air Coalition
Current Issue
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Last year we saw yet another summer in which climate change served up deadly wildfires and heat domes, and yet another autumn of supercharged hurricanes. But at the UN climate conference in Glasgow last November, one promising action reflected the urgent need for progress on climate. Led by the United States and the European Union, countries around the world signed onto a global pledge to reduce methane, the second most important driver of climate change, after carbon dioxide.

The Global Methane Pledge calls on countries to reduce methane emissions by at least 30 percent by 2030 relative to 2020 levels. As of March, 110 countries had signed on. This is a major win for fast action on climate and shows that countries are broadening efforts to fight the climate crisis.

Why target methane? Methane emissions are responsible for almost half of the net warming impact caused by human activities since the beginning of the industrial revolution. To keep warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius, we must get to net-zero emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases—primarily carbon dioxide—along with large reductions in emissions of short-lived climate pollutants, primarily methane. Both achievements need to happen. Unlike carbon dioxide, which stays in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, methane’s lifespan is approximately twelve years, That means that while decarbonization provides long-term, but not near-term, climate relief, actions to reduce methane can rapidly slow warming. Phasing out fossil fuel usage only achieves about 30 percent of the methane reductions needed to limit warming to 1.5 degrees over the next 30 years. The global pledge specifically targets methane across all sectors, making it a critical companion to net-zero goals.

Our recent Global Methane Assessment for the UN Environment Programme and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition found that a 40 percent reduction in methane emissions in 2030 relative to 2020 levels would put us on a path consistent with 1.5 degrees of warming. The pledge brings us at least three-quarters of the way to that goal—if implemented widely. That’s a good start, and as countries get better at reducing methane and technologies improve, we can and should aim for even bigger cuts.

The reductions needed could be achieved almost completely through measures that target methane directly, with technology we already have and at neutral costs. In the United States, these include leak detection and repair for oil and gas systems, increased recovery of gas currently flared or vented from oil and gas operations, oxidation of methane vented from coal mines, and capture and use of methane from landfills and manure. All emitting sectors need to be involved. To cut the rest, the United States should reduce food waste and loss and adopt healthier diets, with reduced consumption of cattle-based foods. These efforts would have the equally important benefit of reducing hunger and improving public health, and are arguably best addressed with programs focused on those areas and knowledge from the behavioral sciences.

Curbing methane emissions is also relatively cheap. About 60 percent of the emissions controls are low-cost (less than $600 per metric ton of methane) or even result in net savings. That’s because captured methane, whether from manure, decomposing food scraps, or at oil wells, has value if brought to market or turned directly into electricity. When gas pipelines and storage tanks leak, they’re essentially leaking money. When needed, governments should support financing for such methane capture projects.

And then there’s the upsides for the environment and for public health. Meeting the pledge’s 30 percent reduction target would shave off approximately 0.2 degrees Celsius warming from 2040 to 2070, avoid roughly 200,000 premature deaths per year from ozone exposure by 2030, prevent the loss of about 21 million tons of wheat, rice, corn, and soy per year from ozone exposure and climate change, and save 60 billion lost work hours annually from heat exposure. Those benefits would increase with further methane reductions after 2030.

When we add up the cost to human health, agriculture, forestry, labor productivity, and additional climate-related damages, each metric ton of methane emitted totals roughly $4,300 in losses and unrealized potential. Put simply: the benefits of reducing methane through targeted measures far outweigh the costs. And prior experiences in reducing air pollutants and ozone-depleting substances show us that actual mitigation costs are frequently far less than initial estimates. We must raise awareness of this financial calculus.

The Global Methane Pledge represents a pivotal moment in our fight against climate change and comes at a time when rapidly improving monitoring capabilities can help optimize targeted reductions. The United States should lead by implementing policies that make the pledge’s goals a reality and rapidly reduce emissions from the fossil sector, landfills, and manure. We must make cutting methane a priority. We can’t afford not to.

Drew Shindell is Special Advisor on Methane Action to the Climate and Clean Air Coalition and Nicholas Professor of Earth Sciences at Duke University.

Cut All Fossil Fuel Production, Not Just Methane
Author
Kassie Siegel - Center for Biological Diversity's Climate Law Institute
Center for Biological Diversity's Climate Law Institute
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If carbon dioxide is the fossil-fueled broiler of our heating planet, methane is a blow torch. Wherever it’s found, methane heats the atmosphere 86 times more than carbon dioxide over a 20-year period. And methane is everywhere, leaking at every stage of the fossil fuel lifecycle—from fracked oil and gas wells to abandoned coal mines to pipelines to your own gas stove.

That matters because fossil fuels are both the largest source of methane emissions in the United States and by far the greatest cause of the climate crisis overall. 85 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas pollution and 75 percent of global greenhouse gas pollution come from oil, gas, and coal.

To preserve a livable planet, methane emissions must be slashed from the energy sector, along with all others, as quickly as possible. But crucially, methane reductions must be achieved in conjunction with—not instead of—a rapid phaseout of all fossil fuel production and use.

Methane reductions alone are simply not enough. Imagine a cauldron on a hot stove, heating up until the boiling water threatens to overflow. Making quick and deep methane cuts is like throwing in chunks of ice to cool the temperature. But the only way to stop the pot from overheating is to shut off the gas—put an immediate cap on fossil fuel production and rapidly phase it out.

Limits on fossil fuel production are the essential missing policy piece, because even as greenhouse gas emissions are rising globally, fossil fuel producers are pushing for more extraction. In fact, there’s already more than enough oil, gas, and coal in development globally to heat the planet far beyond 1.5 degrees Celsius—a critical threshold scientists warn the planet must not surpass.

Scientists project an additional half degree of warming above that guardrail would double the number of people facing water shortages and expose an additional 23 percent of the world’s population to severe heat waves, droughts, and flooding. Ice-free Arctic summers would be ten times more likely, along with greater risk of the collapse of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and resulting multi-meter sea-level rise. Species extinction risk would dramatically increase, and coral reefs would virtually disappear.

As a relatively quick and affordable step to avoid these harms, methane cuts are getting overdue attention. A major 2006 study by EPA shows the benefits of methane reductions that are low-cost and, in some cases, cost-positive—the polluter can make money by stopping the methane leakage.

Methane reductions are relatively inexpensive and offer a wide array of benefits, as Drew Shindell and other scientists have demonstrated. Because higher methane levels lead to more health-harming ground-level ozone, a strong methane-reduction strategy could save hundreds of thousands of lives per year from the ozone reductions alone, in addition to reducing ozone-related crop damage. Methane reductions can also help slow the rapid heating of the Arctic by reducing warming during the spring ice-melt season.

Despite the fact that methane reductions are a relatively cheap and easy way to get phenomenal benefits, industry has fought regulations at every turn. Thus, nearly 16 years after EPA’s landmark report, methane emissions have barely budged. And because emissions of this gas from the fracking-induced oil and gas production boom are not properly accounted for, methane emissions are far worse than those figures show.

Fossil fuel producers have understood climate science for over half a century. But instead of adapting their business, they embarked on an aggressive disinformation campaign—based on the tobacco industry’s playbook—to confuse people and block solutions. And make no mistake: They’re still employing these tactics today, along with more subtle and insidious greenwashing. Our planet burns while fossil fuel corporations reap record profits, and Russia funds its brutal war with oil, coal, and methane gas export revenue.

The fossil fuel industry must be regulated; those profits must be used to properly seal and remediate every well and fix every methane leak. These climate-saving and job-creating actions must be paired with a rapid phaseout of fossil fuel production and a massive, equitable buildout of truly green, renewable energy.

Methane reductions have to be part of a transformative global effort to protect our planet from fossil fuel profiteers. Anything less will put us on a catastrophic path to an unrecognizable world.

Kassie Siegel is the director of the Center for Biological Diversity’s Climate Law Institute.

Clean Up Air Pollution for Our Health
Author
Liz Scott - American Lung Association
American Lung Association
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The health community is starkly aware of the harms of oil and gas production. The extraction, transportation, and storage of oil and gas results in the release of methane emissions into the atmosphere at every step in the process, with serious health consequences.

Methane is a greenhouse gas more than 80 times as powerful as carbon dioxide. Climate change is leading to a range of health threats—including longer allergy seasons, increased risks from vector-borne illnesses like Lyme Disease, extreme heat, and more frequent and intense flooding and wildfires. These health impacts are not far-off occurrences. Health professionals right now are responding to the crises created by climate change. Each time an extreme weather event or a wildfire strikes, healthcare systems are disrupted.

Methane is not the only danger from the burning of oil and gas. Alongside methane, air pollutants called volatile organic compounds, or VOCs, are emitted. These include gases like benzene and formaldehyde, which are known carcinogens. VOCs increase the risk of developmental and neurological disorders. To make matters worse, they also interact with sunlight to form ground-level ozone pollution, which causes asthma attacks, heart attacks, strokes, increases in hospital admissions, and premature death.

There are likely children playing outside whose parents would never expect that their health is at risk simply by breathing. An estimated 17.6 million people live within one mile of an oil or gas well, putting them at immediate risk from the air pollutants released along with methane. The situation is like rubbing salt in a wound, because as methane is fueling climate change, climate change is making air pollution worse.

This is why the health community supports the strengthening and rapid finalization of a recent proposal from the Environmental Protection Agency that would clean up pollution from oil and gas wells. Over 50 national, state, and local health organizations submitted comments to EPA urging the quick adoption of a strong rule limiting methane pollution. The agency should improve its proposal to provide greater immediate health benefits by reducing air pollution in the following ways.

First, EPA must require that all wells are subject to frequent leak detection and repair inspections. Some wells near the end of their lifespans are kept running because it is expensive to decommission them. While some of these so-called “stripper wells” are low emitters, others emit higher levels of methane, and it’s difficult to predict which is which. Therefore, a broadly applicable system of monitoring and repair is necessary.

Second, routine flaring must be prohibited. Flaring is a widely used practice to dispose of methane that is not captured. The process can still result in emissions of methane and VOCs if the gas is not completely combusted. Even when combustion is complete, flaring methane gas still releases carbon dioxide. Flaring also generates nitrogen oxide emissions, which pose an immediate threat to health in communities near the site and can react to form ozone and particulate matter pollution in the atmosphere.

Oil and gas wells are disproportionately placed in low-income communities and communities of color. That means that exposure to the air pollution released alongside methane are compounding other social determinants of health that often negatively impact residents. It’s imperative that frontline communities are included, consulted, and collaborated with when it comes to actions that could alleviate—or worsen—their exposure.

And lastly, EPA has a responsibility to clean up abandoned wells that continue to release methane even when they are not actively used. While this issue of cleaning up orphaned wells is not within the scope of the most recent EPA proposal to reduce methane, it’s a problem in need of greater attention.

In order to best protect public health now and into the future, the country needs to accelerate toward zero-emission transportation and power sectors. And when I say zero-emission, I mean zero-emission. It would be a false solution to focus on reducing greenhouse gases by shifting to sources that still emit air pollution. Energy sources like biomass burning still put the health of nearby communities at risk from harmful air pollution.

The science is clear. We have an extremely short window of time to act if we are to prevent catastrophic climate impacts. Cleaning up methane pollution is a critical part of the solution. The good news is—we have proven technology to cut methane pollution from the oil and gas sector! And better news, we know that when we cut methane, we also reduce additional pollution that causes illness and even death. Federal limits to curb methane emissions from the oil and gas sector could be a huge win for Americans’ health, if we are bold enough to take action.

Liz Scott is the national advocacy director for healthy air at the American Lung Association, where she pushes for science-based clean air and climate protections in federal policy.

Call to Action for Zero Methane Emissions
Author
Cynthia L. Quarterman - Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center
Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center
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For more than a decade, new geologic finds and mining practices have supplied the United States with a bounty of natural gas. The country has become the world’s largest gas producer and a net exporter, with plenty to spare, even in time of war. Thanks to this bounty, natural gas has surpassed coal as the largest feedstock for electricity generation in the United States, helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Nonetheless, the use of natural gas is no panacea. It mitigates one problem, carbon dioxide releases, but exacerbates another—methane emissions. To unleash the full clean energy potential of natural gas, policymakers and industry need to quickly adopt and implement common-sense methane mitigation measures.

While natural gas burns relatively cleanly, it is made up primarily of methane, a potent GHG. When methane is not burned, but released into the atmosphere, its climate effect is significantly more potent than carbon dioxide in the short term. Methane is estimated to have accounted for 30 percent of global warming since pre-industrial times. The largest contributor to anthropogenic methane releases is agriculture, from sources such as livestock, manure, and enteric fermentation. Second are fossil fuel-related methane emissions from the energy sector. Third is the waste industry, from landfills and sewage. Although addressing the larger, longer-term effects of carbon dioxide is a top priority, decreasing shorter-lived methane emissions now will allow more time to address society’s bigger carbon emissions challenge.

There is no doubt that reducing methane emissions is the right thing to do for our future. Fortunately, most stakeholders appear to be on board—which means the time to act is now. Beyond slowing down climate change, the country will reap economic benefits associated with new methane-capturing technology. Still more economic benefits will arise from recovering and selling otherwise wasted methane. Yet, before any great leaps can be made in methane emissions reduction, the federal government should develop a comprehensive national policy and research strategy to single out methane reduction from the long laundry list of climate change initiatives.

The plan must not only identify current methane emissions by sector, but also clearly delineate future target levels for each—and how benchmarks will be reached. Many view the fossil fuel industry as having the greatest potential to mitigate methane emissions at the least cost, in part because any methane recovered can be sold. That may be true, but we cannot rely upon the oil and gas industry alone to reduce emissions.

The residential appliance industry downstream can also work to prevent methane releases. And though agriculture, the largest methane emitter, may seem too multitudinous to tackle, at a minimum, large-scale livestock industry players must seriously engage in reducing methane emissions by using different livestock feed or improving manure and animal-handling practices. Similarly, the waste management industry needs to create and implement systems that reduce methane emissions or convert releases into fuel. The expectations on all industries must be clearly set and defined.

To act on the low-hanging fruit in the fossil fuel industry, we first need a clear understanding of the current state of affairs. EPA and some NGOs have attempted to estimate methane emissions from the sector. The crux of the problem is: How much and from where is methane leaking, and how should these releases be monitored, measured, minimized, and verified? A White House working group on GHG monitoring and measurement announced at the end of January is starting to look at that question.

Fortunately, many technological solutions to minimize and prevent methane leaks in the fossil fuel arena already exist. What’s missing is either a firm industry commitment with government acceptance, or an enforceable policy mandate and accompanying industry agreement to reduce methane emissions to a certain level by a specific date. The proposed EPA rule to reduce methane emissions from oil and gas operations is a step in the right direction. A long-stymied Bureau of Land Management waste prevention rule to minimize methane emissions on federal lands would also help. Similarly, the planned rulemaking by my former agency, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, could help reduce methane emissions from oil and natural gas transportation-related operations.

Every little bit will help, but can we really wait for those iterative, piecemeal regulatory changes to pass through the digestive track of the long, litigation-rich rulemaking process? Is that necessary when some of the biggest stakeholders in the oil and gas industry (including the American Gas Association, American Petroleum Institute, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, and others) and their company’s shareholders vocally support methane reduction? Would a congressional solution or negotiated agreement be feasible? And finally, among the many paths forward, can we as a country rise to the occasion and find a solution before it is too late? As a former chief of two fossil fuel-related regulatory agencies, I believe we can, and we must.

Cynthia Quarterman is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. She is former administrator of the federal Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and former director of the Minerals Management Service at the Interior Department.

Use Incentives to Boost Innovation and Cut Emissions
Author
Mary K. Crowell - Beveridge & Diamond PC
Beveridge & Diamond PC
Current Issue
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The increased focus on methane emissions is likely here to stay. The Biden administration has demonstrated that reducing methane emissions is a high priority, and the EU released its own Methane Strategy in 2020. In addition, more than 100 countries, including the United States, have pledged to reduce methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030.

This flurry of recent activity will only continue, given the scientific consensus on global warming from human activity. It is important that stakeholders—such as producers who emit methane, states and municipalities, and other industry players—understand the risks and opportunities of these policy goals, and seize available incentives to harness the current momentum.

Because of years-long legal challenges to rulemaking under the Clean Air Act to limit greenhouse gas emissions, the regulatory landscape in the near future is somewhat unpredictable. In the challenges’ latest iteration, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Trump administration’s Affordable Clean Energy Rule, which directly implicates EPA’s authority to create rules that regulate greenhouse gas emissions under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. The pendulum continues to swing; this decision could effectively limit EPA’s authority or expand it, providing a degree of regulatory uncertainty for methane emissions regulations under Section 111(d).

Notwithstanding this uncertainty, policymakers and regulators will likely continue to use whatever tools are available to them to address methane emissions. For example, the Biden administration recently released its U.S. Methane Emissions Reduction Action Plan. The sweeping plan introduced a litany of strategies to reduce key sources of methane from various sectors. Targeting methane emissions through voluntary incentive programs is a pillar of the plan’s strategy to decrease emissions. By injecting billions of dollars into the mix, the administration hopes to create new energy sources, markets, and jobs at the same time. This strategy could work: In many cases, cutting emissions will require innovation in emission control and detection technologies, particularly for hard-to-target and hard-to-detect emissions sources. The methane plan reflects the belief that robust government incentive programs can work in tandem with regulation to spur solutions.

In this spirit, programs like the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Climate Smart Commodities show promise for reducing methane emissions through creating new markets and products. Announced in February 2022, the program will allocate $1 billion toward projects proposed by producers that bolster methods of climate-conscious agricultural production. With this funding, USDA aims to develop “climate-smart commodities,” defined as an “agricultural commodity that is produced using farming, ranching, or forestry practices that reduce greenhouse gas emissions or sequester carbon.”

The investment offers strong incentives for the agricultural sector, which is the greatest contributor to U.S. methane emissions and has seen its emission levels increase since 1990. The grants span from one to five years, with totals up to $100 million. This kind of public and private partnership is an example of how voluntary engagement of knowledgeable stakeholders can lead to innovative solutions.

Another important incentive in the toolkit could be bolstering the carbon credit system for producers that capture their methane emissions to create biogas. Many landfill operators already capture biogas, and, according to EPA, an estimated 474 additional landfills are viable candidates to follow suit. States are increasingly focusing on landfill emissions. The methane plan also announced EPA’s intentions to boost its voluntary Landfill Methane Outreach Program, with a goal of recovering 70 percent of landfill methane for biogas creation. Landfill operators could tap into these resources to continue to develop systems to capture biogas to sell in the alternative fuel market, turning this methane into an energy source.

Funding for methane reduction projects similarly abounds under the 2021 bipartisan infrastructure law. The law aims to reduce methane emissions in the oil and gas sector by allocating $4.7 billion to plugging the more than 3 million estimated abandoned wells. 26 states have already provided notices of intent to obtain program grants, and additional funding will also be allocated for federal land and a tribal orphaned well grant program. The infrastructure law also directs $11.3 billion to the Abandoned Mine Land Program through the Department of the Interior. These funds will be accessible to states and tribal nations to address old mining operations that emit methane.

Although incentive-based strategies alone are unlikely to achieve current methane emissions reduction goals, they can work in tandem with other command-and-control regulations, thereby lessening the regulatory burden imposed on stakeholders and offering an important tool to reduce methane emissions. Ideally, policies can spur connections between stakeholders, provide critical project funding, and encourage creative innovations.

Mary K. Crowell is an associate attorney at Beveridge & Diamond PC. Opinions expressed are her own.

Opportunity Knocks to Cut Methane. Can We Rise to the Occasion?
Author
Mary K. Crowell - Beveridge & Diamond PC
Cynthia Quaterman - The Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center
Durwood Zaelke - Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development
Liz Scott - American Lung Association
Kassie Siegel - Center for Biological Diversity's Climate Institute
Drew Shindell - Climate and Clean Air Coalition
Beveridge & Diamond PC
The Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center
Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development
American Lung Association
Center for Biological Diversity's Climate Institute
Climate and Clean Air Coalition
Current Issue
Issue
3
The Debate: The New Toxic Substances Control Act Is Now Five Years Old: A Report

Methane is over 80 times more effective than carbon dioxide at trapping heat in the atmosphere, making reducing emissions crucial to slowing climate change. But satellite technologies pinpoint tens of thousands of methane sources—from oil and gas wells, to natural gas pipelines, to livestock feedlots, to landfills. How can we come up with the best policies to foster innovation and cut methane from such a variety of sources?

At last fall’s UN climate summit, more than 100 countries signed onto a global pledge to reduce worldwide methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030. Back home, EPA unveiled a set of proposed rules in November to reduce methane leaks from pipelines. Meanwhile, the bipartisan infrastructure law allocates billions of dollars toward cleaning up orphan oil and gas wells and modernizing natural gas pipelines.

At the local level, cities from Seattle to New York have recently banned gas use for heating and cooking in new buildings. Others point out that methane emissions from livestock (think: cattle burps) and agriculture have yet to be tackled by the administration.

We ask experts from a range of backgrounds: How can we capitalize on the heightened interest in methane to achieve the most reductions possible? What role should affected sectors play in fast-tracking methane cuts? And among a slew of technological and policy proposals for reducing methane, which are the most promising—and what solutions are missing?

Methane is over 80 times more effective than carbon dioxide at trapping heat in the atmosphere, making reducing emissions crucial to slowing climate change. But satellite technologies pinpoint tens of thousands of methane sources—from oil and gas wells, to natural gas pipelines, to livestock feedlots, to landfills. We ask experts from a range of backgrounds: How can we come up with the best policies to foster innovation and cut methane from such a variety of sources?

Moving in Synch
Author
Sally R. K. Fisk - Pfizer Inc.
Michael Mahoney - Environmental Law Institute
Michael Vandenbergh - Vanderbilt Law School
Pfizer Inc.
Environmental Law Institute
Vanderbilt Law School
Current Issue
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3
Drawing of two people, one with a sash that says business and the other with sash that says government, ice skating in synch with each other.

This issue of The Environmental Forum is published exactly three decades after the Rio Earth Summit, where world leaders signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Since then, a lack of effective governmental policies has contributed to huge increases in global greenhouse gas emissions, which grew by almost 61 percent in the last 30 years, to 36.4 gigatons per year of carbon dioxide equivalents. Today scientists know that to stabilize global temperatures at or below an increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius from pre-industrial levels—the goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement—humanity needs to cut emissions sharply. The first milestone is a cut by 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030, and then society must reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Unfortunately, the trend has been strongly in the opposite direction. This failure means it is time to change the governance climate as well as the physical climate, in the United States and globally.

It is time to look beyond government alone to set realistic policy and form appropriate instruments regulating market behavior. And it’s time for the private sector to move in synch with the government. Climate change is not good for business. It jeopardizes facilities, supply chains, and markets. It also concerns investors, who monitor corporate financial and non-financial performance. At the same time, the transition to clean energy and net-zero carbon emissions presents an unprecedented opportunity for companies and institutions that are quick to seize emerging opportunities in the market. The United States has contributed the most to the buildup of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, but it has much to contribute to the blend of smart, innovative policy and world-class, leapfrogging technology that can achieve not only its own nationally determined contribution, or NDC, under Paris but foster the world community’s ability to realize the agreement’s science-based temperature limits.

While we remain hopeful that comprehensive federal climate legislation will pass, the year 2030 is not far away, and it is time to get creative with solutions. The U.S. State Department has launched two programs that point the way toward government-business partnerships. The Clean Energy Demand Initiative connects countries with companies to signal demand for clean power, enabling the countries to foster the development of credible clean energy procurement options. The department is also responsible, with the World Economic Forum, for the First Movers Coalition, a public-private partnership to jump start the global demand for emerging green technologies. Such opportunities are also present elsewhere in the government.

A further promising avenue may lie in the intersection of private actions being taken by companies to reduce GHG emissions, aligned with the criteria of the Science Based Target initiative, with existing U.S. government programs and initiatives that could incentivize and further legitimize the actions of the business community. SBTi “drives ambitious climate action in the private sector by enabling companies to set science-based emissions reduction targets.” SBTi was established in 2015 by the World Resources Institute, CDP, World Wide Fund for Nature, and the UN Global Compact, and it has developed criteria and guidance for science-based targets with the support of several major companies. SBTi’s efforts have addressed some of the trepidation that stakeholders have had in company GHG reduction targets. Its criteria and its efforts include many of the attributes needed for effective public governance systems that engage the business world.

Our view is that committing to verifiable steps to achieve a 1.5 degree pathway through the SBTi establishes a strong foundation to build on in the near term. Significant reductions in GHG emissions could be achieved if existing company commitments are met—and there is an even more remarkable opportunity if many more companies commit to science-based targets. Through relatively simple but important steps, the U.S. government can bolster company GHG commitments and incentivize thousands of additional firms to commit to deep reductions by leveraging its purchasing power and signalling that early reductions made by companies will count as verified reductions in any new regulatory program. The regulatory recognition will only oc­cur when a company is verified to be on—and so long as it stays on—track to achieve its science-based target.

In getting business and government in synch on a 1.5 degree path, this article looks at potential steps that the administration and corporate enterprises can take to quickly form a public-private partnership as an effective gap-filler while support builds for comprehensive climate legislation. And we need to act together, because time is not on our side.

As an example of the power of a public-private partnership, we can look to the experience of the pandemic. The joint response to Covid and rapid launch of the vaccine succeeded because industry and the government recognized that they quickly needed to change the way they had operated for years to launch new medicines and vaccines and meet patients’ needs. Both sectors left old ways of doing things at the door, took risks, and placed humanity’s interest well above self-interest. The world will suffer if this approach is not replicated to address climate change—it is time to move from conflict to coordination in the business-government operating manual.

While Congress and the Biden administration have taken important steps, carbon tax and other bills that would limit carbon emissions have unfortunately not been adopted. Meanwhile, many major firms have been working to reduce their GHG emissions. Company GHG commitments in aggregate are significant. Yet the U.S. government does not consider the total impact of these corporate goals when setting its own public governance strategy for GHG emissions reductions, relying instead on more traditional levers of government.

Professors Michael Vandenbergh and Jonathan Gilligan of Vanderbilt University, in their June 2015 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law article “Beyond Gridlock,” were among the first to recognize the potential for aggregate company GHG reductions to represent a meaningful percentage of needed global cuts. They coined this potential reduction as the “private governance wedge.” In a July 2020 Environmental Law Reporter article, “Under the Radar: A Coherent System of Climate Governance, Driven by Business,” Louis Leonard explained that over the past several years a science-based approach to reducing GHG emissions has emerged in the United States and other major economies that is resulting in meaningful climate reduction commitments by major companies without regard to government mandates.

Leonard reported that a 2018 global assessment of corporate climate commitments found that 2,175 companies have pledged at least one climate commitment under the reporting platform used by CDP. If they were to successfully achieve their goals, global emissions would be reduced by 3.4 gigatons of carbon dioxide annually by 2030, an amount greater than the annual emissions of any country except the United States and China.

Reductions of this magnitude could help the United States as well as other countries meet their NDCs under the Paris Agreement. However, as discussed below there are reasons why governments have not relied on the carbon reduction commitments made by the private sector.

Despite the potential for very significant global GHG reductions from corporate action, stakeholders, including the government, advocacy groups, and the public, remain skeptical that companies will achieve their commitments. Last year, a New York Times article, “What’s Really Behind Corporate Promises on Climate Change,” raised stakeholder concerns with voluntary GHG reduction commitments because few have identified a plan to achieve the targets—or they allow the potential use of poor-quality carbon credits to achieve the targets. There is also a concern that companies are not including their entire value chain emissions in their targets or being transparent about the magnitude of their emissions.

These concerns are valid and fueled in part because of the emerging examples of greenwashing by companies and because environmental sustainability commitments made by major companies over the past decade have largely fallen short in addressing key stressed planetary boundaries. Recently, the NewClimate Institute issued its “Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor,” which analyzed pledges of 25 large companies and concluded that the commitments only reduce GHG emissions by 40 percent on average, not 100 percent as suggested by their “net-zero” and “carbon neutral” claims. However, these concerns are also driving changes in expectations for GHG reductions and enhancement of the private standards that guide goal setting, monitoring, and transparency in reporting and disclosure that together are helping increase the legitimacy of company commitments.

The phenomenon of setting ambitious targets while building the roadmap to achieve those goals is not dissimilar to the commitments many governments have made under the Paris Agreement, which are bold and ambitious, but potentially lacking the concrete plans to deliver their stated reduction commitments. Thus, the public and private sectors appear to have a shared interest in furthering mutual accountability for their GHG reduction commitments.

An effective complement to public governance could be the answer. In his ELR article “Under the Radar,” Leonard argues that the effectiveness of a private governance system as a complement to a public governance system calls for examination at both the systems and initiative levels. He discerns a systemwide effectiveness framework based upon several “operational functions” that are expected in public environmental law.

These same features would be expected in any system designed to complement the public governance system, and the most significant include motivating participation by the threat of negative sanctions or benefits of positive incentives; setting emission standards that align with societal science-based benchmarks; assessing and disclosing emissions data specific to individual companies to facilitate allocation of responsibility; driving implementation using tools such as subsidies, market-based instruments, and guidance; tracking progress to measure and publicly report progress against goals; and promoting the use of robust mechanisms to hold to account those who do not comply.

In addition to a complementary governance scheme being effective, Leonard and other experts recognize that the system must be a “legitimate” form of governance that includes fair decisionmaking for all participants and stakeholders; transparent decisions and data to attract and retain participants and build public trust and confidence in the system; and equity and justice for participants and stakeholders.

The SBTi process is an opportunity for business to align with government initiatives, becoming an effective addition to the public climate governance system we hope will succeed it and build upon its success. SBTi’s criteria require companies to establish significant near-term targets to achieve the trajectory aligned with science-based 2050 global GHG reduction targets established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. SBTi revises its criteria on a regular basis to assure consistency with the latest climate science.

Importantly, experts from SBTi conduct a detailed review of a company’s GHG reduction commitments against their scientific criteria to validate the legitimacy of corporate reduction commitments. To maintain the SBTi validation companies must show meaningful progress toward the target and publicly report progress annually.

Last October, SBTi, with extensive private- and public-sector stakeholder input, published a sustainability standard that establishes additional criteria that companies will need to meet to reach validated science-based net-zero GHG reductions across the entire supply chain. Importantly, SBTi’s standard addresses the most significant issues in companies’ net-zero GHG commitments identified by the NewClimate Institute in its 2022 report.

As a result, SBTi’s program has evolved to include many of the key attributes and operational functions identified by Leonard that are needed for a private climate change governance approach to be an effective and legitimate measure and complement to government requirements. Importantly, these are the same attributes that most leading companies have stated are needed in climate legislation, including science-based ambition, public reporting, steps to foster implementation and innovation among the regulated community, and accountability for participants.

Our focus is on the opportunity for existing governmental programs and initiatives to supplement the SBTi program, to thus create an approach that can complement a future public climate governance system. Alignment with government programs and initiatives could incentivize more companies to commit to and achieve net-zero carbon reduction targets, and it could enable the federal government to accept firms’ commitments as part of its NDC using existing or modified GHG accounting systems to break out company emissions that occur in the United States.

To become an effective and legitimate gap-filler and ultimately complement comprehensive federal climate legislation, several additional programmatic elements are needed to enhance the existing SBTi program. These include strong market-based incentives, meaningful consequences for non-compliance, disclosure of how companies estimate GHG emissions, and transparency in SBTi’s internal decisionmaking for determining the adequacy of company targets.

With more incentives to significantly reduce GHG emissions—such as preferential procurement—more companies might commit to net-zero GHG reduction targets. And with more meaningful consequences for lack of transparency or greenwashing, the federal government might be better positioned to focus enforcement resources on those companies that fail to comply with future regulatory requirements, and to accept companies’ commitments as part of its NDC.

A public-private partnership that synchronizes SBTi’s program with existing federal government initiatives would be an effective mechanism to accelerate GHG reductions, provide a fill-in for federal climate legislation, and ultimately complement comprehensive federal climate legislation when it is passed.

Initiatives that the federal government has established, including the sustainability purchasing initiatives announced by the Biden administration, hold tremendous potential to supplement the SBTi governance framework in a short timeframe, transforming it into a public-private climate change partnership that possesses the key attributes of a comprehensive public governance approach.

In “The Next Phase of Business Sustainability,” an article published in the Spring 2018 Stanford Social Innovation Review, Andrew Hoffman described the power of the market in addressing global environmental challenges. Hoffman stated:

“The market is the most powerful institution on Earth, and business is the most powerful entity within it. Business transcends national boundaries, and it possesses resources that exceed those of many nation-states. Business is responsible for producing the buildings we live and work in, the food we eat, the clothes we wear, the automobiles we drive. . . . This does not mean that only business can generate solutions, but with its unmatched powers of ideation, production, and distribution, business is best positioned to bring the change we need at the scale we need it.”

Last December, President Biden signed the Executive Order on Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and Jobs Through Federal Sustainability. The EO establishes requirements for federal agencies to purchase sustainable products identified or recommended by EPA. Through the agency’s existing Environmentally Preferable Purchasing program, EPA can recommend purchasing products from a company that has established private environmental standards and eco-labels that meet EPA’s Framework for the Assessment of Environmental Performance Standards and Ecolabels for Federal Purchasing. The agency’s recommendation of purchasing preference to companies committed to the SBTi’s Net-Zero voluntary consensus standard, or a VCS under the parlance of the EPA’s Framework, would provide a strong market incentive to help companies with their ambitious carbon reduction targets. Eligible company’s products could carry a certified eco-label like that for USDA’s organic stamp.

Other large consumers, including public entities such as EU member states, the UK’s National Health Service, the UN, and municipalities, and private entities such as health insurance companies, Walmart, Unilever, and Amazon, are seeking to become more sustainable through purchasing preference protocols for net-zero carbon products and services. Billions of individual consumers are also seeking to become more sustainable through their purchasing decisions.

If the U.S. government and other large consumers gave purchasing preference to products and services from companies committed to net-zero targets, then more companies that compete for these consumers would recognize that to compete, they too will need to commit to the Net-Zero VCS. As a result, this would provide both a market incentive to commit to net-zero and, importantly, would level the playing field between companies expending money to achieve net-zero carbon emissions and companies that do not act. The terms establishing a government purchasing preference also could promote the development of standard terms for private supply chain contracts even for supply chains with no government involvement.

Companies that participate in the SBTi program provide data on emissions voluntarily, and no mechanism exists to guarantee that a company is including all emissions. While SBTi has stated its commitment to continuing to improve the veracity of corporate commitments, this concern can also be addressed by involving the expertise and perhaps some level of oversight by EPA. This may also be reinforced by the climate disclosure regulations that the SEC is developing.

EPA has the expertise to confirm that SBTi’s guidance for companies’ accounting of emissions is technically sound and, as a participant in a public-private partnership, can provide an important role in conducting random assessments of participating companies’ GHG emissions. Finally, the CDP’s existing database could be used as the accounting system for the partnership and modified, if needed, to break out firms’ U.S. emissions.

In a purely private governance system, the consequences for a company that fails to achieve its emission targets are limited. Certainly, a company missing its targets is open to criticism by its stakeholders, reduced environment-social-governance rating scores, loss of supply chain customers, potential claims under SEC rule 10b-5, and breach of contract actions, and perhaps will suffer some reputational damage, but evidence that companies suffer significant consequences for not achieving voluntary goals is scarce.

On the other hand, the consequences for non-compliance with environmental legal requirements include potentially significant civil and criminal penalties—if EPA is able to adopt the requirements, defend them in the courts, and aggressively enforce them, all of which are difficult in the current polarized political system. However, if the approach is incentivized by a commitment from the U.S. government to provide a purchasing preference to net-zero carbon emission products, then loss of the certification because of non-compliance with a target could result in meaningful marketing consequences.

Companies can impose legally binding requirements on suppliers to reduce GHG emissions aligned with SBTi through specific provisions in supplier contracts. In the UK, the Chancery Lane Project has developed model supply chain contract provisions for climate issues in many types of contracts. In the United States, the Environmental Law Institute is working with individuals from the private sector, advocacy groups, and universities to develop model supplier contract language for GHG reductions, and these provisions could easily dovetail with the requirements of a comprehensive public-private partnership on climate change.

As another incentive for companies to commit to following SBTi’s Net-Zero VCS, EPA could provide relief to a company from future GHG mandatory requirements that exceed those achieved through its prior commitments, provided the company remains in substantial compliance with the VCS. In other words, a company that volunteered to pursue an SBTi-approved carbon reduction pathway would need to remain on that pathway, but it would be credited for having done so and, to the extent possible, would not be required to exceed that pathway through new regulations. Although the authority for crediting individual companies for early actions in this way would need to be established, this approach is not regulatory relief but rather recognition for early compliance, since EPA is unlikely to require more than a 1.5 degree emissions pathway, which is what SBTi requires. In addition, the agency has accounted for these types of collaborative actions in the past. Substantial non-compliance could then result in loss of this relief.

Companies generally prefer to achieve performance-based targets through approaches that suit their operations, rather than command-and-control requirements that can be difficult to achieve cost-effectively. Obtaining credit for early commitments and certainty that a 1.5 pathway can be maintained should act as additional inducements for companies to commit to net-zero carbon reductions.

What would a public-private partnership to address climate change look like? It would have several components. Companies that have Net-Zero VCS reduction targets validated by SBTi or commit to secure validation by SBTi would be eligible to opt into the partnership.

For its part, EPA would establish its own certification or review and accept an independent private certification for companies that have achieved science-based targets or are committed to achieve targets. The certifications could be available in three tiers, the highest tier—for companies that have achieved net-zero targets—a middle tier for companies that have committed to net-zero targets, and a tier for companies that have committed to near-term science-based targets. For example, an eligible company’s products could carry a certification seal along the lines of “Product from a Net-Zero Carbon Committed Company.”

Companies that opt into the program would allow auditors to review, under an EPA-approved process with EPA-approved auditors, its emission calculations, accounting, basis for targets, and progress in achieving targets. If an auditor determines that a company’s approach is not technically sound, the company would be given an opportunity to remediate. Then, in accordance with the 2021 EO on purchasing preference, the chair of the Council on Environmental Quality would establish instructions to provide preferential purchasing to products and services from companies that are SBTi validated. Through a memorandum of understanding, EPA can commit to account for the emissions reductions of companies that have joined the partnership in future mandatory regulatory requirements for GHG reductions if it has the statutory authority to do so. Substantial non-compliance that is not remediated in a timeframe prescribed by the agency would result in loss of the relief—the company would be given a short but practical timeframe to achieve compliance with mandatory requirements.

With the company commitments established, as well as the consequences of significant failures to achieve targets, the government can then develop an accounting frame­work to take credit for these private-sector reductions as part of its NDC under the Paris Agreement.

Since most of the attributes of an effective public-private climate partnership already exist, the partnership could be launched in a few months, which is critically important, since 2030 is not far away. For this approach to succeed, both the private and public sectors need to take some risk and work together.

To address uncertainties and questions that will face the public and private sectors, the partnership can be piloted for a pre-determined time period.This would allow adoption and implementation concerns to be worked through while still allowing progress in recruitment of companies and proof of concept of the incentive offered by the government procurement program. It is time to change the climate. TEF

COVER STORY Filling the gap created by the absence of federal legislation, businesses with growing climate change commitments can join with U.S. government initiatives to form powerful public-private partnerships that will accelerate carbon reductions.

Legal Issues Dominate Intersection of Climate and Energy Transition
Author
Ethan Shenkman - Arnold & Porter
Arnold & Porter
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Ethan Shenkman

“I’m all for providing further clarity, not only for industry but all stakeholders in our proceedings,” said Richard Glick, chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, soon after FERC announced that it was backtracking on its new climate policy under the National Environmental Policy Act. The new measure addresses large natural gas projects and provides a framework for assessing how pipelines and other facilities contribute to climate change. Following a grilling of the commissioners by members of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, FERC decided to take a step back and solicit further public input before issuing a revised policy.

This was only the latest bump in the road as the Biden administration attempts to move forward with new climate and energy policies and regulations. Environmental practitioners advising their clients in this space are confronting a volatile policy landscape, where Congress, litigants, and the courts are pushing federal agencies in different, sometimes contradictory, directions. Not only do practitioners require special expertise in the emerging legal issues underlying the energy transition, they are finding that they need to follow developments on a continuous basis and must be prepared to advise clients on how to proceed in an uncertain regulatory environment.

FERC’s recent interim policy statement, for example, which had been approved by its three Democratic nominees and voted against by its two Republican nominees, detailed how the commission would consider the greenhouse gas emissions of facilities that transport natural gas in interstate commerce, or import or export natural gas internationally. Among other things, it stated that an Environmental Impact Statement will be required any time a proposed project exceeds emissions of 100,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent annually, considering both the construction and operation of the project and, in appropriate circumstances, the downstream combustion of transported gas. Using project data from the last four years, approximately 72 percent of projects would have required an EIS had the policy been in effect during that time frame.

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, echoing criticisms of others, including Senate Energy Chair Joe Manchin, asserted that FERC’s climate policy would complicate approvals with “new ill-defined ‘environmental justice’ factors” and considerations of climate impacts. “At a time when we should be looking for ways to expedite the approval of these important projects,” he said, “erecting new roadblocks to affordable, abundant energy makes no sense, particularly in this tenuous time.”

Meanwhile, the courts are keeping up the pressure on the commission. Earlier this month, the D.C. Circuit ordered FERC to complete a supplemental environmental review for a natural gas upgrade project in Massachusetts, in response to a challenge filed by two environmental groups. The court agreed that the commission’s environmental assessment failed to account for the reasonably foreseeable indirect effects of the project—specifically, GHGs attributable to burning the gas to be carried in the pipeline. The court rejected FERC’s finding that the project would have no significant environmental impact, reasoning that “the end use of the transported gas is reasonably foreseeable, and the commission, in response, invokes nothing more than a mere possibility of offsetting reductions.” Quoting an earlier decision, the court held “the commission is wrong to suggest that downstream emissions are not reasonably foreseeable simply because the gas transported by the project may displace existing natural gas supplies or higher-emitting fuels.”

The roller coaster for lawyers in the energy and climate space did not stop there. Earlier this year, a federal district court judge in Louisiana issued an injunction against the federal government’s reliance in rulemaking proceedings on the social cost of carbon, an economic metric which places a monetary value on the societal benefits of reducing GHG emissions and avoiding climate impacts. The nationwide directive caused federal rulemaking to go topsy turvy. According to the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, at least 38 regulations would need to be postponed or rewritten if the temporary ban stayed in place. The Department of Justice, however, filed a successful emergency appeal with the Fifth Circuit, which issued a stay of the injunction and allowed the government, for now, to continue to rely on the metric in its rulemakings.

The Fifth Circuit’s intervention had real impacts. Notably, the Department of the Interior had planned to hold an onshore oil and gas lease sale in March, but hit the pause button after the judge ruled that it couldn’t use the social cost of carbon in its environmental review. Now that the appeals court has blocked that decision, stakeholders are awaiting Interior’s next move, with environmental and energy lawyers watching closely.

Legal Issues Dominate Intersection of Climate and Energy Transition

The SEC Steps Toward the Full Monty on Corporate Climate Risk Disclosures
Author
David P. Clarke - Writer
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David P. Clarke

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s recent vote to propose a rule mandating that companies disclose their greenhouse gas emissions and climate change risks, if finalized, will be a big win for advocates. The Biden administration, Democratic lawmakers, environmentalists, and investors managing trillions of dollars have called for businesses to report their emissions and disclose how worsening climate change could threaten the companies’ financial health. Threats include not only direct physical damage to properties from extreme storms or rising sea levels, but also, among others, “transition risks” that could reduce the value of companies’ assets as the world moves toward increasingly common “net zero” carbon goals.

But Republicans on the Senate Banking Committee, some industry groups, and others see an effort to remake “society” or “our economy as a whole” through SEC’s disclosure standard. Clearly, the stakes are high for both sides.

With its March 21 vote approving release of a 510-page proposal that for the first time would mandate that SEC-regulated companies “provide certain climate-related information in their registration statements and annual reports,” the SEC responded to a steadily building demand for corporations to come clean on their GHG connections. At the meeting, Commissioner Allison Herren Lee noted that after she published a climate disclosure statement in 2021 while serving as acting SEC chair, the “overwhelming majority” of comments in response agreed that the commission should adopt mandatory climate disclosure requirements.

But what exactly that will mean awaits a final rule that SEC says could go into effect in December. During the 60-day public comment period, two interlinked issues will certainly be at the heart of intense discussions, as they already have been. The first issue, “materiality,” refers to whether a reasonable investor’s decisions would be affected by information disclosed, in this case about a company’s climate-related risks. The second, “Scope 3 emissions,” refers to the GHGs along a company’s value chain, such as emissions from suppliers or from a product’s use. Supply chain emissions typically account for a company’s largest carbon connection. Scope 1, a company’s direct facility emissions, and Scope 2, GHGs from purchased energy, are less controversial because they are more easily calculated.

Regarding materiality, the one commissioner who voted against the proposal, Republican Hester Peirce, protested that it would mandate climate disclosures “without regard for materiality.” Current SEC disclosure rules are “rooted in the materiality principle,” she said, and argued that the proposal would “undermine” and turn the existing framework “on its head.” GOP lawmakers have also argued that mandating disclosures of “non-material climate-related information” would undermine the concept and its central role. However, SEC Chair Gary Gensler, in voting for the proposal, stated that his decisions about climate and other disclosures are “guided by the concept of materiality.”

On the Scope 3 issue, it is worth noting SEC staff struggled with those provisions, delaying release of the draft beyond an October 2021 target date. According to Reuters, industry critics argued with SEC staff that Scope 3 GHGs should be excluded because they are beyond a company’s control and there is no consensus method for calculating those emissions.

But in discussing Scope 3 GHGs and materiality, the draft notes that disclosing those emissions might be necessary to give investors a complete picture of a company’s climate risks. The draft concedes that collecting Scope 3 data and calculating emissions “would potentially be more difficult” than for Scope 1 and 2. Yet, those emissions could be an especially significant source of “transition risks” that “may materially impact” a company’s business operations and “associated financial performance,” the proposal says.

Given the importance of Scope 3 emissions coupled with the potential data and measurement challenges, the SEC in its extensive discussion of the issue is proposing that Scope 3 disclosures only be required “if those emissions are material,” or if a business claims its GHG-reduction goal includes Scope 3 emissions, among other concessions to allay concerns. Despite obstacles, SEC included Scope 3 as a “relatively new type of metric” because “capital markets have begun to assign financial value” to the information, making it potentially “material” for investors, the draft states.

The SEC’s proposal comes after the commission published 2010 guidance that another financial regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, found did not result in high-quality disclosure of climate change risks. It also follows the UN’s latest “dire warning” about climate inaction. The time for companies to fully disclose their GHG links may have arrived at last, and with it mounting pressure to act.

The SEC Steps Toward the Full Monty on Corporate Climate Risk Disclosures